Nuclear War: A Scenario

The warning from the satellite reaches the National Reconnaissance Office in Aurora, Colorado. Personnel at that base instantly relay this message to several other offices across the country, especially those tied to the National Security Agency and the Department of Defense.

The US Space Force wants to make sure that they have not detected a ballistic missile by accident. Most countries announce their launches in advance, but “the exception is North Korea” (37), which sees its nuclear program as a unique symbol of its national prowess. Now, it is crucial to discover where the missile is heading and whether it is an attack or just a provocation. Officials rely on all available sources of information to learn as much as possible as quickly as possible.

The National Military Command Center (NMCC) is a bunker under the Pentagon and would serve as a major nerve center during a nuclear war. Its officials are furiously trying to interpret the signals regarding the ICBM, and which protocol they might need to execute as a result. As they try to make sense of the intelligence, they deal with “the fog of war” (40), the profound uncertainty of a fast-moving situation where countless lives are hanging in the balance and decisions must be made quickly even before gathering all the facts.

Clear Space Force Station in Alaska is a remote base that is best equipped to get a first read on where the North Korean ICBM is headed and relay its information to the proper military agencies. However, only 20 seconds in, it is still too early to tell whether the missile is on a trajectory that suggests a test or attack, and so everyone waits.

At the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) base in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado, everyone is both stunned and puzzled: “Everyone is thinking the same thing. One nuclear missile doesn’t make any sense” (45). An attack ought to consist of many more missiles designed to “cut off the head of the snake” or else the attacker essentially guarantees their own destruction (46). NORAD’s function is to collect all the disparate information from various agencies and present it to decision-makers. This puts enormous pressure on them to ensure that the information they deliver is reliable.

At the headquarters of the US Strategic Command (STRATCOM) in Nebraska, the commander scrambles to an underground bunker, attempting to find out how soon a potential missile will strike and when the US can begin its retaliatory launches.

At the NMCC, the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff set up videoconference links with the commanders of NORAD and STRATCOM. The NORAD commander then confirms that “an attacking intercontinental ballistic missile is on its way to the East Coast of the United States” (52).

Providing a historical background, Jacobsen explains that the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) was developed in the early 1960s as a long-range nuclear weapon that, unlike a bomber, could not be shot down before delivering its payload. A Pentagon scientist named Herb York wanted to calculate how long it would take for a missile from the USSR to reach the United States. He arrived at a figure of 26 minutes and 40 seconds, or 1,600 seconds. This is simply too short a time for anyone to make rational decisions, especially governing the lives of millions. This number seemed to prove “that there is no way to win a nuclear war” (53). A typical ICBM spends roughly five minutes in its boost phase, from its launch site into the earth’s atmosphere, about 20 minutes cruising through space, and then a 100-second terminal phase where it bears down on its target. A missile launched from North Korea targeting the East Coast of the United States would extend York’s figure by only a few minutes at 33 minutes.

Back in the narrative’s hypothetical nuclear attack situation, the STRATCOM base sits on a forbidding stretch of territory in rural Nebraska, known for terrible flooding which inflicted enormous damage on base infrastructure in the past. This is important since the base contains the Doomsday Planes, responsible for taking a portion of the US government that survives a nuclear attack to conduct the ensuing war from the sky. The STRATCOM commander needs to get aboard one of those planes as soon as possible, but first, he is determined to speak to the president with clearer information on what is occurring.

At the NMCC, it is now confirmed that the missile is heading for the East Coast of the United States. The question is now whether or not to activate the US’s “Launch on Warning” policy, by which “America keeps a majority of its deployed nuclear arsenal on ready-for-launch status, also known as Hair-Trigger Alert” (58).

Providing a historical background, Jacobsen explains that it is official US policy that it may launch its nuclear weapons at the prospect of being attacked, even before such an attack has occurred. This is a very controversial policy, which then-candidate George W. Bush described as creating “unacceptable risks of accidental or unauthorized launch” (59). Despite these and other criticisms from future presidents, including Barack Obama and Joe Biden, the policy remains firmly in place.

