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MenciusMencius
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Book IIChapter Summaries & Analyses
Book II, Part A Summary
Part A begins by giving the clearest justification yet for the overall project of Mencius. As Mencius says in the opening section, in the past there were “six or seven wise or sage kings” (30), and the people were content. However, “the appearance of a true king has never been longer overdue than today; and the people have never suffered more under tyrannical government than today” (31). The contrast he draws is all too apparent. The tyranny of the present, including wars and starvation, necessitates the return of another “true king” and an accompanying social and spiritual transformation. It is not merely that the change Mencius seeks would be preferable or desirable. Rather, given historical reality, it is morally and existentially essential.
Fortunately, the people are not alone. There are, and have been, “sages,” wise men, who can help instill benevolence and virtue in present rulers. Mencius is one of them. In section 2, he talks about the qualities that qualify him for this role. When asked what his strong points are, he replies, “I have an insight into words. I am good at cultivating my ‘flood-like ch’i'” (33). Ch’i is a concept in Chinese philosophy and culture that refers to something like “life force” or “energy.” While Mencius does not explicitly discuss the meaning of this term, taking it instead for granted, ch’i is the vital force animating all life and matter and is neither strictly physical nor strictly mental.
Mencius has his own specific interpretation of ch’i. Unlike some Chinese philosophers who believed that each person has a fixed quantity of ch’i, Mencius holds that it can be developed and cultivated by consistent right action. This is why Mencius can claim that his ch’i is “flood-like,” or abundant. At the same time, cultivating it does not mean forcing it to grow. Mencius uses the analogy of a man who pulls at his seedlings to make them grow to prove his point. In the example, the man ruins the seedlings by his over-anxious efforts.
As for the “insight into words” to which Mencius refers, it involves, according to him, the ability to read the intention of the speaker behind the explicit content of their speech. As such, Mencius claims to be able to tell when someone is being evasive, heretical, or blind. This is doubtless an important skill when dealing with powerful individuals and kings. It also brings Mencius to a discussion of Confucius as an exemplary sage. Like Mencius, he is said to have excelled in virtue but also “excelled in rhetoric” and understanding of words (34).
Finally, in section 6, Mencius raises the question of how benevolence is possible, and how it is possible to cultivate it. His answer is that the possibility for the development of moral conduct is provided for by the feeling of compassion. Compassion, loosely put, can be defined as sensitivity to, or awareness of, the suffering of others. This feeling is “the germ of benevolence” (38), since it provides a starting point and a motivation for the cultivation of a broader moral understanding and sentiment. Mencius cites the case of a young child about to fall into a well as a proof of his claim. That all human beings would be moved by what they saw, shows that compassion is an instinctive and basic part of human nature, and that it serves as the seed of morality for all.
Book II, Part B Summary
In Part B, Mencius touches on and re-iterates a variety of topics of note. Human unity, he says, is the most valuable resource of a state, rather than material resources, and “the way” is needed for its development (section 1). The proper relation between father and son and between subject and king is held up as crucial to the social order and as being the most important types of relationship (section 2). Indeed, Mencius points out that “the former exemplifies love, the latter respect” (42). Likewise, the duty of the king is to ensure the people’s economic survival (section 4). So, too, is balance and proportion required in gift giving (section 3). Finally, Mencius builds on an idea introduced in Book I, Part B. This is the question of whether it is ever right for a leader to be deposed by a foreign state. Here Mencius maintains that it can be legitimate to do so if the leader is bad, but only if the one doing it is appointed by heaven and is virtuous (section 8).
Book II Analysis
Book II addresses a core question that arises from Mencius’s initial conception of “the way” and his broader world view. This concerns the conditions of its possibility: How do we know that moral virtue, or benevolence, is possible at all? Or at least, how do we know that it is something most people, and most rulers, are ever capable of? This question is especially pressing given that Mencius believes the rulers of his day are not benevolent. It is also obviously not an issue that can be resolved simply by asserting that past kings existed who were virtuous.
Mencius appeals to the feeling of compassion to address this problem of possibility. He relies on the thought experiment of imagining reactions to the child by the well. He argues that the man there would be “moved to compassion,” “not because he wanted to get in the good graces of the parents, nor because he wished to win the praise of his fellow villagers or friends, nor yet because he disliked the cry of the child” (38). In other words, it was nothing connected to self-interest that moved him. From this fact, he claims that an un-egoistic germ present in all humans can be inferred.
However, this argument seems problematic. If it is not the cry of the child, or the direct, intuitive response to another’s suffering, that moves the man, it is unclear what does. On the other hand, if Mencius is appealing to a more conventional sense of compassion, then this idea is vulnerable to the objection that this is not truly ethical, at least not by his exacting standards. If we reacted to the child at the well because of either a mechanical response or the desire to alleviate a feeling of psychological displeasure, we would be behaving amorally, or out of self-interest. Thus, any moral aspect to the response is tarnished with personal interest. This kind of dilemma led Kant in Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785) to reject intuition and emotion as the basis of morality. Instead, for him, it is the exercise of reason that must ultimately ground morality.
Still, granting the common intuition that compassion does nevertheless exist and is in some way ethical, there is the further question of how one gets from a mere feeling of compassion to a more fully fledged benevolence and virtue. Much hangs on the notion of cultivation. Mencius suggests that the priority is to build up a morally virtuous character. This will then allow one to act appropriately and sensitively in any situation, without the need to follow a general rule or decision procedure. He gives a clue as to how this is done in section 2 of Part A. There he says, regarding character and ch’i, that one must: “Nourish it with integrity and place no obstacle in its path and it will fill the space between Heaven and Earth” (33). That is, moral cultivation, and the transformation of the germ of compassion into benevolence, depends upon creating the conditions for growth. It does not necessarily mean acting in specific ways or forcing one’s character to follow a particular model.
The metaphor of “weeding” and removing obstacles is illuminating here. Just as the good gardener does not overwater his plants or force them to grow, nor does he leave them totally unattended. Rather, he must put active effort into allowing them to develop in their own natural way. He or she must respect the plant’s nature and ch’i, while not letting negative external influences—weeds—hinder or corrupt that growth.
This idea invites parallels with the way Confucius is described in this book. According to Mencius, the nature of the true sage, like Confucius, and the virtuous man is to be in a position of continual openness to new wisdom, teaching, and development. It is not to rest with any settled position or to have claimed to have understood everything. In this sense, Mencius provides an answer to the question of moral development with the idea of cultivation. He is also able to indicate, at least if one accepts his philosophical premises, how benevolence for all humans might be possible.
