The Spirit of Laws

Part 3 discusses climate and terrain to show how geophysical and atmospheric conditions affect the law, the mores, and the general spirit of the state. Montesquieu is especially concerned with slavery and the effect of climate on human character. In Book 14, he extends the “general idea” of Part 3: “If it is true that the character of the spirit and the passions of the heart are extremely different in the various climates, laws should be relative to the differences in these passions and to the differences in these characters” (231). The author intends, then, to determine how laws should relate to climate, which ostensibly has a powerful effect on a people’s character.

Montesquieu begins with a sweeping generalization: “The peoples in hot countries are timid like old men; those in cold countries are courageous like young men” (232). He bases this conjecture on the belief that colder climates desensitize people to pleasure, while the hotter climates of the southern regions sensitize people to love and make people lazy: “As you move toward the countries of the south,” he writes, “you will believe you have moved away from morality itself” (234). To support his claim, the author asserts that in temperate climates, like those of the Mediterranean, people have a more inconstant character that oscillates between virtue and vice. Additionally, he claims, people are less likely to work in hotter climates, and since agricultural labor is necessary, people in hotter climates must be prodded to work by their governments; this, in turn, produces a more servile population than in the northern countries, generally speaking. He concedes that these supposed personality traits are not inherent; if a person moves to a different climate, their character will change accordingly.

In Books 15 through 17, Montesquieu addresses slavery, including the idea of a “right of slavery” and whether any instance of slavery is ever comprehensible.

He opens Book 15 by stating that slavery, “by its nature” (246), is a bad thing. It harms the master and the slave, albeit in very different ways. It also directly contradicts the spirit of a republic, and Montesquieu emphasizes that in monarchies and republics, slavery is a perverse, undue power and luxury for the enslaver. The author shows a special contempt for religious defenses of slavery, writing,

[The idea that] religion gives to those who profess it a right to reduce to servitude those who do not profess it [is what] encouraged the destroyers of America in their crimes. On this idea they founded the right of making so many people slaves; for these brigands, who absolutely wanted to be both brigands and Christians, were very devout (249).

On this note of acrimony, Montesquieu launches into his famously vitriolic satire of popular defenses of American chattel slavery in a section titled, “On the Slavery of Negroes.” Remarking on the rhetorical angle of this material, political scientist Diana Schaub writes that “[r]ather than sermonize on the injustice of slavery, Montesquieu mouths the self-incriminating arguments of slavery’s proponents. Stripped of all euphemism, these justifications appear for what they are: brutal, prideful, and absurd” (Schaub, Diana. “Race and the Constitution.” National Affairs, 1990). Montesquieu also mocks the notion of “natural” slavery, tracing it to classical Greece: “Aristotle wants to prove that there are slaves by nature, and what he says scarcely proves it” (252).

Notwithstanding these relatively progressive assertions, Montesquieu surmises that in despotic countries, civil slavery is “more bearable” because all subjects are already politically enslaved to the despot. Additionally, as he examines the idea of a “right” of slavery, he claims, “There are countries where the heat enervates the body and weakens the courage so much that men come to perform an arduous duty only from fear of chastisement; slavery there runs less counter to reason” (251). Montesquieu also suggests that utility-based slavery is less egregious than slavery imposed for the sake of the slaveholder’s luxury. He provides a number of practical precautions and limitations that should be undertaken in slave societies, including the freeing of slaves, which, he claims, should not be done at once in considerable numbers (he again cites the ancient Roman republic).

Montesquieu makes domestic slavery, or servitude within the family structure, the subject of Book 16. He discusses polygamy, modesty, household governance, and divorce. Just as a previous book posited that men’s character is climatically determined, so here Montesquieu outlines a theory of the development of women’s character. He claims that in temperate and cold regions, women bear children at an older age and live more naturally in equality with men than they do in hotter regions. Due to this variation in the character of women, the domestic subjugation of women will be different depending on the climate. Climate, according to Montesquieu, should determine whether or not a people should practice polygamy. In Book 17, he writes that political subjugation follows domestic and civil servitude in its dependence on climate.

In Book 18, he shifts from his discussion of climate and servitude to the deterministic aspects of terrain. The fertility of a terrain is at once a blessing and a curse. It is a blessing, clearly, because of the abundance it provides for the inhabitants of the land. However, according to Montesquieu, the people of such lands will be consistently fearful of invasion, believing others want to seize the land. Not only that, but they will also not be industrious:

The barrenness of the land makes men industrious, sober, inured to work, courageous, and fit for war; they must procure for themselves what the terrain refuses them. The fertility of a country gives, along with ease, softness and a certain love for the preservation of life (287).

The most cultivated regions are not, therefore, the most fertile. Montesquieu then opines on islanders; American terrain; the technical difference between “savages” and “barbarians”; and the customs of various peoples, including the Arabs, the Tartars, and various Germanic tribes of the Medieval period.

Book 19 is more philosophically oriented and returns to some of the themes of Part 1. Montesquieu introduces a new term, the “general spirit,” which emerges from the confluence of factors that govern people’s behavior. Climate and terrain are among these factors, but so are laws, religion, historical example, mores, and manners. Together, they forge a unique blend that makes up the spirit of a people and its moral character. He writes,

The various characters of the nations are mixtures of virtues and vices, of good and bad qualities. The happy mixtures are those that result in great goods, and one often would not expect them; some result in great evils, and one would not expect them either (313).

Montesquieu writes that the prudent legislator should understand the general spirit and use it as a principle to guide legislation. The legislator should not legally enforce mores. For Montesquieu, it is important to elucidate the distinction between mores, manners, and laws. Laws govern citizens, while mores govern the whole of a person and determine the inner character of a soul. Manners are merely the external expressions of the mores of a people. While mores and laws ought to be mutually reinforcing, they should not be mistaken for one another. Tyrannical laws enforce mores and make princes hated. Montesquieu quotes Solon, an ancient Athenian legislator famous for his understated wisdom, to make a central, relativistic claim: When asked whether he had provided Athens with the best laws, Solon replied, “I have given them the best laws they could endure” (322). If the Athenians were a more perfectly virtuous society, then perhaps they could endure better. Montesquieu’s point is that the laws must be made for the character of the people. People accustomed to servility will not be best served by laws instituting extensive political liberties.