Back in the hypothetical narrative, the President finally receives word that a North Korean ICBM is heading for the United States, confirming that this is not a test.

The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff prepare to talk with the president and provide their advice, although advise is all they can do. Once the president has been briefed, he will have a mere six minutes to make a decision, “roughly the amount of time it takes to brew a ten-pot cup of coffee” (64).

At the White House, Secret Service agents carry the president to an underground bunker, while the president comes to grips with how little they understand the situation and what is required of them. Given that the most important person involved has serious gaps in their knowledge, the potential for mistakes or miscalculations is all too real.

Providing a historical background, Jacobsen explains that the Hwasong-17 ICBM in the scenario fired from a mobile launcher, which, unlike American ICBMs, can move around and are thus harder to detect or take out in a first strike. North Korea most likely developed such a weapon by stealing or otherwise illegally acquiring a Russian-made rocket motor, the RD-250. US officials long assumed that North Korea would not be able to hit the US with an ICBM, but in addition to having demonstrated that capacity far sooner than anyone anticipated, North Korea’s geography also creates severe problems for any defense against a missile attack. Unless a drone is fortuitously located to knock a missile out in its boost phase, it will enter a “dark black hole” (70), after which detection and interception become significantly less likely.

Back in the hypothetical narrative, with the Hwasong-17 now in the Earth’s atmosphere, the Missile Defense Agency is the last possible hope for averting a catastrophe. The US has a total of 44 missiles to shoot at an incoming ICBM, and the results of previous tests are far from encouraging.

The SBX radar station is a floating base in the Pacific Ocean that is supposed to provide the intelligence necessary for a successful missile defense, including when a missile is in its midcourse flight, although there are serious doubts that its capabilities measure up to how it was originally sold to Congress. Critics have called it “the Pentagon’s 10-billion-dollar radar gone bad” (76).

After much public fanfare and billions of dollars spent, the intercepting missiles make their attempt to collide with and destroy the North Korean missile.

In a process “akin to shooting a bullet with a bullet” (81), the interceptor rushes at the ICBM and fails, as does the next. The next two fail as well. As the prospect of success dwindles, the president must decide how to retaliate.

In the Presidential Emergency Operations Center (PEOC), the president prepares to make the decision that he alone can make regarding the launching of the US nuclear arsenal. Beside him is an aide carrying the so-called “Football,” a satchel containing executive orders and launch codes needed to commence a nuclear strike.

Providing a historical background, Jacobsen explains that in 1959, US military officials at a NATO military base in Europe realized, to their horror, that the safety protocols around nuclear weapons were shockingly lax. A Soviet attack could at any moment overwhelm those weapons and neutralize them before a retaliatory launch. In response, the US installed Permissive Action Links, electronic locks that would make it impossible for a weapon to detonate without positive authorization from the proper authorities, namely the president. To keep those codes intact, they instituted a system whereby a military aide with the proper codes is at the side of the president at all times.

Back in the hypothetical narrative, the President is reviewing his options of “what nuclear weapons to use, what targets to hit, [and the] estimated casualties that will result” (88). There are a variety of plans, each drawing on different wings of the nuclear triad, the missiles, bombers, and submarines that deliver nuclear weapons to their targets. Connected by video link, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) advises the president to move US forces to DEFCON 1 (most likely for the first time). The Secretary of Defense is eager to wait until he can establish contact with his counterparts in China and Russia, while the STRATCOM Commander and JCS insist that the president must initiate the countdown to retaliation.

The STRATCOM commander, also talking to the president on video, is ready to provide a set of options for retaliation. They must also be honest about the number of casualties such actions will entail, both from the blasts and the myriad environmental results. While the Secretary of Defense insists on contacting Moscow (to no avail, which has happened in real-life crises) and warning against the dangers of a wider war, the STRATCOM and JCS commanders produce a list of targets inside North Korea and demand quick action.

