47 pages • 1 hour read
John J. MearsheimerThe Tragedy Of Great Power Politics
Nonfiction | Reference/Text Book | Adult | Published in 2001A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Chapters 5-6Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Chapter 5 Summary: “Strategies for Survival”
Chapter 5 highlights the methods great powers employ to maximize their share of world power. Mearsheimer posits that states are primarily driven by the pursuit of hegemony within their region, due to the inherent challenges in projecting power across oceans. This pursuit of regional dominance is underpinned by the desire for economic superiority, as wealth is a crucial foundation for military power. Furthermore, great powers strive to have dominant land forces and seek nuclear superiority, though the latter is particularly challenging to achieve.
The chapter then explores various strategies states use to either gain power or prevent others from gaining power. War, despite its controversial and destructive nature, is a primary method for acquiring power. Mearsheimer challenges the notion that conquest is futile, arguing that history provides instances where expansion through war has been beneficial.
Great powers, according to Mearsheimer, not only aim for regional hegemony but are also intensely focused on economic dominance. The quest for wealth is not solely for economic prosperity but is intrinsically linked to military strength. In this pursuit, states are vigilant about the economic rise of potential rivals, as economic power can be swiftly converted into military might. This perspective can be observed in historical apprehensions towards rapidly-modernizing states. For example, the rise of Germany in the late 19th and early 20th centuries caused alarm among European powers, not just because of its military capabilities, but due to its burgeoning economy. Similarly, contemporary concerns about China reflect this linkage of economic growth to potential military expansion. This underscores the realist view that power is not merely military but also economic, with great powers constantly assessing the relative economic standings of potential rivals.
Another strategy is blackmail, which relies on the threat of force rather than actual conflict. This approach, however, is often ineffective among great powers due to their relative strengths. Mearsheimer also examines more subtle tactics like “bait and bleed” and “bloodletting,” where states encourage prolonged conflicts between rivals, thereby weakening them without direct involvement.
The principal strategies to counter aggressors, according to Mearsheimer, are balancing and buck-passing. Balancing involves directly preventing an aggressor from upsetting the balance of power, which often leads to the formation of alliances. Buck-passing, in contrast, is where a state attempts to have another power counter the aggressor, thereby avoiding direct conflict and its associated costs.
Mearsheimer’s analysis of balancing and buck-passing highlights the complex strategic calculations states undertake. In balancing, states not only form alliances but also engage in internal mobilization to bolster their defense capabilities. This process can be intricate and fraught with challenges, particularly in alliance dynamics where differing national interests and strategic visions can create friction. On the other hand, buck-passing, while potentially less costly, involves significant risks. The reliance on another state to check an aggressor can backfire if the buck-catcher fails or if the aggressor turns its sights on the buck-passer after defeating the initial target. Historical instances, such as the dynamics of European politics in the lead-up to both World Wars, provide vivid illustrations of these strategies in action. The complex interplay of balancing and buck-passing strategies in these periods shaped the course of events, demonstrating the high-stakes nature of these strategic choices in international politics.
Mearsheimer critically assesses strategies like appeasement and bandwagoning, which involve conceding power to a rival. He argues that these approaches are counterproductive in the realist framework, as they often lead to an increase in the aggressor’s power, ultimately destabilizing the balance of power further. In special circumstances, however, conceding power can be strategically viable. For example, a state may do so to buy time for mobilization or when facing multiple threats, prioritizing which to confront directly.
The chapter concludes by discussing the realist argument that states imitate successful strategies of others, whether defensive or offensive, while also valuing innovation to gain the upper hand. This competitive imitation and innovation are key drivers in the constant struggle for power among states.
Throughout the chapter, Mearsheimer emphasizes the central realist premise that states are primarily motivated by power and survival, leading them to pursue a range of strategies in the anarchic international system. The pursuit of power, be it through direct conflict, strategic alliances, or innovative tactics, is fundamental to understanding the behavior of states in the global arena.
Chapter 6 Summary: “Great Powers in Action”
Mearsheimer offers a comprehensive analysis of the foreign policies of major states, particularly focusing on the aggressive nature of great powers in their quest for hegemony and power maximization. This analysis serves as a critical test of Mearsheimer’s offensive realism theory, which posits that great powers are inherently inclined toward aggression to maximize their share of world power. The chapter uses historical behavior of powers like Japan, Germany, the Soviet Union, Great Britain/United Kingdom, and the United States as evidence to validate this theory.
The chapter begins by examining Adolf Hitler’s strategic and diplomatic skills, emphasizing his ability to avoid a two-front war and secure early victories in World War II. Hitler’s success in preventing a united front against Germany allowed him to defeat his adversaries sequentially. However, his critical miscalculation in invading the Soviet Union in 1941 led to a costly war of attrition, ultimately resulting in Germany’s defeat. This case illustrates that while Hitler’s actions were strategically calculated, they were ultimately flawed rather than irrational.
