42 pages • 1 hour read
MenciusMencius
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Book IChapter Summaries & Analyses
Book I, Part A Summary
Book I, Part A begins by introducing the core concern of Mencius—namely, the pursuit of benevolence and “rightness” over self-interest as a way to avoid social conflict. In the first section, Mencius goes to see King Hui of Liang. The king says that, given how far he has traveled, he “must surely have some way of profiting my state” (3). In response, Mencius says that “profit,” or the advantage of a certain state, ruler, or individual, is of no importance, and what matters is benevolence. Moreover, Mencius uses an argument that appeals to enlightened self-interest to justify his claim. He claims that if everyone is looking out for a particular interest, whether of family, self, or the power of the state, then “the state will be imperilled” (3). In other words, if everyone is only attending to specific profit, rather than the common good, then all people will be in perpetual conflict with each other. In such a situation, even the very existence of the state, and ordered society, will be under threat.
The rest of the sections in this part flesh out what must be done to avoid this predicament and to practice benevolence. In the case of the ruler, he must ensure that he pursues “benevolent government.” This means, firstly, marshalling and managing the resources of the economy properly. Mencius gives specific suggestions on how to do this (see sections 3 and 4). A certain natural order of things must be respected, and fishing, farming and the cutting of timber must be done in the proper proportion and at the appropriate times (section 3). In this way, resources of food and fuel will be sustainable. The King will therefore be able to fulfil his most basic obligation of ensuring people avoid cold and hunger.
The king should also reduce taxation and punishment and provide education. Doing so will allow his subjects to become good sons and brothers and to exercise their reciprocal duties to family, elders, and their king. Finally, the ruler should share the wealth of his state with the people in the form of public parks and buildings (section 2). With this point, Mencius also gives another motivation for the practice of benevolence: By exercising benevolence, and sharing his riches, the king can take joy in the happiness of his subjects.
Book I, Part B Summary
Part B starts with a man recounting to Mencius the story of a king in the state of Ch’i who was “fond of music” (15). Mencius uses this idea of music, and its enjoyment, as a metaphor for the rewards of benevolent government. He argues that music is more pleasurable when heard in the company of others rather than on one’s own. It is also better when enjoyed with many rather than few. By analogy, if a ruler provides for his people, ensuring they are happy, he will be happier than if he merely caters to himself. Conversely, the people will take pleasure in their king’s health and well-being, as well as his interests, like hunting or music, if they are provided for.
Part B also furnishes more detail on the obligations of good governance. For example, an emperor should take an interest in his entire kingdom and visit his feudal lords at certain times. He can thereby ensure that agriculture is being conducted properly (section 4). He should also take a direct hand in the appointment of councilors. Mencius mentions the “former Kings,” who were exemplary leaders and did not indulge in personal “excesses” such as alcohol consumption.
In later sections (6 and 8) Mencius brings up the question of whether it is ever permissible to replace a king. He again uses analogy to prove his point. Addressing King Hsuan of Ch’i, he asks what he would do if, after entrusting his children to a friend while away, he found on returning that they were cold and hungry. The King says he would break with the friend. By analogy, Mencius suggests, if a king fails in his obligations to provide for the security and well-being of his subjects, he should be replaced. The position of king or ruler, then, is no different from any other role: It must be done properly, or the person should be fired or replaced. Mencius follows up this idea in sections 10 and 11 by exploring one way in which a bad king might be replaced. If “you please its people” (24), it is permissible for a different state to annex a province and depose its king. That is, military intervention by another state can be a legitimate way to remove a poor king if doing so would be advantageous to its people.
Book I Analysis
On the surface, the first book of Mencius appears to be advancing something like a social contract theory argument. Social contract theories attempt to justify the state’s existence, and its power over individuals, by appeal to a hypothetical “contract.” The individual in a pre-political “state of nature” submits to laws restricting their freedom in exchange for the state’s security. Further, this argument is premised on the notion that without a state, and law, human beings would descend into endless fighting and strife. As the philosopher Rousseau said, “The strongest man is never strong enough to be master of all time, unless he transforms force into right” (Rousseau, Jean-Jacques. The Social Contract, trans. M. Cranston. Penguin Classics. 1968, p. 52). In other words, when human relations are ruled by force, everyone will eventually be attacked or robbed by one who is stronger.
Mencius appears to be saying something similar in addressing the question of why we, and the ruler, should look beyond individual profit and pursue benevolence and morality. The answer seems to be an equivalent enlightened self-interest. As he says, if we all simply pursue immediate advantage, “those above and those below will be vying with each other for profit and the state will be imperilled” (3). As such, it is possible to think about Mencius in terms of a “Mencian contract.” The people who are ruled accept the governance of a king making laws for them because he does so with the common good and a harmonious social order, not profit, as his goal. If he should fail in this duty, pursuing policies contrary to this goal, the people can depose him.
This is certainly a part of Book I of Mencius. However, it is not all, and Mencius’s concept of the social order, and view of the state’s role in this, differs in many ways from standard social contract theory. Mill’s On Liberty serves as a useful point of comparison here. Mill says:
That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of the community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant (Mill, John Stuart. On Liberty. Penguin Classics. 1985, p. 68).
Mill is saying that there are clear limits to the state’s authority over and relationship to the individual. The state is entitled to legislate for one’s behavior if this behavior directly impinges on another’s freedom or welfare. Beyond this, however, is a realm of individual liberty that no authority should transgress. Mencius’s conception of “benevolent government towards the people” is far broader and more interventionist (4). The “true King” should not merely look to ensure that his people do not harm one another. Instead he must actively pursue their welfare and happiness, tending both to education and to prosperity. Moreover, the ruler himself, and the state, is just one albeit central aspect of a wider system of interconnected relationships and obligations. Proper relations to family, social customs, and nature are all necessary to the harmonious social order Mencius seeks to restore. Contrary to liberal notions about both the state and philosophy, not only is it possible for these relations to be prescribed, but it is in fact morally obligated.
For similar reasons, one must be wary in comparing Mencius’s views to a more recent theory. It is tempting to interpret Book I of Mencius simply as doing “political philosophy” in a way analogous to John Rawls in A Theory of Justice (1971) or Robert Nozick in Anarchy, State and Utopia (1974). In both texts, the authors develop conceptions of justice and what the ideal, “just” society would look like. In this regard, these projects seem similar to Mencius’s pursuit of “rightness” and his descriptions of the ideal social order.
However, subtle but crucial differences exist. As already seen in book I, Mencius is both more historically rooted and more pragmatic than the theories of either Rawls or Nozick. In the latter cases, concepts of justice, society, and the state are developed in relative abstraction and isolation. How or whether the ideals of justice they outline could come into existence is never really raised or is considered extrinsic to the theories themselves. In contrast, in Mencius these practical questions form a central aspect of the text. Mencius is at pains to show that a past ideal order historically existed with the “former kings” and therefore could occur again. Likewise, Mencius, the person and the text, seek to actively bring about this order. Speaking to and advising various kings and rulers about benevolence and good government, Mencius is a part of, and participant in, the very order he seeks to help create.
