Most Dangerous: Daniel Ellsberg and the Secret History of the Vietnam War

With plans to bug the Democratic campaign office, the Plumbers rented a banquet room in the Watergate Hotel. They planned to enjoy a late dinner, then sneak into the Watergate office building, break into the Democratic National Committee’s offices, photograph documents, and place listening devices. Their plans were foiled when the hotel restaurant closed, and a guard told them they had to leave. Hunt and another operative hid in the liquor cabinet, hoping to continue the mission, but they remained stuck there all night.

They made it to the Democratic National Committee (DNC) offices the next night, but they failed to pick the lock. They tried again the following night. This time, they managed to pick the lock and plant the listening devices, but the audio they recorded was too poor for them to understand what was being said. On the night of June 16, 1972, the Plumbers tried a fourth time. One of the operatives put electoral tape over a door bolt to keep it from locking but forgot to remove it after they entered. A guard found the tape. Suspicious, he called the police, who caught the operatives in the DNC offices.

The next day, the story was a small headline on the front page of the Miami Herald. Nixon thought the “preposterous” story must be “some sort of prank” (285). However, as the investigation progressed, clues began to tie the incident to the White House. Nixon insisted he had no knowledge of or role in the Watergate break-in, but some of his close advisors were implicated. Nixon and his team worried that the FBI would eventually track down Hunt and Liddy and learn about the White House’s role in other jobs, like the break-in to retrieve Ellsberg’s file from his psychiatrist’s office. So, Nixon and his team decided on a cover-up. They would get the CIA to tell the FBI that the Watergate incident had been part of an important intelligence operation and not to investigate the matter any further.

Meanwhile, Ellsberg and his lawyer were preparing for his upcoming trial. The case had no precedents; no one had ever been prosecuted for leaking government secrets. Ellsberg’s lawyer thought his client had a 50% chance of going to prison.

As the 1972 presidential election approached, Nixon led in the polls. Kissinger returned to Paris for peace talks with North Vietnam, and Nixon urged him to convince the Vietnamese that he would be “the mad bomber” in his second term (289). Finally, Kissinger and the North Vietnamese made a deal. In exchange for withdrawing all American forces, the North Vietnamese agreed to a ceasefire and promised to return American prisoners of war. Kissinger knew that North Vietnam would remove the president of South Vietnam when the Americans were out of the way, but the deal would still allow Nixon to declare “peace with honor” before the election (297).

However, they hadn’t included South Vietnamese President Thieu in the deal. Kissinger and Thieu had a tense meeting in which the angry president accused the Americans of “selling out” the South Vietnamese and demanded 69 modifications to the deal.

On election night, Nixon won with a landslide 60% of the vote. However, the threat of the Watergate investigation and the uncertainty of the peace agreement in Vietnam marred the victory. The government of North Vietnam refused to agree to the revised agreement, so Nixon responded with a violent bombing campaign that some referred to as “[w]ar by tantrum” (294). In the face of the relentless bombing, North Vietnam returned to the bargaining table. South Vietnam was still unhappy with the deal between the North and the US, but Nixon promised to respond with military action if North Vietnam violated the agreement.

On January 23, 1973, the peace deal to end the Vietnam War was signed. Kissinger guessed that the US would have to bomb North Vietnam again later in the spring, but Nixon announced the success of “peace with honor” to the American public (297).

Meanwhile, Ellsberg and Russo’s trial finally began, and Hunt, Liddy, and others involved in the Watergate break-in were found guilty. However, the investigation still hadn’t connected the operatives to any other jobs.

On the 68th day of Ellsberg and Russo’s trial, Ellsberg finally took the stand. He described his early role in the Vietnam War and how his mind had been changed by experiencing the violence and devastation firsthand. During lunch, Ellsberg sat at a table and sobbed.

At the beginning of April 1973, Judge Matthew Byrne, who presided over Ellsberg’s trial, was approached by John Ehrlichman, who was still Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs. Ehrlichman said Nixon was searching for a new head of the FBI and was considering Byrne. It was “a brazen attempt to win influence” with the judge (303). Nixon worried about the Ellsberg break-in coming to light and hoped Byrne would decide against admitting the evidence into the trial if it should appear. Byrne expressed his interest in the position and met with Ehrlichman again to “reiterate his strong interest” in the position (303).

