The Hundred Years' War on Palestine: A History of Settler-Colonial Conquest and Resistance, 1917-2017

Khalidi focuses on Israel’s 1982 invasion of Lebanon, the seven-week siege of Beirut, and the aftermath of this invasion as the fourth declaration of war on the Palestinians. Defense minister Ariel Sharon served as the architect of this war. He often kept Prime Minister Menachem Begin and the Israeli cabinet in the dark about his goals and operations plan. Sharon’s goal was to destroy the PLO militarily. He believed that doing so would weaken the Palestinian national movement in the occupied territories of the Gaza Strip, East Jerusalem, and the West Bank, making it easier for Israel to control and eventually annex these areas.

Khalidi notes that “the siege constituted the most serious attack by a regular army on an Arab capital since World War II. It was not to be equaled until the US occupation of Baghdad in 2003” (144). The scale and duration of the war was unprecedented. Israeli sent over 120,000 troops into Lebanon to fight far fewer Palestinians, Lebanese, and Syrian fighters for 10 weeks. Israeli troops targeted Palestinian refugee camps, which fiercely resisted the Israeli invasion, and apartment buildings in Beirut including in the university district. Israeli forces also committed war crimes such as using car bombs to terrify Palestinians and Lebanese civilians. A Mossad officer describes these car bombs as “killing for killing’s sake” (149). Nearly 20,000 Palestinians and Lebanese were killed in the war and another 30,000 wounded. This war also represented the third highest military casualty toll for Israelis. Khalidi underscores that, despite Israeli’s aggressive and often brutal campaign, they were unable to destroy the PLO’s communication centers and underground control and command posts. Moreover, the attack did not kill any PLO leaders.

Khalidi also examines two important events that took place during the war. The first was the PLO’s Eleven-Point Plan. This plan laid out the withdrawal of PLO fighters from Lebanon to Tunisia. It also established several strategies to protect Palestinian and Lebanese civilians left behind in Beirut, including the creation of a buffer zone, slow withdrawal of Israeli forces, deployment of international forces, and international safeguards for the civilians. Lebanese and American officials agreed to the terms of the plan. However, Israel did not agree with international protection for Palestinian civilians. Nevertheless, the PLO took the US and Lebanese agreements as binding commitments to protect civilians. As a result, they departed Lebanon, believing that civilians were safe.

The second event was the massacre by Israeli forces and Lebanese Forces (LF) militia at the Sabra and Shatila refugee camps, which took place after the PLO’s departure. More than 1,000 Palestinian and Lebanese men, women, and children were murdered. An Israeli commission of inquiry set-up after the events found several high-ranking Israeli government and military officials to be complicit in the massacres.

Khalidi underscores the enormous political impact the war had on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and wider Middle East region. First, the war resulted in the rise of the militant group Hizballah in Lebanon, which became a deadly foe to Israel and the US. Second, many Lebanese, Palestinian, other Arab, and European people were furious with the US and Israel for their complicity in the war’s atrocities against civilians. Suicide bombings attacked several US targets in Beirut, including the US Embassy and Marines barracks. Third, the war sparked widespread revulsion in Israel, leading to the growth of the Peace Now movement, a non-governmental organization that continues to advocate for peace and a two-state solution. Fourth, Palestinians garnered international sympathy, even temporarily shedding the terrorist image that Israeli propaganda had stuck to them. Fifth, the war shifted the center of the Palestinian national movement from surrounding Arab countries back to Palestine.

While Israel is responsible for the invasion of Lebanon, Khalidi reinforces US culpability. First, previously unknown documents reveal the full extent of the role played by the US in the war. These documents demonstrate that Sharon told the US Secretary of State about his plans in great detail. The US Secretary of State’s only response to Sharon “was that there ‘must be recognizable provocation,’ one that would be ‘understood internationally’” (151). The US gave the green light for the invasion. Second, the US also supplied Israel with deadly weapons. The US did this knowing that an Israeli attack was going to “see American-made munitions being dropped from American-made aircraft over Lebanon, and civilians were going to be killed” (162). Third, the US refused to physically protect Lebanese and Palestinian civilians. The US chose this option despite US intelligence highlighting the potential of LF to wage a murderous campaign on Palestinian civilians with the departure of the PLO. The US only gave assurances of protection, which turned out to be worthless. For all of these reasons, Khalidi argues that the 1982 invasion of Lebanon should be seen as a joint US-Israeli venture whose goal was to wage war against the Palestinians. Khalidi expresses frustration that none of the American officials involved in the war were held accountable for their actions.

Khalidi also argues that the war also shows the weakening of USSR power in the region. He discusses his own personal experiences with this assertion. In the spring of 1982, several months before the war’s outbreak, he attended a presentation by Dr. Yevgeny Primakov, the director of the Soviet Oriental Institute and a high-ranking KGB officer. Primakov warned about the Israeli invasion which he said would have the support of the US. He also notes that the USSR did not have the resources to stop the war or protect its Lebanese and Palestinian allies.

Khalidi also blames the PLO for Israel’s invasion of Lebanon. He notes how, in the years prior to the war, the PLO targeted Israeli civilians, hurting the Palestinian national movement. The PLO also angered many Lebanese who were caught in the crossfire of the ongoing conflict. Lebanese groups did not initially come to the PLO’s defense at the start of the war because of this anger. After the war, many Palestinians felt that the PLO leadership failed the Palestinian people. The PLO leadership mostly ignored these sentiments. Khalidi notes that, “unsurprisingly, Arafat was the least self-critical” (166).