The Social Contract

Within each magistrate reside three separate wills: the private will of that individual; the corporate will of the magistrates as a governing body; and the general will of the people, or sovereign. Unfortunately, the natural order dictates that these wills grow weaker in descending order from individual to corporate to general. The greater the number of magistrates, the more closely the corporate will resembles the general will. However, a greater number of magistrates leads to a weaker government in terms of its force. In turn, the fewer number of magistrates—approaching a single magistrate, the king—the more forceful the government can be. But with few or only one magistrate, the corporate will may too closely resemble the private will to the detriment of the general will. This means that a balance must be struck between force and will when dictating the size of the government.

Rousseau distinguishes between three general forms of government: democracy, aristocracy, and monarchy. When all or most of the people are magistrates, taking an active role in administration, the government is a democracy. When there are multiple magistrates who comprise a minority of the people, the government is an aristocracy. When there is a single magistrate, the government is a monarchy.

The circumstances of a particular state weigh heavily on what type of government is best for it. Generally, Rousseau argues that small states are best suited for democracy, medium-sized states for aristocracy, and large ones for monarchy.

True democracy, Rousseau claims, is an impractical form of government: “If we take the term in the strict sense, there never has been a real democracy, and there never will be” (47). Aside from the practical difficulties of having every member or most members of a community devote themselves to public affairs, Rousseau argues that it goes against the natural order for “the many to govern and the few to be governed” (47). That said, there are some conditions that make democracy more viable for some states than others. A democratic state should be small with a population that is largely equal in rank and riches. To remain equal, the population must also be very virtuous, lacking unfavorable traits like vanity and covetousness. Rousseau concludes, “Were there a people of gods, their government would be democratic. So perfect a government is not for men” (47). 

Rousseau identifies three types of aristocracies: natural, elective, and hereditary. He characterizes the earliest societies as natural aristocracies, as heads of families gathered regularly to discuss public affairs. He also characterizes contemporary societies of Indigenous Americans as natural aristocracies, calling them “admirable.” However, he also calls natural aristocracies only suitable for “simple peoples.”

In elective aristocracies—preferred by Rousseau—leaders are chosen by virtue of their power, riches, or fitness to govern. He admits that some “inequality of fortune” is probably inevitable in elective aristocracies. However, this is justifiable in that the government will be administered by those who are most able to devote their time and energy to the task—as long there are assurances that those wealthy leaders will govern on behalf of the general will not their individual wills.

Finally, Rousseau quickly dismisses the viability of hereditary aristocracies—in which power is inherited through family bloodlines—calling them “the worst of all governments” (47).

A monarchy exists when the government and all its executive power is invested in a single individual, generally a king. Its biggest advantage is that executive power is most vigorous when it is not shared by multiple magistrates. However, its biggest disadvantage is that the king may act solely on their individual will rather than the general will, leading to tyranny. Moreover, kings are incentivized to keep their people “weak, wretched, and unable to resist them” (48). This, Rousseau writes, is the true lesson of Machiavelli’s The Prince: Although that book is framed as a lesson for kings on how to rule, it is really a lesson to the people showing what kings are capable of.

As previously stated, monarchies work best in large states. Yet to govern large areas, there need to be subordinate princes and governors. Herein lies another of monarchies’ defects, according to Rousseau. In aristocracies and democracies, it is rare for an unqualified and incompetent individual to rise to a high-ranking position. In monarchies, however, the nature of court politics tends to encourage the rise of petty and treacherous individuals to these positions.

The issue of succession is another major defect of monarchies. A king’s death results in chaos unless a successor is already anointed. To ensure continuity, successors are named through hereditary means, which all too often results in monarchs who are “children, monstrosities, or imbeciles” (49). Rousseau grants that if kings were always virtuous, then monarchy would be a splendid form of government. Yet personal experience tells him that “either [kings] will come to the throne wicked or incompetent, or the throne will make them so” (50).

The three types of government rarely exist in a pure form. Absolute monarchs still need subordinate magistrates, and democracies require a head of state. In Rousseau’s view, the simpler the government the better.

