On War

Since overthrowing the adversary is “the natural end of the act of War” (376) the plan must be within the limits of this objective. Clausewitz argues that wars are “not like mutually destructive elements brought into collision, but like tensions of two elements still apart which discharge themselves in small partial shocks” (376). The state and its specifics have a direct impact on war. Because theory “is still quite powerless against the force of circumstances,” it must have room to account for all eventualities (377). The author separates theory into “where [one] can,” and “where [one] must” (377).

War in the real world deviates from “the absolute form of war,” in which “one thing follows another in rapid succession” (378). War has one final result, and until the result is attained, “nothing is decided” (378). For example, Napoleon’s success at the Battle of Borodino and conquest of Moscow did not lead to the ultimate victory of the French but that of the Russians. In war, everything is connected, and the results of single events are not independent. For these reasons, the beginning of every war must feature “its character and main outline” (379). The latter must be done “according to what the political conditions and relations lead us to anticipate as probable” (379). Addressing one’s opponent “will be regulated by the proportions of our own and his political demands” (380). The scale of means used in war is directly related to the political aims thereof; all the circumstances must be considered.

Clausewitz provides a brief history of warfare from Roman times to the early 19th century. He mentions the rise of Rome through military means, the Mongol invasions, warfare in Medieval Europe politically disunited under feudalism, and the condottieri armies of the Italian city-states. He highlights the exceptions, such as the power of Rome and Alexander the Great, that would be inapplicable to modern Europe. The author differentiates military service through Medieval land-based vassalage with paid mercenaries as he traces the development of standing armies used by modern states. The states paid such armies from their treasuries. For the civilians, the barbarism of pillaging and devastation of an invasion declined in this period as the armies became more civilized and addressed their political goals more efficiently. At the same time, “[w]ar had suddenly become again an affair of the people” (386), as happened with resistance to Napoleon in Spain and Russia. The “affair of the whole nation” pushed war closer “to its real nature, to its absolute perfection” (387). Despite the differences between the states, war has a fundamental nature, and it is up to war theory to identify it.

Overthrowing the enemy is the overarching objective of warfare. However, overthrowing the enemy is not synonymous with the conquest of his country. For example, in Clausewitz’s view, it would have been impossible for Napoleon to conquer the vast expanse of the Russian Empire. The objective must keep in mind “the overruling relations of both parties” because they contain a “center of gravity” upon which “everything depends” (389).

There are three key features of the overthrow of an enemy: 1) the dispersion of enemy troops; 2) conquest of the enemy’s “center of the power of the state,” which is usually the capital; 3) “[a]n effectual blow against the principal ally” (389). In principle, if conquering all enemies can be done by conquering one of them, then “the defeat of that one must be the aim of the war” (389). In this framework, making the objective last longer than necessary makes it more difficult.

Overall, a “methodical offensive war” comprises five main attributes: 1) conquest of enemy fortresses; 2) necessary supplies; 3) fortifying key points like bridges; 4) resting the troops; 5) waiting for troop reinforcement. Some attributes play to the enemy’s advantage, such as the question of reinforcements and rest. Therefore, it is important to weigh the risks and consider other actions.

If overthrowing the enemy is the overarching aim of war, then it may be adjusted “when the conditions under which this object might be attained do not exist” (393). Herein lies the concept of a limited object. For instance, one may wait for a favorable time if there is cause to do so. It is more common, however, “when neither party has anything definite to look for from the future” (394). For example, when a superior power challenges a smaller state, the small state may attack the former if the circumstances are expected to worsen over time. The latter forces the issue before the situation worsens or translates into an advantage for the smaller state.

The political objective has a direct relationship with the military counterpart. It is important to note that an ally of a state never addresses its cause “with the same earnestness as its own” (395). In unsuccessful cases, such an ally—an auxiliary armed force with its own leadership—“tries to get out of it on the cheapest terms possible” (395). At times, states do not perceive their enemy as one that must be destroyed but rather as a business transaction by weighing the risks and the benefits. When the influence of politics is particularly strong, it may include “such warfare as consists in a mere threatening of the enemy and in negotiating” (396). At this juncture, the theory of war is in a difficult situation.

When “war is only a part of political intercourse,” it is no longer “an independent thing in itself” (396). After all, war is often an instrument for governments and “nothing but a continuation of political intercourse, with a mixture of other means,” nor can it ever be separated from politics (396). Since war belongs to the political realm, “it will naturally take its character from thence” (397). With a grand policy, war may attain “its absolute form” (397). Subordinating war to politics “would be contrary to common sense, for policy has declared the war” (398). The one exception is “when policy promises itself a wrong effect from certain military means” (399). When war and policy are harmonious, then it is possible “to make the chief commander a member of the cabinet” (399).

When an overthrow of the enemy is not possible, then one should focus on a limited objective such as an offensive war. Such a war would undermine the enemy's resources and supply base, its military capabilities, and gained territories may be kept or used in negotiations. The exertion of one’s own troops depends on the geography, with contiguous enemy lands requiring less effort in contrast to “a strip running up between hostile provinces” (401). However, the enemy may be conquering territory elsewhere at the same time.

Defensive war cannot focus on absolute negotiations but rather on making the enemy feel threatened. The disadvantages of defense include the exhaustion of troops. For this reason, “the defense should find its object in the idea of the ‘waiting for’” if the defender is unable to counterattack (403). In this context of “strategic passiveness,” the defender must gain advantage by “repelling partial attacks” or even engage in “small offensive operations” to gain temporary advantage (403). Clausewitz extensively examines the differences between the positions of Frederick the Great during the Seven Years’ War and the Napoleonic invasion of Russia. For example, the Russian defense pursued a deep retreat and had an “enormous success” of a counterattack backed by “suffering and sacrifices” (405).

To destroy the enemy, one must “reduce the weight of the enemy’s power into as few centers of gravity as possible” (406) by acting in a concentrated way and as quickly as possible to avoid wasting power. Reducing the power of the enemy to one focal point depends on “its political connection” (406), such as allies and on the character of the theater of war. The exception to the center-of-gravity rule is “if ancillary expeditions promise extraordinary advantages” (407). In such cases, it may be beneficial to divide the troops in an offensive if the division yields greater results, or if the war theater’s breadth translates into splitting up the troops. After the victory, one must engage in a “pursuit of fresh blows wherever necessary” (413). To illustrate his points, Clausewitz concludes the last chapter with a hypothetical scenario, in which Russia remains neutral, while the Netherlands, Britain, Prussia, Austria, and other parts of Germany attack France, the strongest power.