Leviathan

“The greatest of human powers is that which is compounded of the powers of most men, united by consent, in one person, natural or civil, that has the use of all their powers depending on his will; such as is the power of a Commonwealth: or depending on the wills of each particular; such as is the power of a faction, or of diverse. factions leagued. Therefore to have servants is power; to have friends is power: for they are strengths united.”

Hobbes states the book’s predominant thesis: that for people to exercise the greatest power, they must sort themselves into commonwealths ruled by an undivided sovereign ruler. The precept that humans should strive to amass and exercise power at all is supported by Hobbes’s argument elsewhere that the chief human appetites—for wealth, dignity, and honor—are merely extensions of a desire for power. In addition, the argument that a commonwealth is best-suited to fulfill these desires is supported by Hobbes’s belief that when people are left to their own passions, with no civil authority or order, they are doomed to fall into a state of never-ending violence, in which any power gained is short-lived.

“Also the religion of the Church of Rome was partly for the same cause abolished in England and many other parts of Christendom, insomuch as the failing of virtue in the pastors maketh faith fail in the people, and partly from bringing of the philosophy and doctrine of Aristotle into religion by the Schoolmen; from whence there arose so many contradictions and absurdities as brought the clergy into a reputation both of ignorance and of fraudulent intention, and inclined people to revolt from them, either against the will of their own princes as in France and Holland, or with their will as in England.”

Hobbes refers here to the Reformation Era, which began in 1517 when German theologian Martin Luther published his Ninety-five Theses, a document highly critical of papal authority and the various ways the Catholic Church was said to have misinterpreted the Bible. Though only hinted at here, Hobbes’s antipathy toward the Catholic Church is made clear throughout the rest of the book. He strongly believes that the pope’s supposed ecclesiastical authority over civil sovereigns represents a profound contradiction with his broader theory of commonwealths. Yet he is not content to leave the criticism at that, accusing Catholic clergymen of failing in virtue and for interpreting much of scripture through the works of so-called “heathen” philosophers like Aristotle.

“In such condition there is no place for industry, because the fruit thereof is uncertain: and consequently no culture of the earth; no navigation, nor use of the commodities that may be imported by sea; no commodious building; no instruments of moving and removing such things as require much force; no knowledge of the face of the earth; no account of time; no arts; no letters; no society; and which is worst of all, continual fear, and danger of violent death; and the life of man, solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short.”

From this quote, modern scholars have adopted the term “Hobbesian” to describe humankind’s natural state of being as violent and self-serving. This quote is frequently abridged to include only the final phrase starting with “the life of man” (76) to make “Hobbesian” synonymous with deep pessimism about human nature. Yet doing so ignores that Hobbes speaks here of very specific conditions of precivilized man. On the contrary, Hobbes believes strongly in humankind’s capacity to live peaceably, and Leviathan is largely written as a roadmap for how humanity might achieve said peace.

“Where there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice.”

Hobbes’s opinion of justice and injustice is that these concepts should be predominantly viewed as functions of civil society. This tends to lead to some uncomfortable conclusions that situate justice as something independent of morality. For example, a man murdering his neighbor in a precivilized state of nature is just because there are no laws prohibiting it. Yet if a man disobey orders from his civil sovereign to murder his neighbor, it is viewed as unjust because it constitutes a violation of the covenant between subject and sovereign.

“From this fundamental law of nature, by which men are commanded to endeavour peace, is derived this second law: that a man be willing, when others are so too, as far forth as for peace and defence of himself he shall think it necessary, to lay down this right to all things; and be contented with so much liberty against other men as he would allow other men against himself.”

Like Locke and Rousseau, Hobbes roots his political philosophy in natural law, which in theory should be based on reason and is thus inviolable. Yet all three philosophers arrive at different conclusions despite their supposedly shared empirical roots. This is because as much as Hobbes wants to believe his natural laws are as provable as a law of geometry or thermodynamics, human behavior does not lend itself to the same empirical predictability as mathematics or physics.

“This done, the multitude so united in one person is called a COMMONWEALTH; in Latin, CIVITAS. This is the generation of that great LEVIATHAN, or rather, to speak more reverently, of that mortal god to which we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and defence.”

It may seem strange for Hobbes to characterize his veritable savior of humanity—the civil sovereign—as a biblical beast that swallows humans whole. Yet his aim is to highlight the role fear plays in ensuring obedience and thus order from subjects. Moreover, some scholars believe his use of the leviathan as a symbol for his book’s de facto protagonist is a calculated attempt at provocation designed to draw more attention to his arguments.

“Every one, as well he that voted for it as he that voted against it, shall authorize all the actions and judgements of that man, or assembly of men, in the same manner as if they were his own, to the end to live peaceably amongst themselves, and be protected against other men.”

