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PlatoTheaetetus
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Chapters 29-35Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Chapter 29 Summary: “Aviary Model Criticised”
On closer inspection the aviary model does not solve the initial paradox of false judgment, which is the problem of how one can not know what one knows or be wrong about what one knows. To successfully “get hold of” a piece of knowledge in our minds, we must identify the correct piece of knowledge. Put another way, if we get hold of the wrong thing, or misidentify it, when asked a certain question about it, then we cannot say that we really know that thing. For example, if you “got hold of” the philosopher Heraclitus to identify the author of a quote that was in fact said by Thales, then you do not truly know Heraclitus. As a result, due to this impasse with false judgments, Socrates changes tack. He opts to reverse the order of enquiry and look at false judgment again only after he has first defined “what, exactly, knowledge is” (93).
Chapter 30 Summary: “True Judgment Is Knowledge”
In response to Socrates’s question regarding a definition of knowledge, Theaetetus reiterates his earlier suggestion that knowledge is true judgment. Socrates undermines this idea, though, using the example of speech-makers and lawyers in a court of law. Such men, he says, persuade jurors to make judgments about things of which the latter have no knowledge. For example, they persuade others that a particular person committed a robbery on a given day. Further, these judgments prove true at least some of the time. Since it is possible to make a true judgment about an event without actual knowledge of it, knowledge cannot be identical with true judgment.
Chapter 31 Summary: “Socrates’ Dream”
Theaetetus offers the further hypothesis: “that true judgment with an account is knowledge” (95). To explain more precisely what this means, Socrates recalls a dream in which he heard people talking about the primary elements. According to this “dream,” the primary elements that comprise all things do not give an account. They can only be named and perceived. However, it is possible to give an account of complexes of primary elements by referring to their constituent elements. For example, clay is earth mixed with water. When combined with true judgment, such accounts equate to knowledge.
Chapter 32 Summary: “Socrates Dream Criticised”
Socrates examines the idea that an account can be given for complexes in more detail. This is necessary because such a claim underpins the definition of knowledge as true judgment with an account. He finds problems with this picture. Looking at words as complexes composed of letters, he concludes that “a complex would be some absolutely single kind of thing, not divisible into parts” (101). In other words, the meaning of a word is not reducible to the letters that constitute it. Since this is the case, it appears it is no more possible to give a sufficient account of a complex than an element. The view underpinning the thesis that knowledge is true judgment with an account does not stand up.
Chapter 33 Summary: “Three Kinds of Account”
Socrates and Theaetetus scrutinize the meaning of “giving an account.” Socrates again criticizes the idea that giving an account of something is equivalent to being able to list its constituent elements; for example, someone could know all the letters in a word yet still lack genuine knowledge of the word’s meaning. Consequently, another definition of giving an account must be offered to support the thesis that knowledge is true judgment with an account.
Chapter 34 Summary: “Account as Distinguishing Mark”
Socrates explores a final possible explanation of “giving an account” to salvage the last definition of knowledge. This final meaning involves “being able to state some mark by which the thing one is asked for differs from everything else” (106). For example, the sun differs from other heavenly bodies by being the brightest among them. However, this new definition is flawed because, argues Socrates, on this view we would only be able to give an account of any one thing if we already had knowledge of the things from which it differs. Any such knowledge of those things would itself require knowledge of differences from further things. As such, a definition of account in terms of differences ends up creating an infinite regress.
Chapter 35 Summary: “Third Definition Refuted”
As there is no adequate definition of giving an account, it is concluded that knowledge cannot consist of true judgment with an account. This last hypothesis failed, just as the ideas that knowledge was perception and knowledge was true judgment did. Socrates finishes his discussion with Theaetetus by alluding again to his role as a midwife, saying that all the definitions discussed were “false pregnancies” (109). Socrates then departs to attend his trial, facing charges of impiety and corrupting the youth brought against him by a man called Meletus.
Chapters 29-35 Analysis
The reader may feel a sense of futility, or even despair, at the end of Theaetetus. Having followed Socrates through more than 100 pages of often dense philosophical argumentation, we are told that it has all been for naught. All that has been revealed, regarding knowledge, is our ignorance. This sense of dejection is only compounded by the very last lines: Socrates departs by saying, “let’s meet here again, Theodorus, in the morning” (110). The knowledge that Socrates will not return from his trial adds poignancy to these words. The proposed second meeting will never take place. Likewise, the possibility of a new and potentially successful account of knowledge will not be realized.
Yet things are not quite as bad as they seem. Socrates begins the final seven chapters still struggling with the problem of false judgments. A solution here is needed to save the theory that knowledge is true judgment. Unfortunately, all the proposed theories fall short. The view of the mind as a wax tablet is insufficient because it only makes sense of false judgments as they pertain to memories of perception; it cannot explain false judgments as they relate to the internal reasoning of the mind. Similarly, the idea of the mind as an aviary, while initially promising, still does not make clear how we can misidentify the “birds,” pieces of knowledge, in our mind. That is, it does not explain how this misidentification is possible if we really know them. The same goes for Theaetetus’s proposed addition to this model. He suggests that “we ought to have also imagined pieces of unknowing flying about in the mind” (92) with pieces of “knowing.” Then false judgment would involve taking hold of this piece of “unknowing.” This simply raises the same problem of how one can know a piece of unknowing without being able to properly identify it as such.
Finally, Socrates considers the possibility that knowledge is judgment with an account. Their discussion flounders on the question of what, precisely, constitutes an account of something. The idea that an account can be given with reference to the elements of which a thing is composed does not work. Equally, the criterion of a distinguishing mark fails as well. This is because, for us to identify something, we would need first “correct judgment as to how that same thing differs from everything else” (108). This would require knowing everything else before we were able to know the thing in question, which would be absurd.
As such, the idea that knowledge is true judgment with an account is rejected. None of the proposed theories hold up. Yet the sense of pessimism that might accompany such a realization, and the apparent failure of the dialogue, is tempered by a couple considerations. The first is that any inference to ignorance might only be provisional. In this weaker interpretation of the text, Socrates and Theaetetus have failed. Nevertheless, a definition of knowledge remains possible. Perhaps a focus on practical expertise will yield a viable way of understanding how to give an account. Alternatively, a reimagined version of the perceptual theory of knowledge could work. In light of Socrates’s criticisms, this might suggest that knowledge is the capacity to see better or more deeply. Further, the text at least lays the grounds for these possibilities. That is, even if Socrates does not return to do it himself, his discussion at least clarifies the issues and problems that will allow future discussion to continue.
On the other hand, ignorance here may be salutary. In a more forceful reading of the text, Socrates shows not only that specific definitions of knowledge have failed, but also that any attempted definition of knowledge must necessarily do so. Since knowledge is the thing by which everything is known, it must defy definition. Knowledge of knowledge is impossible. Similarly, it is impossible to grasp the being of being, since it is the most universal category. This realization is by no means futile. As Socrates says to Theaetetus at the end, now “you’ll have the sense not to think you know things which in fact you don’t” (109-10). Although it is in our nature to question the nature of knowledge, we have at least discovered its indefinability. In this way, we have at least discovered some positive knowledge about the limits of reason, and therefore also something about its power.
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