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Patrick Radden KeefeA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Chapter 20 opens Part 3, “A Reckoning.” The chapter outlines the end of the Troubles and the transition into the peace process that followed. The IRA abandoned the initial cease-fire by detonating a bomb in London in 1996, demanding that the British government negotiate with Sinn Féin as a legitimate political entity without the provision that the IRA must decommission all weapons. However, political leaders negotiated a second, enduring cease-fire in 1997, and the following year, British Prime Minister Tony Blair and other British, Irish, and American negotiators issued the Good Friday Agreement. This agreement held that “Northern Ireland would remain part of the United Kingdom, but with its own devolved assembly and close links to the Republic of Ireland” (224). The agreement also outlined a provision for future change: if a referendum vote in Northern Ireland ever indicated a majority’s desire to separate from the United Kingdom, officials on both sides of the Irish Sea would facilitate another transition. While this result did not represent an IRA victory, Sinn Féin agreed to active representation in Northern Ireland’s new assembly, and many people in the streets of previously war-torn cities welcomed the prospect of peace.
The chapter then shifts to Boston in 2000, where scholars of Irish history expressed a desire to document the Troubles and “create a historical record of the conflict” (225). A group of professors, library staff, and the recruited director of the project, Belfast journalist Ed Moloney, decided on a secret collection of oral histories “in which combatants from the front lines could speak candidly about their experiences” (227). Secrecy was essential: the IRA and other paramilitaries remained illegal organizations, and confessions of participation could lead to sentencing. The historians insured interviewees that their testimonies would remain secret until after their deaths. Well-connected Belfast men from both sides of the conflict conducted the interviews: Former Provo Anthony “Mackers” McIntyre on the republican side and Wilson McArthur on the loyalist side.
Mackers began conducting interviews in 2001, in republican circles far removed from Gerry Adams and his ideological companions. The Good Friday Agreement remained a controversial negotiation, and Sinn Féin policed republican dissent to the negotiation with threats of punishment. As the interviewers met former gunmen in secret and issued contracts of silence, they sent coded interview tapes back to Boston College for storage in the Treasure Room in the Burns Library. This is the room we encountered in the prologue, and we know that detectives eventually enter it to remove interview tapes.
McIntyre conducted a series of interviews with a particularly important former Provo: Brendan Hughes, living in what remained of the Divis Flats. Never having fully recovered from his stint in prison and disapproving of the change of tide in republican politics, Hughes’s “mood had turned increasingly bleak” (235). He struggled with alcohol and tobacco addiction and lived off of a disability benefit.
The secret interviews allowed paramilitary soldiers to unload and reflect. For several militant former IRA volunteers, conversations ruminated on Adams, acknowledging his betrayal to their cause in favor of a carefully sculpted personal political career. Conceding that the British could remain on the island of Ireland was, to Hughes, a condemnation of the violent action once employed to expel them—action previously directed and endorsed by Adams. Whereas Adams had progressed to “become a well-heeled statesman, a peacemaker,” someone who could successfully “[absolve] himself of any moral responsibility for catastrophes like Bloody Friday” (237), Hughes saw his actions as needless and unjustifiable without the desired end of full Irish independence.
Others reflected this same “sense of disillusionment” (239). Ricky O’Rawe, a prison comrade of both Hughes and Bobby Sands, eventually shared a story he had planned to take to the grave: midway through the deaths of the hunger strikers, Margaret Thatcher sent a secret offer to meet most of their demands in exchange for ending the strike. Adams apparently rejected it, even though the remaining strikers were inclined to accept. O’Rawe speculated that Adams had glimpsed the drastic expansion of a republican political support base as the strike progressed and sacrificed six strikers to continue the momentum. It was widely held that the hunger strike bolstered Sinn Féin’s political capital.
The chapter ends with the introduction of a major revelation. Mackers asked Hughes about Jean McConville. Hughes revealed that Adams had approved her kidnapping, but also held that “the murder had been justified” in his view (243); McConville had apparently been a British informer.
An RUC officer named Trevor Campbell specialized in “the handling of informants,” also called “touts,” during the Troubles (244). Campbell had created a sophisticated and clandestine communication network with them. He recruited additional informants with coercion and bribery. Campbell had truly developed a science, and as a result, managed many well-placed informants within IRA circles.
The IRA attempted to mitigate the threat of double agents with an internal justice system—the Nutting Squad, led by Alfredo “Scap” Scappaticci—which questioned and killed suspected informants. Scappaticci carried out the killings seemingly without hesitation or remorse.
Hughes reported “with conviction” that McConville had passed intelligence to the British via radio communication. Apparently, she confessed to an IRA unit and surrendered the radio, receiving a warning. The IRA then discovered a second radio and discussed how to dispose of her. An IRA leader named Ivor Bell favored letting neighbors discover her executed body to “send a lesson to other locals who might consider becoming touts” (251). Adams overruled this suggestion, ordering that McConville get buried—the contemporary term for disappeared. This course of action was uncommon, but Hughes provided a familiar account of what happened next: Dolours Price and other Unknowns escorted McConville to the Republic to assist in her execution.
Mackers also conducted Belfast Project interviews with Price, a close friend. She had moved to Dublin and divorced Rea in 2003. Like Hughes, she suffered in her reflection of her violent deeds and felt betrayed by Adams and the Good Friday Agreement, though she also expressed a “ferocious pride in her own headlong personal history” of physical and mental strength (255). In one interview, Price announced that she wanted to relate her version of the McConville disappearance. As her friend, Mackers warned her against implicating herself and burdening her children with future ostracization. She decided not to tell the McConville story.
