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MenciusMencius
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Book VIChapter Summaries & Analyses
Book VI, Part A Summary
After the localized and culturally specific character of Book V and its discussion of rites, Book VI, Part A, returns to more conventional philosophical ground. Specifically, it deals with the question of human nature. Part A begins with another Chinese philosopher of the period, Kao Tzu, using an analogy to demonstrate a point about our natures. He says, “To make morality out of human nature is like making cups and bowls out of the willow” (122). In other words, human nature is neither essentially moral nor immoral but can be fashioned, like the willow is into various products, into either.
Mencius responds by using the analogy against Kao Tzu. He says that in Kao’s example the willow tree is mutilated by fashioning it into cups and bowls. Similarly, human nature must be mutilated to be made moral. Consequently, morality cannot prevail if man is amoral and morality is accomplished only by this means. In the next section, presumably because the first exchange was inconclusive, Kao Tzu provides another analogy to discuss human nature. This time it is with whirling water. Kao says that just as water will follow the outlet or channel, to east or west, that has been dug for it, human nature will not necessarily become either good or bad. Which path it chooses will depend on external circumstance. Again, Mencius uses an extension of the same analogy to prove a different point. Principally, he suggests that we can think of human nature’s relation to morality in terms of high and low rather than east and west. In that case, water flows naturally downward but can be forced upwards, for instance by splashing it onto one’s face. Likewise, we can become bad because of circumstance, like water forced upwards, but that does not show that our nature, like water with gravity, does not naturally tend toward the good.
This topic leads Mencius into a discussion of other theories of human nature and other explanations as to why we find immorality in the world (section 6). This time a man, Kun-tu Tzu, outlines these to Mencius. As seen, Kao Tzu believes that human nature can become either good or bad. Hence, under good kings there is much virtuous action, while under bad kings there is much cruelty. Meanwhile, another theory is that some people are naturally good, others naturally bad. This theory would explain why even under good rulers there are immoral people, and under bad rulers there are moral ones. In contrast, Mencius maintains that all men possess compassion, which makes them naturally good. There are immoral people because “there are people who fail to make the best of their native endowment” (126). He explains that this failure is often due to the fact that we are misled and distracted by “external things.” For this reason, some men are greater than others.
Mencius uses a different analogy to illustrate a similar point (section 8). If humans constantly cut down the trees on a mountain and allow cattle to graze there, no trees will grow. However, that does not mean that the “nature” of the mountain is to be bald. Similarly, one cannot be surprised by a lack of wisdom in a king, even if he is advised by a sage. The positive influence of the sage is more than drowned out if the former still spends the majority of his time with people who are superficial or unwise.
Book VI, Part B Summary
Part B begins with Mencius being asked whether one should prioritize sex and food or the rites. He says that the rites are of more importance and of greater weight in any decision, but that the choice over which to prioritize depends on the situation and the relative “weights” of each at stake. So, for instance, it would be permissible to break a minor rite to avoid starvation (section 1). In section 4 and 8, Mencius says more about the morality of war. In the former section he argues that one should not appeal to motives of profit when trying to dissuade kings from conflict. One should only use appeals to morality to avoid war. In the latter section Mencius adds that war can almost never be justified if the territories of the empire are fairly divided according to the rites. Finally, Mencius discusses the correct levels of taxation (section 10). Linking this part to the discussion of human nature, he argues that too high a level makes the king a “Chieh” (a thief), but too low a level would return society to the level of the barbarians owing to the lack of public spending that is necessary to maintain a civilized state.
Book VI Analysis
Book VI contains some of the most stylistically striking passages in the whole of Mencius. The images of the Willow (122), the whirling water (122), and the Ox Mountain (127) resonate with the poetic harmony, and natural simplicity, that “the way” is intended to bring to human society and life. Nevertheless, with regards to the content of Mencius’s ideas, the reader may feel that the analogies themselves shed relatively limited light. A case in point is the water analogy. Kao Tzu believes that human nature is fundamentally malleable and therefore neither essentially good nor bad. Meanwhile Mencius holds that it is essentially good but can be blown off course. The various properties of water, and the analogy, tell us little about who is right. Whether we choose to emphasize water’s lack of preference for east or west or its preference for low over high depends entirely on what theory of human nature we have chosen to endorse in the first place.
The two positions may also appear worryingly similar. If Mencius accepts, as he does, that an initially “good” human nature can be corrupted, then the practical difference with Kao Tzu might seem slight. Both must advocate social interventions to maintain morality. Whether this involves “crafting” human nature or “removing obstacles” to its fulfilment, both ostensibly have the same result. If one looks closer, though, Book VI reveals several important differences, and combining awareness of these with other key ideas and comments in this book reveals a depth and complexity to Mencius’s position; doing so also reveals a number of subtle tensions on the issue of human nature belied by the apparent simplicity of his initial remarks. The analogies, and Mencius’s explanation of how human nature is corrupted, play a part in revealing these elements.
The first thing to note is that Mencius has a distinct motivation for arguing for his specific view of human nature. If the harmonious order of the way is something that can be brought into existence, then human nature, and nature more broadly, must be essentially good, as the different elements of the way must cohere organically without external interference. There must have been a natural and social order before, in the time of the former kings, in which the fulfilment of the nature of each of the parts worked for the good and cohesion of the whole. In the opposite case, external intervention would be constantly required to force the parts to cohere.
It is clear, then, why Mencius wants to say that human nature is essentially good. He is faced, however, with the obvious problem, acknowledged in the analogy of the water, not only that are some people bad, but that the whole social order is riven with immorality and chaos. His response to this problem is to blame external intervention. As in the analogy of the trees on the hill, the constant and unsustainable undermining of man’s natural inclinations makes him immoral or indifferent. Mencius talks about the “dissipation” of the “restorative powers” of nature, and of the “air.” As he says, “If this dissipation happens repeatedly, then the influence of the air in the night will no longer be able to preserve what was originally in him” (127). In other words, like the mountain, if we allow human beings the space and stillness to be with their inner nature, then they will naturally pursue goodness. If we do not, this nature will be drowned out and stymied.
Mencius also gives an indication of the source of the deleterious external influences on our nature. As he argues, “The organs of hearing and sight are unable to think and can be misled by external things” (131). What this suggests is that the senses are easily distracted, or rather attracted, by objects. This comment can be read as a narrative of temptation. It can be viewed in terms of a distinction between a higher essential nature, of the thinking heart, and a lower extraneous nature that is constantly sullied with the external world. We betray our true higher nature, then, when we allow the objects and temptations of the world, of sex, egotism, and power, to penetrate and dominate us. This process explains why individuals can become corrupted. It also explains why more intervention is not what’s needed, but rather the removal or toning down of distracting and superficially tempting external influences.