Mearsheimer then explores Germany’s attempts at hegemony during both World Wars, highlighting the widespread belief, particularly among younger generations in Germany, that these attempts were misguided. The chapter also looks at Japan’s expansion leading up to World War II, including its conflicts with the Soviet Union and China, culminating in its decision to engage in war with the significantly more powerful United States. This decision, the author argues, was a desperate choice in the face of economic strangulation by the US.
The chapter transitions to a detailed examination of the nuclear arms race during the Cold War, underscoring the relentless pursuit of nuclear superiority by both the United States and the Soviet Union. This pursuit directly challenges the defensive realist view advocating for mutual assured destruction (MAD). The nuclear policies of both superpowers are scrutinized, revealing their continued efforts to gain a strategic edge through technological advancements and counterforce capabilities. The author argues that the uncertain nature of technological advancement in military technology justified the pursuit of nuclear advantage, challenging the notion that seeking nuclear superiority was irrational.
Mearsheimer also addresses cases where great powers refrained from expansion, attributing these instances to successful deterrence or external constraints rather than a lack of expansionist intent. He maintains consistent standards in evaluating these constraints and opportunities for expansion, asserting that the patterns of behavior align with the predictions of offensive realism.
Through detailed case studies of Japan, Germany, and the Soviet Union, the chapter showcases their relentless drive for power and regional hegemony, guided by strategic calculations. These examples attempt to refute the defensive realist perspective, which suggests that aggressive policies are often self-defeating and fueled by domestic politics. Instead, historical evidence supports the offensive realist view, where security considerations predominantly drive the aggressive policies of great powers.
Chapter 6 presents an involved argument in favor of offensive realism, using historical case studies to illustrate the inherently aggressive nature of great powers in their pursuit of power and hegemony. The chapter’s analysis has significant implications for international relations theory, especially in the debate between offensive and defensive realism. It concludes by reaffirming the central thesis of offensive realism: Great powers consistently strive for more power and influence, primarily driven by the pursuit of power rather than irrationality or domestic pathologies. American and British foreign policies, which might appear as exceptions to this theory, are discussed in the next section.
Chapters 5-6 Analysis
In Chapters 5 and 6, Mearsheimer elaborates on the strategic behaviors of great powers in the international system, aligning with the themes of The Nature of the International System and State Behavior and Offensive Realism and the Imperative for Power. These chapters dissect the myriad strategies that states employ for survival and dominance, reinforcing the core tenets of offensive realism.
Chapter 5 explores the methods great powers use to maximize their share of world power. Mearsheimer encapsulates the core goals of great powers:
Great powers concentrate on achieving four basic objectives. First, they seek regional hegemony [...]. Second, great powers aim to maximize the amount of the world’s wealth that they control [...]. Third, great powers aim to dominate the balance of land power [...]. Fourth, great powers seek nuclear superiority (140).
This quote underscores the multifaceted pursuit of power, extending beyond mere military might to economic and nuclear domains. Mearsheimer discusses various strategies, like war, economic dominance, blackmail, and more subtle tactics like “bait and bleed” and “bloodletting.” His analysis of balancing and buck-passing strategies unveils the intricate and often high-risk maneuvers states undertake in their quest for power.
In Chapter 6, Mearsheimer examines historical behaviors of major states, including Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, and the United States, to validate his theory of offensive realism. He critiques the defensive realist perspective, showcasing through historical examples the inherently aggressive nature of great powers. The quote, “Either we’ll do it or they will crush us” (195), attributed to Joseph Stalin, epitomizes the existential threat perception and the urgency that underpins state policies in high-stakes scenarios.
Mearsheimer’s narrative structure in these chapters is characterized by a weaving together of historical examples with theoretical insights. He maintains that despite its controversial nature, war remains a critical tool for states to increase their power. The use of historical case studies, such as the strategic behaviors of Germany and Japan during World War II, provides concrete evidence to support his offensive realist theory.
These chapters contribute to the overarching theme of offensive realism. Mearsheimer’s analysis reveals the complex and often aggressive nature of state behavior in the international arena. He challenges the notion that war and expansion are always counterproductive, arguing instead for a more pragmatic understanding of power dynamics in international relations. He discusses the nuclear arms race during the Cold War, scrutinizing the relentless pursuit of nuclear superiority by the superpowers.
Mearsheimer reinforces the idea that the behavior of great powers is driven primarily by the pursuit of power and survival in an anarchic world. The chapters collectively argue against the defensive realist perspective, positing instead that aggression and power maximization are inherent traits of great powers. Through a combination of historical analysis and theoretical exposition, these chapters offer insight into the strategies and behaviors of states, underlining the persistent and dynamic nature of power politics in international relations.
