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42 pages 1 hour read

Desmond Tutu

No Future Without Forgiveness

Nonfiction | Biography | Adult | Published in 2009

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Chapter 9-PostscriptChapter Summaries & Analyses

Chapter 9 Summary: “Why the Heck Am I Doing This Thankless Job?”

While the TRC’s task was to help heal a wounded people, its own members were South African as well. They too were “wounded and traumatized” (198), which made them distrustful of one another. They took offense easily and were defensive of their own turf. The working environment was stressful. Tutu admits making some staffing errors at the outset. He should have been alert to racial representation in staffing, but many early appointments were white. After the first round of staff appointments, the commission almost had a scandal. One commission member sat on a panel interviewing applicants in the Western Cape regional office, and that very same commissioner’s spouse got the job. This commissioner happened to be white. Luckily, the media did not emphasize this issue, but it divided the commission’s attention at the first hearing in East London.

Confidential information commonly leaked to the press, adding to distrust. To adjust to this reality, Tutu “tried to avoid having too much that was confidential” (201) and developed a good relationship with the press. Tutu “would have collapsed” from all the stress if not for his early morning walks, daily Eucharist, and knowledge of all those pulling for him. In response to criticism of bias in the hearings about the Bisho massacre, Tutu made a bland statement to the press about his commitment to fairness. Immediately, members of that panel took umbrage, alleging that he had publicly rebuked them. Although he resolved the matter by removing an offensive paragraph from the report, these types of interactions were common among TRC members.

The greatest threat came when one TRC member was accused of taking part in an atrocity in which three women were killed. Mr. Bennet Sibaya claimed that the commissioner, Mr. Ntsebeza, was in his car with a group of armed men shortly after the attack. In an “electric moment” (204), Sibaya named the commissioner at an amnesty hearing in October 1997. Such a scandal would put “the whole TRC process […] in jeopardy” (205). The Commissioner denied the allegations. The TRC’s Black members believed him, while the white members tended to believe the accuser. Ultimately, Sibaya confessed that both his statement, which he gave under duress to the police, and his later testimony were false. This cleared the Commissioner, to the great relief of Tutu, who accepted blame for not calling for an independent inquiry sooner.

On the eve of the TRC’s handing over its report to President Mandela, the ANC requested a special meeting with the TRC about an adverse finding in the report, but it did so after the deadline had passed. This was surprising because the finding was based on the ANC’s own submissions. Tutu was adamantly opposed to giving the ANC special treatment, as this would give the appearance that “the whole process was an elaborate charade set up to do the ANC’s bidding” (210-11). At its final meeting, the TRC voted on whether to grant the ANC’s request. The vote was 8-7 to deny it, with Tutu breaking the tie. The ANC then took the matter to the High Court to stop the report’s publication but lost again. The ruling cleared the way for the report to go to President Mandela and the press. Because of this late controversy, the “celebrations were very muted” (212).

Chapter 10 Summary: “We Did Not Know”

A series of institutional hearings, “where representatives of the major social institutions came to describe how they perceived their relationship to apartheid” (218), helped Tutu understand the reasons that so many white South Africans ignored the system’s injustice. Racism was prevalent throughout all the major institutions of that society, including news organizations, faith communities, the legal system, and business sectors.

In newspapers, journalists described events from a white perspective, using terms that the government favored, such as “terrorists” rather than “freedom fighters” (218). When the government shut down newspapers that championed the anti-apartheid cause, other newspapers engaged in self-censorship to avoid that fate. The electronic media was worse, as the South African Broadcasting Corporation was “under the thumb” of the Brotherhood, which promoted Afrikaner interests. That corporation prohibited Black employees from looking at white women and threatened to sack or whip any who violated this rule.

Apartheid segregated faith communities, and the health sector also “organized itself along racial lines” (224), grossly discriminating against Black medical students and doctors. Some white doctors even worked with the police, advising them on torture methods. In law, the bar council did not allow Black people to become members until 1990. Virtually all judges during the period under scrutiny were white males who could not relate to the world in which Black people lived. Judges almost always took the police’s word over that of Black detainees as truth. Businesses took part in racial capitalism, using Black people confined to certain areas as a cheap source of labor. Consequently, “South Africa has the most glaring gap between rich and poor in the entire African continent” (228-29). All these sectors worked to reinforce a herd mentality among whites and rewarded conformity with the system.

