Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents: The Politics of Leadership from Roosevelt to Reagan

In Chapter 10 Neustadt re-evaluates the whole argument of the 1960 book, primarily through the through the prism of the Johnson and Nixon presidencies. Written in 1976, the chapter expresses some of the disenchantment that followed President Nixon’s resignation and acknowledges significant changes affecting the demands and responsibilities on the president. However, it ultimately offers a strong endorsement of the basic conclusion and recommendations in the 1960 book.

This chapter, the longest of the entire book, notes that before his presidency, Woodrow Wilson wrote two scholarly works approximately 15 years apart and, in the later work, acknowledged major changes in the significance of the presidency that forced re-evaluation of his conclusions. Neustadt, however, does not see a fundamental shift in the character of presidential power or the role of the president vis-à-vis other branches of government and relevant players in the roughly 15 years since he wrote is major work. In a mock lament, Neustadt mourns the loss of his “chance for prescience” as demonstrated by Wilson when he foresaw the increasing importance of the presidency three-quarters of a century earlier.

Although Neustadt stands by the essence and core aspects of his original thesis and approach, he articulates aspects of this theory affected by intervening events. Specifically, he articulates a need for additional emphasis on each of the following six topics that became clear to him in over the intervening years (during which Neustadt served with Presidents Kennedy and Johnson): (1) perceived legitimacy and associated loyalty; (2) the details of the institutions with which the president relates (spelled out further according to nine such details); (3) a changed policy environment (for example, environmental protection issues gained prominence during this period); (4) individual characteristics and qualities of the presidents in office warrant greater attention, as Johnson and Nixon’s mistakes emphasize; (5) a more effective examination of how a president’s early choices can sow seeds of later problems (illustrated powerfully by Johnson and Nixon); and (6) the dramatic expansion of the executive agencies during this period (such as the creation of the Environmental Protection Agency with its extensive scientific expertise and power to affect major economic interests).

Overall, Neustadt not only stands strongly behind his prior analysis, but he also effectively points the way forward for analysis of presidential power by identifying some of the trends that would continue transforming the interplay of the federal government with itself, the states, and the public. He predicted increased prominence for the presidency, re-emphasized the role of specific choices for prospective power dynamics, and identifies the increasing demands of the American public on the federal government generally.

The president, Neustadt concludes, remains every bit the clerk identified in Chapter 1, written 16 years before this chapter. And yet by the end of the chapter, there is a slight sense of remorse over the problems posed by interrupted presidencies (e.g., the deaths of Roosevelt and Kennedy; the resignation of Nixon) and the major policy disruption related to Johnson’s perceived handling of the Vietnam War.

Written at the end of the Jimmy Carter’s presidency, Chapter 11 asks whether the presidency is possible—in other words, can any individual sustain it through the increasing burden it presents? Neustadt then reframes the question through four lenses: (1) the physical burden of remaining current in all relevant affairs; (2) the moral and emotional weight of the decisions a president must make (including the potential use of nuclear weapons); (3) the intellectual capacity to make decisions on uncertain and voluminous information; and (4) the ability to maintain and manage the immense operation that the presidency has become.

The chapter is sharply critical of President Carter’s imperfect use of presidential power, which is notable because Neustadt served under him. The changes in the presidency seem to offer some explanation.

The increasing independency of individuals in Congress, the fragmentation of the president’s administration, and the growing power of interest groups are major shifts that Neustadt notes. He also points to the growing number of staff persons as relevant.

Reaching the titular topic, Neustadt then highlights the brief transition period from campaign to administration and offers some insights. Using the Bay of Pigs incident at the outset of Kennedy’s administration, he explains that doing well in the transitional period can create a false sense of ability that may undermine a president thereafter.

Finally, Neustadt wrote in spring 1979 that a president’s ability to use television was becoming particularly important. In an addendum written two years later, he re-emphasizes the point by citing the election of President Ronald Reagan.