Soon after, White House lawyer John Dean confessed to “the massive campaign of political spying and sabotage run from the White House” (304). On April 27, Judge Byrne informed Ellsberg and Russo about the attempt to burglarize Dr. Fielding’s office to obtain Ellsberg’s file. Byrne told Ellsberg that they didn’t have to make this sensitive information public, but Ellsberg didn’t hesitate to insist they use the evidence.

On April 30, Nixon “pressured his two closest aides to step down” (305-306), including Ehrlichman, as he tried to contain the Watergate scandal. The same day, someone leaked the story of Ehrlichman’s meeting with Judge Byrne to the Washington Star-News. Back in the courtroom, Judge Byrne described his meeting with Ehrlichman and insisted it didn’t influence his decision in the case. The defense argued that the court was “irretrievably compromised” and asked to dismiss the charges. Byrne refused, but just a few days later, Ehrlichman confessed that the Ellsberg break-in was “part of a White House investigation ordered by President Nixon” (306). The defense again asked for the charges to be dismissed, and the judge refused. Then, on May 10, the FBI revealed that Kissinger had bugged the phones of his assistants. One of these listening devices had recorded phone calls with Ellsberg, but the recording had disappeared in the White House.

With this continued “evidence of government misconduct” (307), Judge Byrne agreed to hear the arguments for and against ending the trial. On May 11, he announced to the packed courtroom that the “government’s transgressions” and “[b]izarre events [had] incurably infected the prosecution of this case” (309). He approved the motion for dismissal, and Ellsberg and Russo went free.

Meanwhile, fighting had resumed in Vietnam as North Vietnamese forces began closing in on the South. Nixon wanted to bomb the North, but the House and Senate had blocked funding for US military action in Vietnam. Because of the Watergate scandal, “Nixon was too politically weak to veto the bill” (313). Ellsberg watched, captivated, as the scandal continued to unfold. He wanted to stop the Vietnam War, and now, “in a winding and utterly unpredictable way, he might have accomplished his goal” (313). The events that began the Watergate scandal had been motivated by revenge on Ellsberg, and now the scandal was crippling Nixon’s efforts to wage war.

The FBI learned about the recording system in the Oval Office and asked for the tapes. When Nixon refused to provide them, the Supreme Court intervened, ruling that he had to turn them over. The recordings provided “irrefutable proof that Nixon had personally orchestrated the cover-up” of the Watergate scandal (314). The House prepared to vote to impeach the president, but instead, Nixon announced his resignation, effective August 10, 1974. His vice president, Gerald Ford, would succeed him.

On April 29, 1975, the “final battle for Saigon” was underway. The North Vietnamese troops were closing in on the city, and the roads were full of refugees and retreating soldiers. The US government announced a complete evacuation of American citizens, and the following day, North Vietnamese troops raised their flag above the presidential palace. Both President Johnson and President Nixon had reiterated their intentions not to become the first US presidents to lose a war. Instead, President Ford “inform[ed] the American people that the country had just lost its first war” (319).

Although the world is different today than when Ellsberg released the Pentagon Papers, the “big questions” about the government’s right to secrecy and the public’s right to information remain relevant.

In 2013, filmmaker Laura Poitras exchanged a series of encrypted emails with an unidentified source that would turn out to be former CIA employee Edward Snowden. Snowden wanted to reveal a “system of domestic spying” conducted by the National Security Agency (322), which was collecting and storing data on American citizens. Like Ellsberg, Snowden was accused of being a traitor and violating the Espionage Act. He flew to Russia, where he was granted asylum. As the debate raged about whether Snowden was a traitor or a hero, Ellsberg was interviewed on CNN. In the 40 years since the conclusion of his trial, Ellsberg had continued to work in peace and anti-nuclear weapons movements and was arrested numerous times at various demonstrations. On television, Ellsberg told the American public he believed Snowden had done an “incalculable service” to American democracy by leaking his story.