The president hesitates, not only as he learns of the massive damage that will likely affect Russia and China as well as North Korea but also from the STRATCOM commander’s admission that there is still no confirmation that the incoming missile contains a real warhead. As he prepares to authorize a launch, however, a tactical team storms into the PEOC and drags the president out.

From Anderson Air Force Base in Guam, a B-2 stealth bomber prepares to take on a payload that it will drop on North Korea or another target, but it takes a surprisingly long time to make it battle-ready.

The administrator of the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) is on the highway when an emergency team promptly arrives by helicopter and whisks him away. This is all part of the Continuity of Operations program, designed to maintain as much government functioning as possible amid a nuclear war. There is also a Population Protection Planning contingency, but in the event of nuclear war, that won’t be much of a priority “because everyone will be dead” (101). As the FEMA chief is whisked away to safety, he realizes that while in many situations the agency is supposed to save as many people as possible, in this case, all they can do is counsel people on how to look after themselves.

The officers who have seized the president are part of an elite Secret Service unit whose main purpose is to keep the president safe in an emergency. The STRATCOM commander objects furiously because the president must authorize launches immediately, but the Secretary of Defense overrules him, and the Secret Service whisks away the president. Fuming over the situation, the STRATCOM commander quickly learns that a bad situation has suddenly become significantly worse. There is now a new indication of a submarine-launched ballistic missile also heading to the United States.

A fierce argument continues between the STRATCOM commander demanding launch authorization and the Secret Service insisting on the president’s safety. The Secret Service decides to hurry the president to his helicopter, Marine One, and get him as far away from the potential blast zone as possible. In Washington, DC, there will be similar efforts to get as many presidential cabinet members as possible to a site known as Raven Rock (or Site R) in Pennsylvania to maintain as much continuity of government as possible. In anticipation of a major blow against government functions, there is strong pressure to rely on submarines, “the most survivable leg of the nuclear triad” (111), to ensure a severe retaliation.

Providing a historical background, Jacobsen explains that nuclear submarines are the most fearsome leg of the nuclear triad because they are undetectable. They carry an enormous payload and may rise to the surface at practically any time, launch, and disappear again before anyone could have a hope of responding, much less preventing such an outcome. Such a capacity may aid in the delusions of a “nihilistic madman with a nuclear arsenal” (116), such as the leader of North Korea, a totalitarian dictator who has imposed extraordinary hardships on his population to maintain the security and comfort of its ruling family.

For decades the US tried to prevent, then limit, the development of their nuclear program, to no avail. Their nuclear submarines are equipped with much less advanced technology than that of the other major powers, but it is at least theoretically possible for them to make a slow advance across the Pacific Ocean, periodically stopping to refuel, accepting the practical certainty that they would not survive the mission. It is far from impossible to imagine a submarine making it to the Alaskan coast, staying in shallow water where detection would be far more difficult due to ambient noise, launching a missile, and then vanishing once again.

Back in the hypothetical narrative, as the submarine-launched missile hurtles toward California, there is a desperate effort to anticipate where it might land. The leading possibilities are various military bases, but it is the Diablo Canyon Power Plant.

None of the weapons systems that the Pentagon has developed to protect against short-range ballistic missiles are anywhere near the power plant. This ushers in a chain of events known as “the Devil’s Scenario” (127). The same situation nearly occurred after the Fukushima nuclear accident in 2011, where a nuclear strike caused the plant’s core to collapse and unleashed enormous amounts of lethal radiation into the surrounding area, which was then propelled by the explosive power of the bomb.

Back in DC, the president crams onto Marine One, which hurriedly takes off to escape the likely blast zone. Learning of the strike against the nuclear plant and anticipating another bomb to hit the Pentagon within minutes, the President finally authorizes a package of 82 missiles, divided between ICBMs and SLBMs, to strike North Korea.

At an ICBM base in Wyoming, crews prepare for launch, which they can carry off with astonishing speed. The crews have been training for this eventuality, and after barely a minute has passed, 50 ICBMS begin their flight toward North Korea. An old man nearby, who is also a Russian spy, informs his handlers that the Americans just launched a nuclear attack.