On War

If tactics change, then so does strategy, because the two are related: “If tactical facts in one case are entirely different from those in another, then the strategic must be so also” (115). Typically, in mass-scale battles, many soldiers are arranged behind one another. A small portion of the mass is engaged in combat until it burns out and the next group is deployed. Modern battles generally follow this pattern because of their military organization, understanding of the theory of warfare, and support of national interests.

Combat is the true expression of war, while all other aspects are auxiliary. Since combat is a fight, then “the destruction or conquest of the enemy is the object” (116). The ultimate aim of war is political. At times, it takes “a number of greater or smaller acts which are bound up into a whole” to attain it (116).

In a single combat, to overcome one’s opponent, one must concentrate on “the destruction of his military force” (116). This act must be carried out “to such a degree that he can no longer continue the contest” (116). It is crucial to destroy the enemy in individual combat scenarios and in general. The destruction of the enemy, however, is the means, and “something else always the object” (117). Clausewitz challenges the notion that it is possible to overtake an enemy by other means, such as strategic blows that would paralyze the force. He argues that “only great tactical results can lead to great strategical ones” (117). Simplicity and directness are preferred, as “we must not lift the arm too far for the room given to strike” (118).

Clausewitz reiterates that “the destruction of the enemy’s army is always the preponderating object in war” (119). What destruction means is “[a] diminution of [the enemy’s army] relatively greater than on [one’s] own side” (119). The destruction not only pertains to men (who are killed, wounded, or taken prisoner) but also equipment, including horses, and supplies. The loss of territory and the status and numerical superiority of reserve troops are of note.

In addition to significant physical losses and the ability to continue fighting, psychological demoralization is also of significance, since “the moral forces are also shaken, broken, and go to ruin” (119). In contrast, morale increases with combat victories. For example, morale may increase if a smaller group beats a numerically-superior enemy. Overall, victory comprises these key features: greater losses of the enemy, physically and psychologically, and “[h]is open avowal of this by the relinquishment of his intentions” (122).

Even though the physical destruction of enemy troops is the ultimate goal of a battle, there also are other goals for which the destruction is merely a means to an end. Clausewitz briefly reviews the two types of war: offensive and defensive. The goal for both types is the destruction of enemy troops. However, offensive warfare also involves the conquest of territory or some other objective. In contrast, defensive warfare involves the defense of a territory or another objective. There are also indirect aims of combat, such as reconnaissance. It is “a bad sign” for strategy if most combat is defensive (125).

The duration of combat is important “in relation to the other forces of war” (125). Clausewitz suggests that “[f]or the conqueror the combat can never be finished too quickly, for the vanquished, it can never last too long” (125). At times, military success is largely dependent on combat duration. For this reason, Clausewitz lists this feature as part of a strategy. In turn, combat duration depends on such factors as strength and position. For example, larger-sized forces will prolong the duration of the fighting.

Individual battles feature key moments, but “[n]o battle is decided in a single moment” (126). However, even before combat is over, there comes “a point in time when it may be regarded as decided” (126). At times, new forces may be sacrificed in combat which is hopeless for one side. Each combat leads to “one total result” (126). Clausewitz highlights key moments of decision in combat: 1) when one side loses an object, the possession of which was the goal; 2) the loss of territory, depending on its significance; 3) other circumstances such as the destruction of enemy troops.

The use of reinforcement differs between simply increasing the existing force or attacking the enemy from the rear or flank. The latter is a more efficient use. These types of attacks have “a more favourable effect on the consequences of the decision than upon the decision itself” (128). Surprise attacks are also effective psychologically. Clausewitz provides a number of examples, such as the 1759 Battle of Kunersdorf, which was disastrous for Frederick the Great, and hypothetical suggestions for changing its course.

There are cases of separating forces meant for fighting together into separate combats even though their goal is “one common combat” (130). Such cases are of strategic significance. Some examples include marches in separate columns and advanced guards.

Battles can only take place upon mutual consent. A battle is a “very modified duel” with its goals being “bound up with the battle” (130). Occasionally, battles are impossible, for instance, when “the position in a camp [is] regarded as something unassailable” (131). In other cases, a defending side may avoid a battle by giving up its position and retreating. One way to force an enemy to accept a battle is by surrounding them. Depending on the circumstances, avoiding a battle by some means may say nothing about the physical or psychological superiority of the opponent offering a battle.

Clausewitz defines “general action” as “[a] conflict of the main body,” and “a conflict with all our might for a real victory” rather than one focused on secondary goals (132). At the same time, secondary goals may be part of general action. The character of general action is linked both to theory, the decision-making process, and the impact of battlefield successes. For example, breaking up a formation that provides a cohesive organization to enemy troops and enhances their chance of victory may constitute such a decision. Alternatively, the decision may involve the conquest of an important physical location from the enemy in a defensive position.