Tutu next assesses the TRC’s work, judging it like “the curate’s egg—good in parts” (231). Acknowledging its weaknesses, Tutu laments its failure to attract the bulk of the white community’s participation, its inability to gain the Inkatha Freedom Party’s participation until late in the process, and the pitfalls of the reparation and rehabilitation process. Specifically, that process did not provide victims with long-term counseling, and the funds were too slow in coming. One major strength of the process was that many police officers came forward in the amnesty process and disclosed the truth. Unfortunately, the military—then the South African Defence Force (SADF)—did not cooperate with the commission.

As Tutu explains, SADF was a part of the “total strategy” (236) that former President P. W. Botha used to annihilate communism. The government propaganda machine tried to convince South Africans that others were out to destroy their way of life, highlighting disasters that had occurred in countries to its north. SADF involved itself in civil wars against liberation movements and engaged in a “policy of hot pursuit” (238), raiding bases and camps it deemed terrorist in other states. The government forced these states to refuse refuge to South African exiles working for liberation from apartheid. According to a report, SADF actions from 1980 through 1988 resulted in the deaths of 1.5 million people and 4 million refugees. Moreover, the strategy led to the militarization of policing in South Africa. An army aims to kill and destroy its enemies. This language made its way into policing, with orders from the top to assassinate all opponents: “The state entered the realm of criminality” (243). It equated resistance to apartheid with communism.

When evidence emerged that President Botha had given the orders in a bombing, TRC deputy chair Boraine suggested that Tutu visit the former president, now retired. In his few previous meetings with Botha, Tutu had never won concessions from the staunch apartheid supporter. This time, the meeting was friendly, and Botha agreed to provide written answers to the TRC’s questions. After 10 months, he completed the questions, but more evidence had emerged by then. The TRC wanted to meet with him, but he refused. When the TRC issued a subpoena, he still did not come, so he was arraigned. At the court hearing, Tutu appealed to him, asking him to simply say that he was sorry for pain that the policies of his government had caused. He refused. A “pathetic figure” (250), Botha wanted no part of the reconciliation process. While his successor, de Klerk, helped pave the way for the transfer of power, he missed an opportunity to become a great leader by trying to undermine Mandela and by qualifying his apologies for apartheid.

Tutu closes the chapter by emphasizing the powerful forces, the pervasiveness of racism, that exerted an influence on people. It was more a wonder that some white people challenged it than that most accepted it. Acknowledging the power of conditioning, Tutu humbly writes, “There but for the grace of God go I” (253).

Chapter 11 Summary: “Without Forgiveness There Really Is No Future”

After receiving much attention in the international press for the reconciliation process, Tutu traveled to several other countries that had histories of hostility. In Rwanda, where Tutsis had been the victims of genocide at the hands of Hutus, Tutu called for restorative justice. A cycle of “reprisal and counterreprisal that had characterized their national history had to be broken” (260). He encouraged those working for peace in Northern Ireland to continue their efforts despite setbacks.

Given his Christian faith, Tutu believes that “cosmic movement toward unity, toward reconciliation” (263), is God’s intention. Despite the alienation and disharmony in the world, this movement toward unity will eventually prevail. Forgiveness is a necessary part of achieving such unity. An arduous process that exposes all the pain, it requires the wrongdoer’s humility and the victim’s courage. It does not ask people to forget the evil but to empathize with the perpetrator. In Tutu’s view, forgiveness liberates the victim and allows for future relationships.

When Tutu visited Israel in 1989, before the TRC’s work, his message of forgiveness after visiting a Holocaust museum was not well received. Ten years later, after his TRC work, he received a warm welcome. However, philosophical disagreements persisted about forgiving Nazi crimes and the current Palestinian situation. Tutu argues that it is up to the living to forgive crimes against those in the past; only the current generation can do that. Otherwise, who could grant forgiveness for the sins of South Africa’s racist past, which predated 1948 by hundreds of years? Peace would be possible everywhere if “today’s adversaries were to imagine themselves becoming friends” (281).

Tutu notes that South Africa, where a government brutally oppressed Black people, is the most unlikely place for reconciliation to have worked—but it did. That should give hope to oppressed people everywhere. He is careful to stipulate, though, that the continued success of reconciliation will require material changes in the lives of people whom the apartheid government kept in poverty. No real reconciliation occurs if someone steals a pen, Tutu explains, and then apologizes but keeps the pen.

