Locking Up Our Own: Crime and Punishment in Black America

Content Warning: The section of the guide addresses racism and racial inequities in the US criminal justice system.

One of Forman’s most important contributions to the study of the US criminal justice system is his recognition of the role of Black leaders in tough-on-crime policies. Researchers have addressed the relationship between federal policies, harsh approaches to crime fighting, and the mass incarceration of Black people. For example, in 1971, President Nixon announced “a new, all-out offensive” against drugs (20). As Forman observes, however, Nixon was primarily concerned with hard drugs. Similarly, President Reagan’s Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986 introduced stiffer penalties for drug crimes, focusing on crack offenses (1986). President Clinton also supported tough-on-crime policies, notably, a 1994 federal crime legislation that financed the construction of new prisons across the country.

Although the federal government undeniably embraced the tough-on-crime policies that fueled mass incarceration, Forman argues that city administrators across the country played an equally important role in promoting punitive justice. Forman points to the failure of Clarke’s 1975 proposal to decriminalize marijuana in DC as a watershed moment in the nation’s tough-on-crime stance. Indeed, many of the city’s Black leaders opposed Clarke’s bill, arguing that marijuana was a gateway drug that would increase the use of harder drugs, such as heroin, which had been ravaging American cities since the late 1960s. The BDC, a DC-based organization of Black nationalists, opposed decriminalization, as did other Black leaders, such as Douglas Moore, a Black nationalist and civil rights activist, and John Fauntleroy, a prominent Black judge. The Black church, however, was the most influential group to oppose Clarke’s bill. Black pastors not only saw marijuana as a gateway drug, but also pointed to its negative effects on mental health. Forman attributes the Black church’s opposition to decriminalization to the “politics of respectability,” arguing that the failure of Clarke’s bill was a small but decisive step toward the mass incarceration of Black people.

Starting in the 1980s, police departments across the country adopted warrior policing, a tough-on-crime policy that Black leaders embraced. After a shooting in DC, Mayor Barry told reporters that he wanted the police to “hunt [the murderers] down like mad dogs” (165). Mayor Maynard Jackson of Atlanta mirrored Barry's anger, pledg­ing to make “the drug dealer's teeth rattle” (165). In 1989, he proposed a program called Kick Their Assets, which aimed to seize the assets of drug dealers. Police chiefs supported the efforts of America’s mayors. In 1986, Isaac Fulwood, the Assistant Chief of the MPD, carried out Operation Clean Sweep, which employed specialized units who jumped out of unmarked vehicles to make gun and drug arrests. Other military-style operations include Operation Ceasefire spearheaded by DC’s first Black US Attorney. This operation centered on pretext stops, a police tactic that involved stopping drivers for minor infractions and finding a pretext to search them and their vehicles. Black leaders across the country supported pretext stops, even though they primarily harmed Black people. Forman uses these examples to show the role of Black leaders and community members in perpetuating tough-on-crime policies and laws, offering as an explanation the fact that many Black people wanted to distance themselves from Black criminals, who they believed were poor representatives of the race.