47 pages • 1 hour read
John J. MearsheimerThe Tragedy Of Great Power Politics
Nonfiction | Reference/Text Book | Adult | Published in 2001A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Chapters 9-10Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Chapter 9 Summary: “The Causes of Great Power War”
Chapter 9 examines the complex dynamics that shift security competition in the international system into outright war. Mearsheimer presents a structural theory to explain the transition from competition to conflict among great powers, defined as conflicts involving at least one great power. The chapter argues that while international anarchy is a deep cause of war, it alone cannot explain the sporadic nature of war, as anarchy is a constant in the international system.
To understand this variability, Mearsheimer examines another structural variable: the distribution of power among leading states. He identifies three primary arrangements: bipolarity, balanced multipolarity, and unbalanced multipolarity. The central thesis is that bipolar systems are typically the most peaceful, while unbalanced multipolar systems are the most prone to deadly conflict, with balanced multipolar systems falling in between.
Mearsheimer acknowledges the limitations of structural theories like offensive realism in predicting the exact occurrences of war. He notes, “Structural theories such as offensive realism are at best crude predictors of when security competition leads to war” (335). This statement encapsulates the inherent unpredictability of war within different system structures. The chapter also recognizes the role of nonstructural factors in war decisions, acknowledging that states do not fight solely for security reasons. For instance, Otto von Bismarck’s decisions for war were driven partly by realist calculations and partly by nationalism and domestic political considerations.
The chapter further explores the stability of bipolar versus multipolar systems. In bipolar systems, the opportunities for war are fewer, power tends to be more equally distributed, and the potential for miscalculation is lower. Conversely, multipolar systems present more conflict opportunities, are prone to power imbalances, and foster greater potential for miscalculation. As Mearsheimer explains, “War is more likely when a state underestimates the willingness of an opposing state to stand firm on issues of difference” (343).
Additionally, the chapter distinguishes between balanced and unbalanced multipolarity. Unbalanced multipolar systems, characterized by the presence of a potential hegemon, are especially war-prone. The potential hegemons, due to their significant power advantage, not only have the capability to cause trouble but also generate high levels of fear among other great powers. This dynamic often leads to a spiral of fear and insecurity, increasing the likelihood of war.
To substantiate his theory, Mearsheimer examines the history of great-power war in Europe from 1792 to 1990. He categorizes European history into seven periods based on the distribution of power and identifies the great-power wars for each period. The analysis reveals that bipolarity is indeed the most peaceful system, balanced multipolarity is moderately prone to war, and unbalanced multipolarity is the most perilous.
While the chapter confirms the offensive realism theory regarding the causes of great-power war, it also highlights the complexity of predicting war. The presence of nuclear weapons, especially during the Cold War, adds another layer of complexity to the analysis. Mearsheimer concludes by acknowledging the difficulty in separating the effects of system structure and nuclear weapons on peace and war, especially in the post-Cold War era. The chapter sets the stage for further exploration of great-power relations and the potential for conflict in the future.
Chapter 10 Summary: “Great Power Politics in the Twenty-first Century”
Mearsheimer explores the dynamics of great power politics in the 21st century, particularly focusing on the interaction among major world powers post-Cold War. Mearsheimer challenges the optimistic view that international politics has transformed fundamentally with the end of the Cold War, asserting that realism still offers the most powerful explanations for international relations.
Mearsheimer criticizes the belief that the end of the Cold War has brought about a new era where cooperation replaces security competition and conflict among great powers. He contends that major states still care deeply about the balance of power and are destined to compete for power. The notion that the new world order has rendered theories like offensive realism obsolete is, in his view, misguided. “The real world remains a realist world” (361), he argues, where states still fear each other and seek to gain power at each other’s expense.
Despite the collapse of the Soviet Union, which caused a major shift in the global distribution of power, Mearsheimer asserts that there has not been a fundamental change in the anarchic structure of the international system. The survival of states as the principal actors in world politics and the lack of a global authority to govern their actions mean that the dynamics of power competition remain unchanged. He supports his argument with evidence from the 1990s, pointing out that power politics did not disappear from Europe and Northeast Asia, regions with multiple great powers.
One of the most pivotal quotes from the chapter is:
In short, the real world remains a realist world. States still fear each other and seek to gain power at each other’s expense, because international anarchy—the driving force behind great-power behavior—did not change with the end of the Cold War, and there are few signs that such change is likely any time soon (361).
Mearsheimer explores various theories and arguments positing a change in the nature of international politics, such as the growing influence of international institutions, economic globalization, and democratic peace theory. He critiques these arguments, highlighting their weaknesses and reaffirming the relevance of realism in understanding international politics.
He also examines the military and economic capabilities of major powers like the United States, China, Russia, Japan, and Germany, projecting their potential influence in the global arena. Mearsheimer predicts that the future of international politics will likely see increased competition among these powers, with the potential emergence of China as a particularly significant player. He argues that the United States has a vested interest in preventing any single power from achieving regional hegemony, particularly in key areas like Europe and Northeast Asia.
Mearsheimer’s analysis in this chapter underscores the enduring relevance of power politics in the international system. He argues that despite changes in the global landscape, the fundamental principles of realism continue to provide the most compelling framework for understanding the behavior of great powers.
Chapters 9-10 Analysis
Chapters 9 and 10 represent a culmination of Mearsheimer’s exploration of international relations through the lens of offensive realism. These chapters investigate the intricacies of great power conflicts and the dynamics of global politics in the 21st century, weaving together theoretical frameworks with historical and contemporary examples.
In Chapter 9, Mearsheimer tackles the complex question of what transforms security competition into outright war among great powers. He challenges the notion that international anarchy alone can explain the sporadic nature of war, instead focusing on the distribution of power among leading states as a crucial determinant. Mearsheimer’s structural theory distinguishes between bipolarity, balanced multipolarity, and unbalanced multipolarity, positing that unbalanced multipolar systems are most prone to conflict. This nuanced approach to understanding war is reflected in his candid admission: “Structural theories such as offensive realism are at best crude predictors of when security competition leads to war” (335). This humility adds a layer of complexity to his argument, acknowledging the unpredictable nature of war despite the framework provided by offensive realism.
His examination of European history from 1792 to 1990 serves as a powerful empirical foundation for his theory. The distinction between balanced and unbalanced multipolarity is particularly significant, as it highlights the intricate dynamics that lead to war in an anarchic international system.
In the final chapter, Mearsheimer addresses the post-Cold War era, challenging the optimistic view that the end of the Cold War has fundamentally transformed international politics. He asserts, “The real world remains a realist world” (361), emphasizing that states continue to engage in power politics. This statement captures the essence of Mearsheimer’s argument, underscoring the enduring relevance of realism in the 21st century.
Mearsheimer’s analysis of major powers like the United States, China, and Russia illustrates ongoing power dynamics. He critiques alternative theories such as democratic peace and economic globalization, reinforcing the primacy of power politics in shaping international relations. This critical examination of contemporary theories and practices demonstrates Mearsheimer’s commitment to a realistic understanding of international politics, even in the face of changing global landscapes. As he states in Chapter 10, “States still fear each other and seek to gain power at each other’s expense” (361), encapsulating the core premise of Offensive Realism and the Imperative for Power.
These chapters collectively offer a comprehensive synthesis of Mearsheimer’s themes and insights. The analysis underscores the persistence of power politics and the relevance of offensive realism in understanding the behavior of great powers. Mearsheimer’s work challenges conventional wisdom, encouraging readers to view international relations through a lens that prioritizes power and security over idealistic notions of cooperation and peace.
