68 pages • 2 hours read
Dava SobelA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more. For select classroom titles, we also provide Teaching Guides with discussion and quiz questions to prompt student engagement.
Summary
Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Key Figures
Themes
Index of Terms
Important Quotes
Essay Topics
Tools
As the Age of Exploration got underway in the late 1400s, ships ventured far out to sea: a vast expanse with no landmarks to give sailors their position. Though they could determine their distance north or south of the Equator by observing the sun, moon, and stars, they had no way of knowing how far east or west they were. This was the “longitude problem,” named for the vertical lines of longitude on maps of the Earth. Without knowing a sailing vessel’s position relative to one of those lines, it and its crew effectively were lost. Although methods existed by which captains could estimate their longitude, being even slightly off could prove disastrous as errors compounded over time and distance. A ship might wander for weeks while its crew starved or, as it neared known land, crash onto shores hundreds of miles east or west of its destination. This was what happened in 1707, when four British naval vessels and nearly everyone on board sank after striking rocks miles away from their expected location.
In 1714, the English Parliament passed the Longitude Act, which provided a large cash prize to anyone who could develop a method of determining a ship’s longitude to within half a degree (roughly 34 miles at the Equator), with lesser prizes for methods that neared that level of accuracy: “The fact that the government was willing to award such huge sums for ‘Practicable and Useful’ methods that could miss the mark by many miles eloquently expresses the nation’s desperation over navigation’s sorry state” (54).
A clock might solve the problem if it were accurate to within three seconds a day, but most timepieces of the era were off by minutes a day. In theory, a super-precise clock could keep home-port time reliably, and by comparing that time to local time (as determined by the location of the sun, moon, or stars), a ship could locate itself on the globe to within a few tens of miles—a margin of error significantly smaller than the hundreds of miles possible with guesswork.
By the 1730s, John Harrison had invented a large clock with a mechanism accurate enough to pass the Longitude Act’s strictest tests. Decades later, improved and miniaturized versions called chronometers would lead to general adoption of Harrison’s sea clock method, but not before another equally accurate system, the lunar method, would compete for the prize. This method used books called ephemerides that contained timetables for the motion of the moon against the background of stars. Sailors who used a quadrant or sextant to observe the moon’s position relative to a star and compared the local time with the listed time for the same event in London or Paris could reckon their ship’s longitude.
The English Board of Longitude, charged with finding the best method, recognized the value of both timepieces and time charts, but the sea clock method stood out as more practical. The lunar method could calculate longitude, but it was complicated, took more than a half-hour (and up to four hours) to complete, and its many steps increased the chance for error. Clocks, on the other hand, themselves contained the correct time in London or Paris, eliminating the need for all those painful sky-watching calculations; all that was necessary was a quick estimate of local time, and the time difference between ship and home port was known. The first marine clocks, however, were very expensive; it wasn’t until watchmakers mastered the techniques of mass-producing precision chronometers that the sea clock method of determining longitude finally was adopted worldwide.
At the time the search for a more precise measurement of longitude got underway, modern science and engineering were still inventing themselves. They were nothing like the gigantic industries they’ve since become, with large teams of professionals improving (for example) atomic clocks that calculate time to within billionths of a second. Instead, most such discoveries fell to “natural philosophers”—usually well-educated men from the upper classes who had the leisure to explore the secrets of the universe.
If they had backing from, say, the king of England, such theorists might make great progress on a scientific problem, aided by at most one or two assistants. This was the approach of the astronomers who directed the Royal Greenwich Observatory. Beginning with John Flamsteed and continuing through Nevil Maskelyne, the Observatory’s chief astronomers collected vast amounts of data, largely by hand over years and decades, in a quest to compile a book of timed sky events that might aid sailors in finding their location at sea. Edmund Halley, the second Astronomer Royal, even sailed south “to map the stars of the southern hemisphere—virtually virgin territory on the landscape of the night” (51)—stars whose locations would help mariners who voyaged south of the Equator. Today, Halley would probably direct a platoon of scientists who performed most of the data collection, but in the early 1700s he was one of the few people on Earth with the expertise to conduct his studies of the night sky.
Harrison was if anything even more isolated in his work. Watchmaking too was a fairly new skill, and the inaccuracy of most timepieces meant there was room for a lone inventor to make a mark. John Harrison was also self-taught and at least initially lacked the institutional support astronomers like Maskelyne enjoyed. Consequently, Harrison spent several decades, largely on his own, inventing the clocks that would change seafaring. His skills were so unique that only he could apply them to the task. Watchmakers who adapted Harrison’s concepts into pocket watches at first also tended to work alone.
Harrison’s experience as lone inventor was typical of the careers of the great discoverers of the age. Though he had allies, nearly all the work of developing maritime clocks was his, and history notes that the credit should go to him as well. Nevertheless, Harrison perhaps also serves as a cautionary tale on the potential pitfalls of working alone. As his struggles with the Board demonstrate, Harrison was fiercely protective of his inventions and reluctant to involve anyone else in the design process. In many ways this suspicion was justified, since much of the Board lacked the expertise and will to ensure the safety of the clocks. Nevertheless, Harrison’s approach led him to get bogged down in legal battles that delayed recognition of his scientific contributions.
John Harrison was an honest man with a brilliant invention: a sea clock that could keep time to within a few seconds a month and help mariners determine their position at sea. This was an invention worthy of a fortune in state-sponsored prize money. His competitors, however, weren’t so ethical, and the committee that awarded the longitude prize fell prey to a corrupt selection process. Harrison had to navigate these obstacles to win the prize.
Early in Harrison’s journey, the Board of Longitude offered him the prize outright, but he refused it: He believed his clocks weren’t yet quite good enough, and meeting his own standards mattered more to him than rushing to claim the reward. Unfortunately for Harrison, this was not an attitude his competitors shared; in fact, some were willing to exploit Harrison’s diligence to their advantage. By the time Harrison presented an improved sea clock 20 years later, a prominent Board member, Astronomer Royal of the Royal Greenwich Observatory James Bradley, had begun campaigning for his own competing invention: the lunar method of determining longitude. Bradley apparently worked to impede testing on Harrison’s H-4 clock so that his colleague, Nevil Maskelyne, could finish up important research that might prove their lunar method more deserving of the prize. Consequently, though H-4 performed better than required during its sea test, the Board abruptly changed the rules and insisted that Harrison donate his clocks to them, along with the secrets of their creation. Harrison resisted but finally relented.
Maskelyne succeeded Bradley as Astronomer Royal and Board member, and he requisitioned Harrison’s various sea clocks for further testing. He abused and neglected the clocks and declared them unfit. Maskelyne was “probably more hardheaded than hardhearted” (112), but he and his predecessor’s active participation in judging an invention that competed with their own makes it clear that “conflict of interest” hadn’t yet entered the vocabulary of contest judging.
The Board eventually awarded Harrison a half-prize. It was left to England’s King George III to set things straight. He agreed to bring Harrison’s H-5 clock to his private observatory for a fair testing; when the clock passed with flying colors, the king badgered Parliament into awarding Harrison most of the rest of the longitude prize.
By Dava Sobel