On War

The elements of combat in strategy include psychological, geographical, physical, mathematical, and statistical aspects. For example, the physical element describes “the whole mass of the military force” (86). Geometrical elements describe the terrain. All the elements from these broad categories “are generally manifold, and intimately connected with each other in every single operation of war” (86). The conquest of “provinces, towns, fortresses, roads, bridges” and other parts of the terrain is “the immediate object of battle, but never the ultimate one” (85). The 1814 capture of Paris is one such example that led to the collapse of Napoleon’s power and peace in Europe. Battles are to be looked at as a “chain” that is “strung together,” including the “capture of land” (85).

Psychological factors play a key role in warfare as “the spirits which permeate the whole element of war” (86). They affect not only the commanders and the soldiers but also public opinion and have “the moral effect on a victory of or defeat” (86). At the time of writing, psychological factors were generally not part of military theory, but “they still belong to the theory of the art of war” (86). Only by acknowledging the “full value” of human psychology, and its “frequently incredible influence,” can one gain a complete picture of warfare (87).

The key psychological traits include “The Talents of the Commander; the Military Virtue of the Army; Its National feeling” (88). They must factor into warfare, and “the best plan is not to undervalue any of them” (88). It is also important to pay attention to “enthusiasm, fanatical zeal, faith, opinion” (88). Thereby, these powers comprise “the national spirit of an army” (88).

Clausewitz describes the military virtue of the troops as “a definite moral power which may be supposed wanting, and the influence of which may therefore be estimated—like any instrument the power of which may be calculated” (89). Virtue is different from “mere bravery” (88). In contrast, enthusiasm “gives life and greater fire to the military virtue of an army,” but is not a requirement for virtuous behavior (88). Furthermore, war is a distinct realm “different and separate from other pursuits” (88). It is necessary, however, for the army to have corporate spirit which “forms the bond of union” and is part of military virtue (89). Thus, the “honour of its arms” translates into “the true military spirit” (89).

The author also identifies other important psychological features, including endurance, bravery, enthusiasm, and aptitude. They “supply the place of military virtue” (89). The latter “is a quality of standing armies only” in contrast to national uprisings or standing armies opposing “national insurrection” (89, 90). Overall, this type of virtue is especially important “the more the theater of operations and other circumstances make the war complicated” (90).

Boldness “stands opposite to Foresight and prudence” and has a direct relationship with war (91). Even when boldness leads to detrimental consequences in war, it is a “fine failing” (91). The one exception is the use of boldness to disobey the superior authority. After all, “there is nothing in war which is of greater importance than obedience” (91). In Clausewitz’s view, “boldness becomes of rarer occurrence the higher we ascend the scale of rank” (91).

Perseverance is another important quality considering the uncertainties of war. For example, commanders may find themselves “in a constant whirlpool of false and true information” as well as mistakes that result from negligence and fear (93). The commander’s “stability of character” is one way to guard against an onslaught of emotional impressions (94). Furthermore, physical and moral power are required to combat the “endless exertion, pains, and privations” that are not unusual in war (94).

The significance of numerical superiority depends on strategy and exerts “a very essential influence on the issue of the combat” (94). Psychological factors such as valor aside, the number of soldiers determines the outcome. However, “superiority has degrees,” and is relevant when it is “sufficiently great to be a counterpoise to all other co-operating circumstances” (95). In the early 19th century, European armies generally resembled each other in equipment, skills, and organization, while military virtue and leadership talent made a difference. Generally, it is difficult “to gain a victory over an enemy double [one’s] strength” (96). However, numerical superiority is not “a necessary condition of victory” (97).

Surprising the enemy is an important element, without which “the preponderance at the decisive point is not properly conceivable” (97). Its two key features are speed and secrecy. It is usually difficult to conceal war preparations, considering the size of the army and the quantity of supplies and arms. For this reason, surprises usually occur in a different way. For instance, Frederick the Great (See: Key Figures) used the element of surprise during the 1760 Battle of Leipzig when he changed his position at night.

A stratagem is a plan to challenge or outwit an opponent and “implies concealed intention” (100). It is deceit to achieve a military goal. Its etymology highlights its links to strategy. In some cases, the greater the impression on the enemy, the greater the expenditure for the one carrying out the deceit. For a general, “a correct and penetrating eye is a more necessary and more useful quality” as opposed to craftiness (101). In some cases, stratagem becomes the last resort to change the course, as “boldness and strategy intensify each other” (101).

