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Thorstein VeblenA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
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This chapter analyzes how belief in luck encourages people not only to gamble but also to religious observances. Veblen observes that the sportsman is very similar to the religious devotee for participating in superstitious rituals. They both are predisposed to believe that supernatural forces are behind certain sequences of events and are therefore more likely to attach themselves to a specific institution of faith. Furthermore, both the sportsman and the religious devotee have the desire to emulate; they are propelled by their envy or admiration for someone else’s circumstances. This is the case with college athletics: students engaged in sports are notorious for their competitiveness and for being devout believers in some “inscrutable Providence” (194). Therefore, they are, in general, much more likely to proselytize than the rest of the student body. Other traits, such as the ability to accept criticism and chastisement, are also elements that can predispose people to being religiously inclined. Veblen observes that the temperament of the sporting man inclines him to be devout, and the repetitiveness of sport helps people develop habits that emulate religious rituals.
Veblen’s second central claim in this chapter is that piety is on the decline. This is because modern life, characterized by industrial production, is quantitative and dispassionate. These traits are incompatible with devoutness, which is a vestige of the past that prevents logical reasoning and the development of the mind. He defines “devoutness” as a propensity to believe in an unexplained supernatural force. It refers to devotion to divinity or religious frameworks that are not based on any material substance. Veblen believes piety is characteristic of the violent mode of life people held in the predatory age; therefore, it is no longer as attractive in the industrial age: Religious order is upheld in a hierarchical community where people think in relation to dominance and subservience.
Veblen concedes that devout believers can rightfully argue that a life devoid of worship may lead to a lack of social order, and people may then fall prey to unadulterated materialism. Nevertheless, he maintains that, however cold his claims may seem, they are valid economic observations. Devotion is economically profitable because it attempts to correct “economically disserviceable traits” and modify the community’s consumption pattern (199). For example, items used in religious ceremonies serve no material purpose and can be categorized as conspicuous waste: From an economic standpoint, they lower the community’s wealth.
Veblen claims there is also a similarity between the divinity and the masters of the leisure class. Both maintain and perform their high status through two avenues: wasteful practices and ceremonial cleanness. They each have ostentatious and conspicuously wasteful buildings associated with them, their servants are dressed in symbolic ornaments that serve no material purpose, and common people are expected to dress in their best clothes when in their presence.
Additionally, both the devout man and the man of leisure have holidays—time specifically dedicated to activities other than production. Thus, devout believers and members of the leisure class are characterized by vicarious consumption. Neither is allowed to engage in mechanical or productive labor for fear of debasement. Both are encouraged to consume wastefully though the devout believer is not expected to have a luxurious lifestyle. In relation to the leisure class, the priest plays the same role as the servant: they are expected to dedicate their lives to their masters, and too much levity or comfort might indicate that they are deviating from their purpose.
Veblen summarizes the central observations he has made over the last few sections. First, modern life, which centers on productivity and materialism, has encouraged a decline in devoutness among the industrial community. The church itself complains that it is losing hold of the middle class in Europe. However, devout observances are still practiced among the leisure class and other members of society who do not actively engage in but profit from the industrial process. This is the case of elites in the leisure class proper, lower-class delinquents (who cause chaos rather than productivity), and the clergy. It is also the case of women and children in middle-class America, who have replaced the men as upholders of religious tradition. Veblen believes this is a result of their role as the vicarious leisure class, who are still trapped in a system developed during an earlier economic age. Their male counterparts may still uphold certain devout observances, but they are not zealous or aggressively pious. According to Veblen, only the American South, which still has a hereditary leisure class, remains fervently religious.
Chapter 13 extends the observations made in the previous chapters about religion: Although the animistic elements of religious observances are in decline, people still cling to certain vestiges of religious life. While people may doubt the existence of supernatural phenomena and divine forces, they associate spiritual institutions with a “sense of communion with the environment” (217), charity, and sociability. Thus, their economic decisions may still be impacted by habits of selflessness and charity. This capacity to think of the welfare of others is what Veblen dubs “non-invidious interests.” For example, donating to those in need is an act of selflessness and serves the purpose of redistributing wealth in a non-wasteful manner. Although the chapter’s introductory paragraphs link charitable work to devout institutions, this chapter mainly focuses on non-religious forms of charity. The temperance movement and other social reforms are examples of non-religious and non-invidious acts.
Non-invidious interests are the opposite of wasteful consumption. They are based on the principles of solidarity and goodwill and originate from a time prior to the “predatory” and “savage” cultures. In those earlier periods, human survival depended on solidarity and cooperation against the forces of nature.
However, as humans began to engage in competition with each other, solidarity and community cooperation gave way to competition. People who had non- invidious temperaments were seen as weaker than people who had predatory temperaments.
According to Veblen, leisure-class women in modern industrial communities are the most likely to have non-invidious temperaments because they are free of economic worries and are less self-regarding than the men they serve. This is because women are more prone to inheriting the dominant culture imposed upon them—in this case, the culture of vicarious consumption. They are conditioned to act with deference and selflessness because their decisions reflect the honor of their masters. Veblen explains this phenomenon by pointing out that some women are uncomfortable with the idea of universal suffrage because they have so long been taught to be obedient and defer to the patriarch, usually a father or husband. Those in favor of women’s emancipation fight for women’s rights to work, a productive task that seeks to dismantle their traditional role as upholders of the vicarious lifestyle.
Leisure class men are capable of non-invidious actions as well, but their charitable actions are more often motivated by self-aggrandizement. For example, establishing universities, libraries, or museums furthers education, but it also legitimizes the founders’ reputation and superior status.
