The Open Society and Its Enemies

In light of Hegel’s intellectual impact on Karl Marx, Popper moves on to analyzing the work of this 19th-century German philosopher. His initial focus is Marx’s methodology, including Marx’s background, his view of sociology, and sociological determinism, specifically historicism in the realm of economics, class struggle, and the structure of society at large. Marx was the last philosopher to build a complex system (294). By using sociology and economic historicism, this thinker may have surpassed both Plato and Hegel despite the accuracy of his institutional analysis (341, 400). Marx believed that politics were subservient to the forces of history, which Popper calls “prophetic historicism” (341).

This tension between inaccurate historicist prophecy and accurate institutional analysis is the reason why Marx’s work impacted Popper in a paradoxical way. On the one hand, Popper argues that the Hegelian roots of Marxism are “so far the purest, the most developed and the most dangerous form of historicism” (293), making him a “false prophet.” Plato, Hegel, and Marx believed that the interests of the state supersede those of the individual. Marx’s views, however, appeared in a materialist framework (310). Marx compared the material aspects of life in society to an extension of human metabolism. He also shared Hegel’s views that the purpose of historical progress is attaining freedom by ameliorating labor conditions. However, complete freedom is impossible because people cannot be free of their metabolism. At the same time, Marx departed from Hegel in his focus on the interaction between humans and their natural environment (313-15). On the other hand, the author is sympathetic to Marx’s “humanitarian impulse” and believes that he had a sincere concern for the plight of the working class. Popper also considers Marx’s methodology of institutional analysis useful.

Beyond Hegel, Marx shared his views with a number of other philosophers. Popper specifically highlights the similarities between the work of the English philosopher John Stuart Mill (1806–1873) and Marx. For instance, Mill’s methods of social science impacted Marx directly, whereas Marx’s “historical periods” parallel Mill’s “states of society” (299). Both philosophers were also critical of laissez-faire liberalism and chose to explain social events through applicable history (299, 312).

Popper also credits Marx with questioning psychologism—this was Marx’s “greatest achievement” as a sociologist. Psychologism is the belief that sociology as a field of study should be reduced to social psychology. Marx’s work in this subject area initiated the autonomy of sociology. The author believes that psychology may inform social sciences but social sciences cannot be reduced to psychology (299, 307-09). The subject of psychologism is also where Marx departs from Mill. The latter subscribed to the psychologistic school of sociology, which focused on human nature and raised classic questions as to the character of laws in society—whether they are “natural” or “conventional” (301). Popper draws a parallel between Mill’s psychologism and Hegel’s idealism (312). Marx, however, opted for the materialist interpretation of events (312). Herein lies another key difference between Mill and Marx: The former’s historicism was founded in psychology (psychologism), whereas the latter’s was founded in economics (economism). Popper defines economism as the belief that the economic aspects of society are fundamental for the historic development of social institutions. He argues that Marx’s economism was, in turn, linked to his historicism (316-17).

The author considers this psychologistic reduction of social laws to human nature to be naïve in its assumptions and historicist in its methods (302-03). Mill’s reliance on psychologism and historicism leads to the notion that human psychology existed before the dawn of society. Popper calls this approach the “psychologistic version of the social contract” (305). Marx’s own criticism of psychologism focused on his view that people are products of society (305), as he wrote in Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy: “It is not the consciousness of man that determines his existence—rather, it is his social existence that determines his consciousness” (300).

However, Marx’s work is deficient in the realm of economics, specifically its practical aspects and the economics of socialism (295). This lack of constructive information led to real-world problems for those who sought to practically apply Marxism. The leader of the 1917 Russian Revolution, Vladimir Lenin, came to the conclusion that Marxist theory was unhelpful after the Bolsheviks took power (295, 318). Popper, therefore, differentiates between the theory and the practice of Marxism:

Marxism is a purely historical theory, a theory which aims at predicting the future course of economic and power-political developments and especially of revolutions. As such, it certainly did not furnish the basis of the policy of the Russian Communist Party after its rise to political power (294).