According to Clausewitz, “[t]he best strategy is always to be very strong, first generally, then at the decisive point” (101). For this purpose, the forces must stay concentrated. There are many historical examples of when the forces were separated to their detriment. The concentration of the entire force must be “acknowledged as the norm” (101).

Since war is the collision of two opposing sides, the stronger one destroys the weaker opponent and carries on. Here tactics and strategy may differ. For example, in tactics, a commander may only use as much force as necessary at that moment and preserve the rest. In strategy, however, there are times when “we can never employ too many forces,” and so “they must be applied simultaneously to the immediate purpose” (103). Clausewitz differentiates between reinforcements and “fresh unused troops” (104). However, fresh troops are not necessarily “esteemed higher in point of moral value” than the soldiers already in the field (104). It is also easier to estimate the required force for partial combat but not for strategy, because it has fewer limits than tactics. In tactics, a military force may suffer “a diminution of power” when time is a factor (105). However, the latter does not affect strategy to a significant degree. Therefore, for strategy, a “continual development of new forces” is important (106).

There are two key reasons for the existence of an army reserve. The first allows “the prolongation and renewal of the combat” (106). The second deals with unforeseen events. For example, for tactical purposes, a corps may be “placed out of reach of fire” in the rear (106). A strategic reserve meant for unforeseen events may be part of strategy. At times, strategy and tactics are linked directly. However, there are cases when strategic reserves are not logical. Those cases pertain to the “supreme decision” when all forces must be employed within the space to which the decision pertains (107). In such cases, a strategic reserve must participate “in the capital result” (108).

The economy of forces describes the effective usage of one’s troops. For example, sufficient forces should be deployed where the enemy’s forces are located. Similarly, having an enemy’s forces fight, while a part of one’s own troops are idle, is a sign of being “a bad manager of [one’s] forces” (108). When there is military action, it is important to ensure that “all parts act” (108).

The geometrical element refers to the positions of the army, fortifications, terrain elements, and other uses of space. It “can become a predominant principle” and is important in tactics (109). Clausewitz suggests that “[i]n tactics time and space quickly dwindle to their absolute minimum” (109). For example, putting the opponent in a situation by attacking the flank and rear to prevent him from retreating. The spatial factor plays a lesser role in strategy “on account of the greater space and time” (109). In contrast, strategy depends more on “the number and the magnitude of the victorious combats, than on the form of the great lines by which they are connected” (109).

At times, the dynamics of war are such that the “circumstances can never be exactly the same on both sides” (110). In addition, war is affected by the imperfect knowledge of the respective positions and by the difference in political goals of each side. For this reason, “a suspension in the act of warfare” seems to stand “in contradiction with the nature of the thing” (110). However, military history reveals that “standing still and doing nothing is quite plainly the normal condition of an army in the midst of war,” while the action is an “exception” (110). Human perception also contributes to the imperfection of war. According to the author, “war is often nothing more than an armed neutrality, or a menacing attitude to support negotiations” (111). Overall, a military “campaign does not progress by a continuous, but by an intermittent movement” (112). It is punctuated by “a period of watching” when both sides act defensively (112).

Clausewitz discusses the character of modern warfare in his time. For instance, he examines Napoleon’s failed invasion of Russia in 1812 and argues that “an empire of great dimension is not to be conquered” (112). More importantly, “the probability of final success does not in all cases diminish in the same measure as battles, capitals, and provinces that are lost” (112). The latter was the case of the enemy’s offensive power being depleted and being overtaken by defensive measures. Both political and military strength is important in the framework of modern warfare, “which is waged with the whole weight of the national power on each side [and so] must be organized differently in principle” as compared to those wars that only rely on their armies (113).

Warfare comprises periods of action interrupted by long pauses. Equilibrium occurs when neither side acts. When there is tension, “everything has been prepared and arranged for great movement” (113). In fact, decisions and measures taken when there is tension are “more important and more prolific in results” as compared to the state of equilibrium (114). The state of equilibrium, action, and tension are relevant to taking practical actions in war and are part of its dynamics. For this reason, commanders must understand the differences between these states and how to use them to their advantage.