Postscript Summary

Tutu notes the incredible psychological toll on the TRC’s members. A mental health worker recommended at the outset that they take breaks, spend time with family, exercise, and have a spiritual routine. Despite doing these things, they were “shattered at what we heard and we did frequently break down or were on the verge of it” (286). Helping heal the nation was a great but costly privilege. Tutu learned of a prostate cancer diagnosis during TRC meetings as well. He describes the commissioners as “wounded healers” (287).

Chapter 9-Postscript Analysis

Tutu’s concern about the potential for scandal resulted from his worries about the public’s accepting the TRC’s recommendations. Restorative justice had many critics, some favoring general amnesty with no reckoning and others seeking punishment for perpetrators. According to G. Theissen and B. Hamber, 46% of white people considered the TRC’s work a “witch hunt,” and 60% did not support compensation for apartheid’s victims. (Theissen, G., and B. Hamber. “A State of Denial: White South Africans’ Attitudes to the Truth and Reconciliation Commission.” Indicator South Africa, vol. 15, no. 1, Autumn 1998, www.brandonhamber.com/publications/Journal%20A%20State%20of%20Denial.pdf. Accessed 23 Sept. 2021.) Critics seized upon any scandal or evidence of partiality toward the ANC to undermine the TRC’s legitimacy.

While the TRC struggled to gain the acceptance of South Africa’s white people, Tutu’s international reputation soared. His leadership of the TRC and advocacy of restorative justice won him widespread acclaim. Given his willingness to lead South Africans toward unity after so many people suffered egregious harm, Tutu had the moral authority to speak in other countries facing ethnic violence and hatred. In Rwanda, he encouraged the Tutsis—victims of a brutal genocide of more than 800,000 in a matter of months—to make peace with the Hutus, who perpetrated the murders. In Northern Ireland, where violence and tension between Catholics and Protestants had a long history, he encouraged those seeking peace. In Israel, he challenged the state to seek peace with Palestinians. While these countries did not necessarily follow his recommendations, people listened to him because of the South African experience.

Tutu repeatedly emphasizes that South Africa was the most unlikely place for forgiveness and harmony to take root—and that it therefore serves as a beacon of hope for all others. If South Africa can achieve peace, so too can other countries where racial, ethnic, religious, or other tensions persist. To reveal the difficulty of tackling racism in South Africa, he describes at length how its assumptions had permeated every institution and poisoned the minds of all. He describes how it penetrated his own mind: When he experienced turbulence on a flight, he worried that the Black pilots would be unable to handle it; of course, they landed the plane safely. Tutu cites this example to show that if someone as introspective as he at times allows unconscious stereotypes to control his thinking, South Africa has a long road ahead to overcome apartheid’s legacy.

Tutu acknowledges that the jury is still out on the long-term success of South Africa. That success depends on achieving unity and improving the Black majority’s economic circumstances. Apartheid systematically impoverished Black people, and the new system must change that. More than 20 years after the TRC completed its work, apartheid’s legacy is clear. Some 60% of the population and 72% of the population of Eastern Cape live below poverty level. The discrepancy in wealth is still staggering in 2021, as the richest 10% own more than 85% of household wealth. (Sguazzin, Anthony. “South Africa Wealth Gap Unchanged Since Apartheid, says World Inequality Lab.” Time, 5 Aug. 2021, time.com/6087699/south-africa-wealth-gap-unchanged-since-apartheid/. Accessed 23 Sept. 2021.)

Efforts to address the gap between rich and poor have included a progressive tax, governmental grants, and huge investments in education. Progress is painstakingly slow, as waste, inefficiency, and corruption hamper programs. When police arrested President Zuma, a Zulu who led the country from 2009 to 2018, on corruption charges in 2021, rioting broke out among supporters. Vigilantism is on the rise too: In one town, South Africans of Indian descent attacked Black South Africans. Although fears of looting motivated these attacks, they nonetheless victimized innocent people. The third largest party in the South African Parliament, the Economic Freedom Fighters, is anti-white and anti-Indian. Although the new president, Cyril Ramaphosa, uses a more unifying rhetoric, South Africa in 2021 still struggles to reach economic justice and unity.

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