Theaetetus

“Yes, you’re suffering the pains of labour, Theaetetus.” 

Socrates says this after Theaetetus’s first attempt to define knowledge, in terms of types of knowledge, fails. Socrates now wishes to prevent him from becoming despondent over this and suggests Theaetetus still has productive ideas in him. Socrates alludes here to his role as an intellectual midwife, drawing an analogy between the pains of labor during birth and those involved in creating a new idea.

“There have been many people before now who have been so disposed towards me as to be literally ready to bite me, when I was taking some piece of silliness away from them.” 

Socrates refers to the hostility some people bare against him. This is because he uses reason to dispel false and ill-conceived opinions and beliefs, which often coincides with challenging the status quo and the Athenian elites. It is this hostility that ultimately gets Socrates killed, as the jurors in his trial find him guilty and order his execution.

“Because he says, you remember, that a man is the measure of all things.” 

Socrates introduces Protagoras’s theory of knowledge, which he takes to be equivalent to the claim that to know is to perceive. He also interprets the statement as an endorsement of relativism, which holds that there is no objective truth, but that truth is relative to the perception of the individual.

“Something I imagine you’ve often heard people asking: what evidence would one be able to point to, if someone asked at this very moment whether we’re asleep and dreaming everything that we have in mind, or awake and having a waking discussion with each other?” 

Socrates presents a critical objection to the perceptual theory of knowledge. Namely, if knowledge is perception, how can we distinguish between real and unreal states? As seen in the case of dreams, the senses themselves cannot provide a means of distinguishing between them.

“I know no more than he does, apart from a tiny bit, enough to be able to get an argument from someone else.” 

This is an instance of Socratic irony and modesty. Socrates claims that he possesses no special knowledge and that his interlocutors know as much as him—except for a very small amount additional knowledge necessary to provoke thought in others.

“[H]e didn’t begin his ‘Truth’ by saying that the measure of all things is a pig, or a baboon, or some other creature that has perception.”

This is another of Socrates’s core objections to the perceptual theory of knowledge. Referring to Truth, one of Protagoras’s major works, Socrates suggests that his theory implies that the perceptions of all sentient beings are equally revealing of knowledge. Consequently, claims Socrates, there is no way of saying that any person or animal is wiser than another.

“If any sort of thing seems just and admirable to any state, then it actually is just and admirable for it, as long as that state accepts it.” 

Socrates explores another consequence of Protagoras’s theory, specifically cultural relativism. In this view there is no objective standard of justice. Rather, justice is relative to the assessments and opinions of different cultures and states, and these assessments and opinions are liable to change.

“Whereas if he did think so himself, but the masses don’t share his view, then, in the first place, it’s more the case that it isn’t the truth than that it is.” 

Socrates examines some of the problems with a relativistic theory of truth. First, it seems to suggest that what is true is simply what the greatest number of people, the masses, think is true. Second, this invites the paradox that if the majority do not believe truth is relative, then according to a relativistic theory of truth, truth must not be relative.

“[N]ot every creature knows what’s healthy for itself and is capable of curing itself.” 

Socrates criticizes Protagoras’s hypothetical response to the “wisdom” objection, which holds that we can still distinguish between people who are wise and unwise on his theory of knowledge, provided we associate greater wisdom with that which promotes greater health, not better access to the truth. However, this creates the problem of by what means we then determine what is healthy and unhealthy.

“If you compare people who have been knocking about in law-courts and such places since they were young with people who have been brought up in philosophy and other such pursuits, it’s as if you were comparing the upbringing of slaves with that of free men.” 

Socrates compares lawyers to philosophers. He claims that while the latter are free, the former are trained to be slaves. This is because their thoughts and arguments always serve a master, that is, an instrumental purpose.

“And their contests are never for some indifferent prize, but always for the one that concerns themselves; often they’re running a race for life itself.” 

Lawyers always act out of self-interest when debating, not in the interests of the truth. They are also always competing against each other. In fact, Socrates suggests that they treat their whole lives as a competition.