According to the author, “[t]he result of the whole combat consists in the sum total of the results of all partial combats” (134). These separate combats depend on three key factors: 1) “the pure moral power in the mind of the leading officers”; 2) “by the quicker melting away of our troops”; 3) by losing territory (134). For instance, the decision to retreat depends on the remaining fresh reserve troops when the opponent is objectively superior.

There are three key effects of victory: 1) impact on the generals and their troops; 2) impact on the states participating in the given war; 3) “the particular result of these effects as manifested in the subsequent course of the war” (136). The author underscores the psychological factors both for the victors and the vanquished. Here, the vanquished are affected by their losses to a greater extent which can “lead to greater losses in physical force,” which in turn translates into an even greater negative psychological impact (136). In other words, the two features reinforce each other on the losing side.

Clausewitz believes that the psychological factor of victory plays a greater role in modern warfare as compared to historical precedents. One effect, for example, may be “a rising distrust of the chief commander” by his subordinates (137). He differentiates between the latter and panic among the troops. In turn, the effect on the country and its people is “the sudden collapse of hopes stretched to the utmost” (138). Based on these factors, Clausewitz concludes that war theory must account for human weakness.

There are five factors that define the concept of war. First, battles must be used to destroy the enemy’s force. Second, this destruction defines the means of a battle. Third, “[o]nly great and general action can produce great results” (140). Fourth, the results are great when separate combats “unite themselves in one great battle” (140). Fifth, the highest command—the general-in-chief—acts as a commander in person only “in a great general action” (140). In other words, general action is “war concentrated” and “the center of gravity of the whole war or campaign” (140). In it, the commander assembles forces “to strike a decisive blow” (140).

At the same time, a great battle is “the bloodiest way of solution” (140). For this reason, politicians and high-ranking army command may try to avoid such a decisive battle by either achieving their aims without it or changing it. Clausewitz believes that modern warfare presupposes bloodshed and, therefore, preparedness for it in peacetime.

Victory in such a battle depends on four factors: 1) tactical form; 2) the country’s character; 3) the proportion of the infantry, artillery, and cavalry (the three arms); 4) the relative strength of the two sides. Exceptions notwithstanding, numerical superiority is also a considerable factor.

Victories in combat have strategic advantages, one of which is the pursuit of a defeated army with the purpose of extending a victory. Pursuits typically happen when the vanquished troops leave their position, making victory “small and weak” (144). There are also scenarios when combat is still ongoing in pursuit of the remaining enemy troops, but victory is already attained. Pursuits may be done in different ways, for instance, by using the cavalry. However, there may be obstacles on the ground that may limit the pursuit. A pursuit may also employ the advanced guard, some of which is the cavalry. The most involved pursuit involves the victorious army advancing as much as its physical stamina allows. Continuing the pursuit into the night increases the impact of combat victory.

The next stages of pursuit are simple, hard, and “a parallel march to intercept” (147). For example, the simple pursuit allows the enemy to retreat “until he thinks he can risk another battle” (147). In contrast, the parallel march is the most effective pursuit. When a retreating army moves toward an important physical point, such as a city, a victor’s march on a parallel road may “quicken the retreat of the beaten army in a destructive manner” (149). The victor may also attempt to intercept the beaten army through a detour.

A second battle after a loss “would lead to a complete defeat” or even destruction, which is “a military axiom” (150). Losses negatively affect the beaten army both psychologically and physically. Readiness for another battle depends on a change in circumstances involving such features as reinforcements. The nature of the retreat and its complicating factors, in turn, depend on the nature of the battle and other circumstances.

The specific way in which night combat is conducted belongs to the realm of tactics. However, it is relevant strategically in its totality. Night attacks constitute a “vehement form of surprise” which creates unequal circumstances for the attacker and the defender (151). However, the attacker may not be aware of the defender’s arrangement or the subsequent possible measures employed by the defender. The defender is also “more at home than the assailant” (152). Such attacks are even more difficult with larger defending forces involved. The risks and difficulties in carrying out such attacks usually limit them to smaller groups. For these reasons, attacking at night is “more difficult in modern wars than formerly” (152).

Overall, night attacks have four key categories: 1) unusual audacity and psychological superiority; 2) enemy panic and one’s own psychological superiority; 3) “[c]utting through an enemy’s army of superior force;” 4) only “extraordinary daring” can bring success to one’s own forces (154).