Rousseau admits that liberty is not attainable for all peoples. Much of this depends on a region’s climate, with democracy thriving in cold regions and monarchy thriving in warmer ones.

Rousseau explains: Governments, which handle public affairs and therefore produce no material goods, rely on the surplus goods produced by the people. When the surplus is large, governments are more likely to demand large tributes or taxes from the people, and smaller tributes when the surplus is small. The size of these tributes dictates the distance between the people and their government. Therefore, cold regions where surplus is typically low are more likely to support democratic rule, while warm regions where the surplus is high are more likely to support monarchical rule.

While there is no absolute answer to the question, “What is the best government?”, Rousseau says there are a number of reliable indicators that show whether or not a people are well-governed. The most important of these, he argues, is population growth: “The rest being equal, the government under which, without external aids, without naturalization or colonies, the citizens increase and multiply most, is beyond question the best” (53).

Given that the particular will can contradict the general will, the greatest source of friction in government exists between the government and sovereignty. Rousseau characterizes this friction as inevitable and always leading toward degeneration, as a human body begins dying the moment it is born.

Rousseau reiterates his point that even the best governments die, asking rhetorically, “If Sparta and Rome perished, what State can hope to endure for ever?” (55). To create a state with an eye toward eternity is a mistake, as such a government is doomed to fail.

Rousseau’s metaphor for the body politic as a literal body goes beyond its inevitable death. He calls the legislative power its heart, the executive power is brain, and the sovereign authority its “life-principle.”

Since the sovereign acts only through legislative expressions of the general will, the people must assemble regularly to ensure the sovereign can maintain itself. To those who argue that this is impractical, Rousseau points to the Roman Republic which would meet in assembly virtually every week.

These assemblies must meet at fixed intervals and not only when summoned to elect magistrates or handle other business as it arises. While this works well when the republic is the size of a single town, challenges arise when the state includes many towns. Some political scientists suggest that in these cases sovereign authority may be divided, but Rousseau has already argued that sovereignty is indivisible. Others suggest that citizens assemble in a single town that serves as a state’s capital, but Rousseau thinks it better for the capital and its seat of government to move from one town to the next. 

When the people assemble as a sovereign body, the government of magistrates and the executive power they wield is suspended. Rousseau argues that when the people are present, representatives do not exist as a legitimate component of the state. Given this friction, the government will often work to stymie the people’s ability to assemble. 

Rather than engage in public affairs, many citizens will pay deputies to attend assemblies in their stead. Rousseau characterizes this practice as mercenary, as when a wealthy individual pays someone to serve as a soldier in their war. He writes, “As soon as any man says of the affairs of the state What does it matter to me? the state may be given up for lost” (57).

Just as it is indivisible, sovereignty is also unable to be represented; Rousseau characterizes representation as a feudal idea. He points to England as an example, calling its people enslaved at all times except when electing members of Parliament. Representation only exists within the framework of the social contract at the executive level.

In Ancient Greece, the people assembled constantly, yet Rousseau admits that they were able to do so because enslaved people did most of the labor. He asks, “What then? Is liberty maintained only by the help of slavery? It may be so” (58). Rousseau then assures readers that he does not mean to suggest that slavery is necessary or legitimate.

Rousseau reiterates that the government, or executive branch, exists separately from sovereignty, contradicting political scientists who believe the social contract exists between the people and the government. Such a “contract” is no contract at all in Rousseau’s mind, as all it does is bind one party to command and another to obey.

If the government is separate from the sovereign, Rousseau wonders how to classify the act of establishing said government: “The difficulty is to understand how there can be a governmental act before government exists” (59). He argues that in the moment before the government is established, sovereignty is a pure democracy in which all citizens are magistrates. The citizens name other magistrates to occupy the executive branch, and thus a government is formed.

To prevent the government from usurping sovereign authority, Rousseau advises that the citizens assemble frequently to vote on two questions. The first is, “Does it please the sovereign to preserve the present form of government?” The second is, “Does it please the people to leave its administration in the hands of those who are actually in charge of it?” (60).