“[T]hey think they have become clever and wise.”

Socrates continues his criticism of lawyers. Their training and skill in rhetoric and argumentation makes them think they are highly intelligent, but the instrumentalization of their reason leaves them intellectually and spiritually stunted.

“What’s useful is surely something to do with the future.”

Socrates examines the idea that what is true for a state is that which promotes what is useful or beneficial. However, the usefulness or benefits of a policy can only be assessed by future outcomes. A better or worse understanding of these outcomes, though, seems to depend upon greater knowledge of objective truths.

“I respect those who say that the universe is one and at rest.” 

This is a theory attributed to Parmenides. It is the opposite of Heraclitus’s flux theory, which says that everything is always in a process of constant change. Conversely, Parmenides’s theory states that there is a fundamental unity and constancy to the universe.

“Theaetetus, you’re handsome, not ugly, as Theodorus was saying; because someone who speaks handsomely is handsome.” 

Socrates alludes to Theodorus’s earlier remark that Theaetetus is not blessed with looks. In other words, Theaetetus’s visage does not matter because he has a keen intellect. For Plato, what constitutes beauty is not physical appearance but nobility of mind.

“But as for calculations about those things, with respect to being and usefulness, they’re acquired, by those who do acquire them, with difficulty and over a long time, by means of a great deal of troublesome education.” 

Socrates creates a distinction between brute perception and reflection and calculation with regard to the objects of perception. He claims that the former is possessed by all humans equally. However, the latter is a skill that requires lengthy cultivation.

“[W]hatever one calls what the mind is doing when it’s busying itself, by itself, about the things which are.” 

Socrates is referring to the faculty of reason. He has just refuted the possibility that knowledge lies in perception. Instead, therefore, it must reside in reason, as only reason can access the being or essence of phenomena.

“If we go on like this, one of two things will happen: either we’ll find what we’re after, or we’ll be less inclined to think we know what we don’t in fact know at all; and such a reward wouldn’t be anything to complain about.” 

Socrates provides Theaetetus with motivation to continue the discussion about knowledge after the perceptual theory of knowledge has been refuted. This is because the conversation will bring something positive no matter what happens. Either they will successfully define knowledge, or they will realize they know less than they thought about the topic.

“Now it follows immediately that if someone makes a judgment, he has in his judgment either one of the things he knows or one of the things he doesn’t know.” 

Socrates introduces the problem of false judgments. If knowledge is true judgment, there must exist the possibility of false judgment. However, this creates a problem in which we can make a judgment about something even though we have no knowledge of it.

“Or do you think there are people who are so clever as teachers that, in the short time allowed by the clock, they can teach the truth, to people who weren’t there.” 

On one level Socrates is criticizing the theory that true judgment is knowledge. He argues that it is possible to have true judgment without actual knowledge, as when jurors deliver a correct verdict on a case. Socrates also uses this argument to further criticize the sophistry of lawyers.

“So according to what you’re saying now, Theaetetus, a complex would be some absolutely single kind of thing, not divisible into parts.”

Socrates and Theaetetus assess the theory that knowledge is true judgment with an account. When Socrates tries to define an account according to complexes that can be explained in terms of fundamental elements, he encounters a problem: there is something irreducible and indivisible about every complex.

“What most people would say: being able to state some mark by which the thing one is asked for differs from everything else.” 

This is Socrates’s last attempt to give an intelligible explanation of an account. He appeals to the idea of a distinguishing mark, but this leads to an infinite regress, since the distinguishing mark must be defined by accounts of things which it is not, and hence by further distinguishing marks and further things.

“And if you stay barren, you’ll be less burdensome to those who associate with you, and gentler, because you’ll have the sense not to think you know things which in fact you don’t know.” 

The discussion ends with all the proposed definitions of knowledge proving inadequate. Socrates consoles Theaetetus by saying that if he conceives of another idea about knowledge, then they will be in a stronger position because of the false ideas that have been dismissed. However, if he has no further ideas, then at least Theaetetus will be better company because he will be less conceited, having realized he knows less than he thought.