The chapter backtracks to 1999 to follow up on some immediate aftermath of the Troubles. That year, governments in the UK and Ireland commissioned the Independent Commission for the Location of Victims’ Remains. Overall, the peace process included little emphasis on reconciliation and closure, but this organization committed to finding the 16 disappeared victims of violence and offered “a limited grant of immunity from prosecution” for those willing to share information (258). The search initially yielded some results, discovering three corpses and repatriating them with family members.
Information surfaced on McConville, suggesting that the IRA had buried her remains on a rocky beach of the Cooley Peninsula, a few dozen miles from Belfast. The McConville children, now in their thirties and forties, attended the excavation, “their grief and anger […]still raw and unprocessed” (260). They disagreed about how to move forward, but all of them vehemently denied that their mother had been an informant. Officials called off the search for McConville at the specified location, determining that the tip had been false.
On March 17, 2002, thieves extracted sensitive police files from the Castlereagh complex in East Belfast, which housed the new Police Services of Northern Ireland (PSNI). Forging security clearances and acting quickly, they walked away with documentation pertaining to informants that had worked with Campbell. This leak of classified information meant that police needed to immediately relocate hundreds of prior informers to protect them from retaliation. No entity claimed responsibility for the break in, though people widely regarded it as an IRA operation.
Interest centered on one informant, in particular, who police had referred to as “Steak Knife” (269). This figure had long been rumored to operate from a high-ranking office within the IRA. In 2003, several newspapers broke a follow-up story: Steak Knife was the executioner Scappaticci. He denied the allegations but fled Belfast.
Scappaticci was not the only critical informant in the commanding ranks of the IRA. Joe Fenton had provided IRA safe houses secretly bugged to collect surveillance. Sinn Féin official Dennis Donaldson continued supplying British intelligence into the 2000s. An unknown gunman hunted him down while he was in hiding and killed him.
British Army officers in Belfast had, through the 1970s, commented on a perceived collusion between Protestant paramilitaries and the British State, though higher-ups hushed the criticisms. The Provos made these accusations as well, but commentators often dismissed them as anti-British propaganda. Thatcher apparently knowingly turned a blind eye to military collusion. The British Prime Minister David Cameron admitted in 2012 to rampant State collusion in the era in question.
The chapter ends with the highly anticipated discovery of McConville’s remains. A man named John Garland found her bones and clothes buried at a beach in the Republic in 2003. The McConville children reburied her after a funeral service. Because of the nature of the civilian discovery (versus IRA assistance in locating the body), the McConville case remained an open criminal investigation.
A major theme emerges in this section: the politics of reconciliation. The governmental infrastructure of the peace process provided very few practical responses for the undeniable communal and cultural need to reckon with the past and hidden truths. Former paramilitary foot soldiers could not speak freely about their enterprises in most cases, unless they had direct knowledge about one of the 16 disappeared Troubles victims. Family members of these victims remained in a “permanent limbo of uncertainty” unless the stories of their relatives’ disappearance came to light and searchers recovered their bodies (258). The McConville siblings reasonably expected to discover their mother’s remains in 1999 but had to wait four years before an accidental discovery by a civilian. By the end of this section, they still don’t have closure, as McConville’s murder remains an unsolved case. The question of her status as an informant also remains open. Her children deny the accusation, while Hughes insists that it is valid. Keefe acknowledges that McConville likely had very little to offer in the way of intelligence but also details the level of double-crossing in every corner of Belfast. He therefore leaves open the possibility that, however unlikely it seems on the surface, McConville may have been supplying British intelligence.
Many former IRA volunteers also felt unable to reconcile present politics, as they felt used and dismissed by Sinn Féin and Gerry Adams. Even as pockets of Belfast continued to regard people like Hughes and Price as heroes, they bore the marks of trauma and confusion from their past and the abandoned IRA mission to oust the British from Northern Ireland. Others championed Adams and the Good Friday Agreement, welcoming the jurisdictional improvements that created a Northern Irish assembly with some degree of independence and no hard border between the Republic and the North. Loyalists appreciated their continued affiliation with England as a formal United Kingdom nation. These political contingencies were best able to accept the late-1990s developments with a sense of closure and compromise. Keefe’s angle, however, focuses on the disparate parties who suffer in the memory of the Troubles and criticize the handling of their aftermath.
The role of the state has loomed large in the book from the beginning, but the topic becomes especially pronounced with the ascent of Sinn Féin. Though initially cast out from UK politics because of continued alliance with an armed IRA, Sinn Féin adopts and polices a mainstream republican ideology that celebrates Adams and the Good Friday Agreement. Adams continues to leverage considerable influence, despite hordes of criticism that place him at the center of IRA violence. He flatly denies ever being a member of the IRA, much to the dismay and infuriation of his former subordinates who struggle with addiction and post-traumatic stress.
The emphasis on Sinn Féin does not suggest that the British are no longer at the center of debate. Keefe offers information in this section about just how illegally British state operations functioned in Northern Ireland when violence was at its height. The issue of justifiability is particularly poignant in the case of Freddie Scappaticci, who supplied British intelligence as he continued to beat and murder dozens of suspected IRA informants. Keefe poses, “If an agent is a murderer, and his handlers know that he is murdering people, does that not make the handlers—and, as such, the state itself—complicit?” (273). Keefe holds that British military efforts focused most acutely on the Provos, even over other paramilitary organizations (such as loyalist ones) and made allowances for violent entities that the British were supposed to also be quelling in Northern Ireland. It becomes clear that collusion and strategic informants, regardless of the legality of their continued activity, played absolutely essential roles in British intelligence and tactics. Many innocent people lost their lives in the British initiative to maintain and protect informants.
While this section documents the Good Friday Agreement and the peace process, it remains clear that the threat of violence. Through most of the events discussed in this section, the IRA retain their arms. They detonate bombs and possibly carry out heists. Keefe will expound on this threat in the final section of the book.
By Patrick Radden Keefe
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