On the Genealogy of Morals

Nietzsche was interested in looking beyond the right or wrong way of living life. Instead, he wanted to understand how particular ideas and social structures came to be and how those structures both influenced and were influenced by historical and social contexts. Instead of instructing his readers on the right way to live—as in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics or Marcus Aurelius’s Meditations—Nietzsche dismantled morality itself. In On the Genealogy of Morals, Nietzsche proposes that morality is a product of social power.

He begins by presenting his theory of “slave morality”—a set of values which emphasize submissive qualities like meekness, patience, compassion, and humility. “Slave morality” contrasts with “aristocratic morality,” or the morality of the nobility, which observes the rituals of power, greed, and domination. With this understanding, Nietzsche argues that there is no such thing as “right” or “wrong,” “good” or “evil.” These pervasive qualities are merely social constructions developed throughout the complex history of human morality.

Nietzsche argues that morality lends humans a sense of purpose and meaning in an otherwise meaningless existence. Aristocratic, or “master,” morality was a way of keeping happy people in positions of power secure in their happiness. So long as they could justify their domination over others, they could continue living lives of privilege while others suffered. The word “nobility” itself, Nietzsche argues, is proof of how the privileged see themselves. “Slave morality,” a form of resentment and retaliation, first formed as the antithesis to aristocratic morality. It was a means for oppressed peoples to view themselves in a greater light than nobility. Their humility and patience stood in stark contrast to the ostentatious lifestyles of the wealthy.

The origin of morality itself begins with consciousness. Nietzsche explains that as soon as humans became conscious, they began to plan for and make decisions about the future, what the philosopher refers to as “making promises.” The results of being able to make promises about the future were concepts like responsibility and obligation, and with these came guilt. These ideas soon developed a unique relationship among humans that Nietzsche argues forms the foundation for all morality: the relationship of the creditor and debtor. This affiliation gave way to punishment when the creditor—whether the individual or the community—demanded payment.

The interplay of these two moralities—the moralities of the creditor and debtor, “slave morality” and “master morality” as defined by Nietzsche—have unique benefits for both parties. For oppressed people, the values and systems associated with “slave morality,” such as peacefulness and community, endow their existence with meaning and an antidote to despair. The moral lens through which they see the world portrays them as superior; their sacrifices assure them that they will one day have an eternal reward after death. For those in a position of power, “slave morality” keeps oppressed people docile, happy, and productive, enabling nobility to continue feeling justified in their benevolent and self-serving morality. Nietzsche emphasizes that neither morality is “good” or “bad.” He has already established that there is no such thing as a weighted value for actions or systems of belief: They are merely the reality of the history of morality as a necessary and complex reaction to a life without spiritual purpose.