There is another difference between donations made by leisure class women and leisure class men: the patriarch, being the head of the household, often donates in larger quantities and expects larger societal acknowledgement for their generosity. Women, in contrast, are more involved in smaller projects for social improvement, frequently done in partnership with religious institutions. Not all acts of community solidarity are secular in nature: churches often provide material relief in conjunction with a religious narrative. Veblen believes this is ultimately less productive than a fully secular approach that targets material poverty.
Another factor may affect the quality and efficiency of donations: the culture of decency cultivated by the leisure class forbids them from becoming familiar with the “vulgar” way of life of the poor. In other words, the charitable organizations they fund often operate under a narrative of cleanliness and decency, which is based on pecuniary self-interest and hinders the effectiveness of their acts. For example, a member of the leisure class may donate to an asylum but design the building in a way that demonstrates his wealth rather than maximizes the comforts of its patients. Even when donations serve the purpose of improving the human condition, it does not always follow that the intent of the donor was non- invidious; Even in modern times, the culture of the leisure class remains a dominant force that shapes society and especially the leisure gentleman’s decision-making process.
The final chapter observes how institutions of higher learning largely replicate the lifestyle of the leisure class, both in their methodologies and in the subjects they teach.
Veblen traces the beginnings of education to religious observance, where heads of “primitive cults” taught community members how to navigate supernatural forces through ceremonies and rituals. This type of education is categorized as vicarious leisure because it is not industrially profitable, not substantive, and approximates the instruction a leisure-class master would give his servants. Priests or shamans in those early societies employed methods that were designed to impress the unlearned, imposing upon them the superior perspectives of their teacher. In this sense, learning was originally a product of the priestly vicarious leisure class.
According to Veblen, this remains true in the modern world. The educated class is notorious for maintaining outdated rituals, and ceremonies characteristic of religious worship, in part because higher education is most readily accessible to the leisure-class population. For example, institutions of higher learning are still steeped in ritualistic customs, such as the use of the caps and gowns during graduation ceremonies inspired by those worn in 12th-century Europe. Higher education has long been available only to the wealthy, and people of pecuniary means have been more likely to become academic leaders.
These rituals are more characteristic of the “higher, liberal, and classic institutions” rather than the “lower, technological, or practical grades” (240). This is especially true of schools dedicated to training the leisure class and the clergy. In contrast, “lower” institutions, which receive less funding and are more closely related to the industrial class, do not hold as many wasteful traditions even though they may occasionally emulate the rituals and customs of the upper class. This only changes when lower institutions accumulate enough wealth to be able to emulate their liberal counterparts. For example, newly established colleges in America are usually characterized by “industry and thrift” but as soon as they have the pecuniary means and enough community recognition, they begin to implement scholastic rituals (241).
Veblen claims that external forces may push colleges to resort to scholastic rituals. For example, the American Civil War encouraged people to adopt a predatory frame of mind, which promotes rivalry and the establishment of cliques rather than solidarity and cooperation. The following generation is therefore more prone to reestablishing social status and ritualistic practices, such as devout observances in an effort to reestablish order. They are more prone to reverting to behaviors from the past, such as believing in luck and supernatural forces; as such, they are more likely to turn to conservatism.
Allowing women access to higher education is a step away from the vestiges of pecuniary culture and a step toward modernity. Women, having belonged to the subservient class for much of history in patriarchal societies, were barred from higher learning because it was seen as indecorous and reflected badly on her master. Even when women were taught certain skills, they were meant to further her capacity to perform domestic duties or to improve her performance in non- productive tasks that would enhance her position as a symbol of vicarious leisure. Allowing her access to learn subjects closely related to production is a step away from conservatism and gives women more industrial and pecuniary power.
Veblen remains pessimistic about the speed at which these changes are taking place. Few institutions in America openly welcome women, and most are reluctant to change. Similarly, liberal colleges maintain their affiliation with religious institutions, a symbol of their attachment to vestiges of the past, even as they purport to teach scientific methods. College sports remain a central aspect of college life and retain elements of “barbarian” culture while promoting a predatory temperament in students. The relation of scholars to their professors and academic leaders emulates the relationship between the servants who practice vicarious leisure and their masters.
Veblen notes that these conservative tendencies are most prevalent in the humanities. This is exemplified in the field of history. The “classics,” which teach unproductive subjects, such as dead European languages, are nevertheless regarded as respectable and necessary because they emulate subjects taught by prestigious institutions of the past. Instructors uphold pecuniary culture by discriminating against productive fields of learning, such as trades, and maintain the leisure class’s culture of decency through valuing elegant diction and other signs of high breeding.
Within the field of the sciences, there is a greater tendency to value intellectual interests and the pursuit of knowledge for productive means, but remnants of pecuniary culture remain. This is because only members of the leisure class, who are free of economic concerns, have the time to engage in scientific research. The field of the sciences values objectivity and productivity not because they are readily accessible to the lower classes but because some “aberrant scions” of the leisure class have repudiated certain aspects of pecuniary culture. Richer members of the industrious class also contribute to the expansion of scientific knowledge in their free time. Combined, these forces have contributed in recent years to the expansion of mechanical industries and theoretical knowledge of production.
In the end, science and progress are found wherever people repudiate the dominant pecuniary culture established by the leisure class. The inventors who have come to see causal relationships between men and their environment rather than supernatural forces are the educators that have enabled economic progress. Their teachings are implemented in primary, rather than secondary education.
They prize intellectual and manual dexterity over spirituality and ceremony. For Veblen, the scientific method is therefore a “by-product of the industrial process” (251).