As a result, Lenin opted for the New Economic Policy, which combined elements of capitalism for small businesses with state control for large enterprises. Even the First Five-Year Plan, used to rapidly industrialize Russia, a largely agrarian country, had little in common with the scientific socialism of Marx and his colleague Friedrich Engels (295). In other words, the difference in the development of the USSR after the Marx-inspired revolution and the original Marxist theory is significant (319). Popper believes that Marx’s failure to establish scientific socialism as a social technology that offers the constructive means of organizing tangible institutions and provides practical economic analysis only points to Marx’s “purely historicist method” (298). As was the case with Hegel, Popper underscores the difference between making scientific predictions based on factual information and prophesizing grand-scale historic events (297).

Central to Marx’s work is the concept of class struggle, in which society is designed by separating people into classes. Under capitalism, freedom from the productive process is only possible by exploiting someone else. The specific methods of exploitation depend on the conditions of production. This relationship is one of symbiosis between the ruling class and those it rules. Popper acknowledges the skillfulness of Marx’s analysis of his immediate social circumstances of unrestrained capitalism (322, 326). However, he warns against historic reductionism:

One of the dangers of Marx’s formula is that if taken too seriously, it misleads Marxists into interpreting all political conflicts as struggles between exploiters and exploited (or else as attempts to cover up the ‘real issue’, the underlying class conflict) (326).

This issue was relevant in the Soviet Union, in which history, including history before capitalism, was taught along this ideological trajectory.

Marx did not believe in the possibility of improving social conditions because the members of the ruling class were “mere functions of the capital which, through his instrumentality, is endowed with will and consciousness” (328,324). The philosopher described political power in the Communist Manifesto as “merely the organized power of one class for oppressing the other” (327). Popper considers this aspect of Marx’s work, along with his theory of the state, to be one of the most significant (326). Not only could change not be attained through political means (331), but any form of government, even democracy, is a “dictatorship of the ruling class over the ruled” (329).

Popper also examines Marx’s attitude toward taking political action: “[C]onsidering that few movements have done as much as Marxism to stimulate interest in political action, the theory of the fundamental impotence of politics appears somewhat paradoxical” (328). Both Marx and Engels held the historicist view that the inevitable social revolution would lead to the dictatorship of the proletariat and, ultimately, the disappearance of the state as such (329). For this reason, they saw political action as useless.

Popper differentiates between the moderate and radical wings of Marxism, in which the former finds political action helpful in specific circumstances, whereas the latter sides with Marx on the impotence of political action (329). The author believes Marx’s view to be a “fatal mistake” (329). However, he also considers this attitude the reflection of the Industrial Revolution, which relied on the brutal exploitation of the working class, including women and children, and a “life of desolation and misery” (331). Critical of unrestrained capitalism himself, the author subscribes to a moderate view of limiting economic freedom through state protection and interventionism (332-34).

Despite Marx’s humanitarianism, Popper fundamentally disagrees with his assessment of political power. For the author, economic power should be subordinated to political power in order to limit the type of capitalist excesses that occurred in Marx’s lifetime. The legal system, as an extension of political power, should also be used to offer the ability to work for those who are able, thus reaching a certain degree of freedom (334). One way to mitigate problems under capitalism is through the democratic form of government: “Without democratic control, there can be no earthly reason why any government should not use its political and economic power for purposes very different from the protection of the freedom of its citizens” (335).

Popper notes the difference between theory and practice in this context as well: Marxists did not follow his doctrine of political powerlessness and engaged in activism instead (336). However, they also underestimated the danger of the growing state power (337). Popper advocates against Marxists’ belief in broad-scale attempts to improve society and once again proposes piecemeal social engineering. His suggestions include establishing protective institutions and only allowing the state to act within limits (339).