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41 pages 1 hour read

Michael Lewis

The Fifth Risk

Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 2018

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Part 3Chapter Summaries & Analyses

Part 3 Summary: “All the President’s Data”

Kathy Sullivan was the top official within the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), which oversees the National Weather Service (NWS). She was also one of three officials that DJ Patil wanted to meet with when he became the Chief Data Scientist of the United States. While completing his doctorate, Patil immersed himself in data from the NWS when he suggested a new statistic for looking at weather: how predictable the weather is at any given moment.

The Department of Commerce collects a lot of data as part of its mission, and the majority of it comes from the NWS. Much of that is critical to daily life within the country, and Lewis writes that “[w]ithout that data [from the NOAA], and the Weather Service that made sense of it, no plane would fly, no bridge would be built, and no war would be fought—at least not well” (163).

When Wilbur Ross was nominated to run the department at the end of November 2016, he met with a former Bush administration staffer who had worked within the Commerce department. That official explained that it was essentially geared toward science and technology, to which Ross replied, “Yeah, I don’t think I want to be focusing on that” (164). Then, in October of 2017, Barry Myers arrived as the new head of the NOAA. He was the CEO of AccuWeather, a for-profit weather company. AccuWeather advertised itself as being more accurate than the NWS. However, all private companies depend on NWS data for their predictions. Myers had long been involved with the NOAA, wanting to keep NWS data from being available to the public because private companies could profit off of individuals’ desire for a forecast. The Bush official who worked with Ross noted, “The more people have access to the weather data, the better it is for the country” (176). Lewis also references how David Friedberg used NWS data to start WeatherBill (later the Climate Corporation) to offer insurance to farmers affected by weather events.

In 2013, President Obama signed an executive order in 2013 to make all unclassified government data publicly available. Patil arrived in Washington a year later with the intention to get as much out of those data as possible. Among the benefits, journalists were able to look through the Department of Health and Human Services data on Medicaid and Medicare. From there, they found an unusual number of opioid prescriptions. Patil tells Lewis that “[w]e would never have figured out that there was an opioid crisis without that data” (177). When Trump took office, Lewis notes, Patil watched much of this data disappear; in particular, climate change data was removed from the websites of the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of the Interior.

When Sullivan became the head of the NOAA, she became interested in the relationship between people and their government, wanting to create a weather-ready nation after walking through the aftermath of a tornado in Joplin, Missouri, in 2011. That tornado had killed 158 people with thousands more injured. Despite the tornado warning being issued 17 minutes before (four minutes ahead of the average), people didn’t seek shelter. She wanted to understand why this was and started to bring behavior economists and psychologists into the NOAA to help collect data on how people respond to risk.

Kim Klockow was among the first scientists Sullivan brought in to achieve her goal. Klockow worked at the National Weather Storm Prediction Center in the NWS building in Norman, Oklahoma. She wanted to investigate how one could influence people to respond to their benefit when confronting storms. She interviewed people who lived in areas that had been hit by tornadoes and found that not only did they not have enough time to escape, but they also did not think that it would hit them in particular. The NWS also implemented new “impact based” warnings, which described what effect a tornado could have. Klockow thought that these were “intellectually dishonest” because “[h]ow could you warn about the impact of a storm whose force you would only be able to discern after the fact?” (208).

The part concludes with Lonnie Risenhoover, the emergency manager in Beckham County, Oklahoma, on the day a tornado was hitting Elk City. By coincidence, a team of researchers at the Storm Prediction Center was trying out a new model, and their data encouraged Lonnie to activate the tornado sirens. Only one fatality occurred as a result. Lewis finishes the book recounting a dinner he had with Hank Jenkins-Smith and Carol Silva, the co-directors of the University of Oklahoma’s Center for Risk Management, asking questions about who is more likely to survive a tornado. The one question he doesn’t ask but considers is whether someone who has experienced a tornado is more likely to survive than someone who hasn’t.

Part 3 Analysis

This part begins with the tornado in Joplin, and Lewis refers to its devastation throughout the section. In focusing on weather-related disasters, he reminds us of the possible effects of climate change as more such events occur as a result.

He also uses the tornado to introduce a broader theme beyond the unpreparedness of the Trump administration when it took over the federal government: the importance of data collection and scientific research.

We learn early on about the utility of NWS data and the importance of investing in it to create more accurate forecasts. Lewis uses the storm predicted by Louis Uccellini on March 12, 1993, as an example. Uccellini himself even “described the advances in weather prediction from about the end of World War II as ‘one of the major intellectual achievements of the twentieth century” (151). Lives are saved when storms are predicted in advance.

The Department of Commerce is often thought to be associated with business in one form or another, and we once again see that it was not a priority for the incoming Trump administration. Even more than that, Wilbur Ross did not understand how critical science was to its operation. On the other hand, Barry Myers did, and he did not want the availability of that data to affect his company’s bottom line. AccuWeather and other private weather forecasts benefit when storms hit because people become more willing to spend money to access these membership-only services. Releasing to data to the public, however, has been shown to make positive advances, such as when it allowed journalists to uncover the opioid crisis. Still, the fear of data appeared again when the Environmental Protection Agency and the Department of the Interior removed climate change data from their websites.

Lewis then pivots to Kathy Sullivan and her career as the chief scientist for the NOAA. Because he has laid the foundation of how useful NWS data is, Lewis is then able to introduce the idea of the relationship between people and their government through Sullivan, who wants to help people learn how to translate NOAA data into their daily lives. She drew from her experience working with the families of the astronauts killed in the Challenger explosion, deciding that other groups needed to be brought in to create a program that would best serve the public while also honoring the crew of the space shuttle.

She took that strategy and applied it to the NOAA, deciding to bring in social scientists. Kim Klockow was the first of these, and Lewis uses her career to show the different ways that scientists have sought to understand people’s decision-making process when confronted with storm warnings. A variety of methods have been used, all trying to combat the fact that even when people are aware of the warnings, they often believe that they won’t be hit by a tornado. The tornado in Elk City and the information that Lonnie Risenhoover had been given proved Klockow’s argument: People had to be convinced that the threat is real. As a result, that tornado had only one fatality, and people mostly kept out of harm’s way, even though over 200 homes and 38 businesses were destroyed. This example is critical to Lewis’s argument because it emphasizes that not only was the data used convincingly, but it was also used in such a way that it positively affected people’s lives.

Lewis ends the section with his dinner with the co-directors from the University of Oklahoma’s Center for Risk Management because it allows him to follow up with the risks outlined in the first part of the book, where he noted, “The risk we should most fear is not the risk we easily imagine. It is the risk that we don’t” (68). Essentially reiterating this statement, he says, “It’s what you fail to imagine that kills you” (219). This idea is relevant to tornadoes, but it also applies to the project management that Max Stier and John MacWilliams talked about early on in the book. By not being prepared to address and manage problems, a bad transition can lead to devastating effects.

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