Hobbes lays the groundwork for his argument that nothing a civil sovereign does, no matter how immoral or harmful to the public good, can be called unjust. This, he argues, is because the sovereign rules with the tacit consent of subjects which is forged through covenant, making them the author of all their ruler’s actions. Yet unlike in the democracies envisioned by Rousseau, Hobbes never makes it entirely clear when this transfer of authorship takes place. Moreover, the validity of these covenants is even more muddled in the case of sovereigns of acquisition, in which a vanquished ruler transfers his sovereignty over subjects to an invading foe.

“And this division whereof it is said, a kingdom divided in itself cannot stand: for unless this division precede, division into opposite armies can never happen.”

One hears strong echoes of this quote in Abraham Lincoln’s 1858 Illinois State Capitol address, during which he uttered the famous words, “A house divided against itself cannot stand.” Although it is unclear whether Lincoln consciously or unconsciously adapted Hobbes’s rhetoric into his own, Leviathan’s themes of how fractured authority leads to civil war are all too relevant to mid-19th-century America. And while Lincoln is unlikely to agree with Hobbes’s prescription for a king with ultimate authority to rule over a dominion, Hobbes’s points about civil unity would have surely resonated with him.

“For they that are discontented under monarchy call it tyranny; and they that are displeased with aristocracy call it oligarchy: so also, they which find themselves grieved under a democracy call it anarchy, which signifies want of government.”

Hobbes argues against what he views as a common rhetorical tactic in his day—that is, to rail against monarchies by labeling all kings as tyrants. He argues that the term “tyranny” is nothing more than an expression of anti-government rhetoric and is effectively interchangeable with the labels used by discontented citizens in other forms of government, including democracies. Thus, corruption or ineffectiveness is viewed by Hobbes as a threat to all types of government and is hardly unique to monarchies.

“And this kind of dominion, or sovereignty, differeth from sovereignty by institution only in this, that men who choose their sovereign do it for fear of one another, and not of him whom they institute: but in this case, they subject themselves to him they are afraid of.”

In comparing commonwealths by institution to commonwealths by acquisition, Hobbes sees no difference aside from the fact that both rely on that sense of extreme fear embodied by the leviathan. Yet it may be difficult for readers to accept that the form and timing of the civil covenant of a conquered nation is the same as one in which a sovereign is elected domestically. Moreover, it may seem uncomfortable for Hobbes to believe that fear is not only an acceptable basis for these covenants but also the only basis.

“Lastly, our Saviour Himself acknowledges that men ought to pay such taxes as are by kings imposed, where He says, ‘Give to Caesar that which is Caesar’s’; and paid such taxes Himself.”

From this biblical passage, Hobbes argues that to follow the civil laws of sovereigns—even those who are not Christian—is to follow God’s law. While this is a reasonable and widely held interpretation of this passage, Hobbes goes a step further and uses it to justify his belief that a spiritual leader like the pope cannot hold authority either above or even alongside a temporal or civil leader. Such an interpretation was controversial in Hobbes’s time and led to accusations of atheism.

“The greatest objection is that of the practice; when men ask where and when such power has by subjects been acknowledged. But one may ask them again, when or where has there been a kingdom long free from sedition and civil war? In those nations whose Commonwealths have been long-lived, and not been destroyed but by foreign war, the subjects never did dispute of the sovereign power.”

At every turn, civil war is the chief consequence Hobbes hopes to avoid with his political philosophy. This makes sense given the tens of thousands of soldiers and civilians who died as a result of the English Civil Wars, during which Hobbes wrote much of Leviathan. Hobbes’s antipathy toward civil war becomes even more justified later in the book, when he expresses grief over the loss of his best friend Sidney Godolphin, a poet killed fighting on behalf of the Royalists.

“If we take liberty for an exemption from laws, it is no less absurd for men to demand as they do that liberty by which all other men may be masters of their lives. And yet as absurd as it is, this is it they demand, not knowing that the laws are of no power to protect them without a sword.”

Like Locke and Rousseau, Hobbes grants that humans are born with certain natural liberties that may necessarily be curtailed in a civil state to ensure the protection of the citizenry. Yet the trade-offs of liberty found in Hobbes’s civil covenants tend to be more severe. For example, because a sovereign’s rights are absolute and can never be considered unjust, it is technically permissible under a Hobbesian framework for a leader to deprive a citizen without cause of their life, liberty, or property, a clear violation of Lockean ideals which would seem to defeat the purpose of giving up certain liberties in the first place. Thus, Hobbes’s conception of liberty in a commonwealth may not be entirely convincing to some readers.

“And the same holdeth also in a sovereign prince that putteth to death an innocent subject. For though the action be against the law of nature, as being contrary to equity (as was the killing of Uriah by David); yet it was not an injury to Uriah, but to God.”

This quote represents two of the most difficult things to reconcile about Hobbes’s political philosophy. The first is the notion that no action taken by the sovereign can be called unjust within a civil framework. The author argues that by consenting to David’s rule as sovereign, Uriah is essentially the author of his own murder, which seems to contradict Hobbes’s first natural law pertaining to self-preservation. The second complication relates to whether a Hobbesian political philosophy can coexist with God’s law and scripture. Although he admits that David’s covetous murder of Uriah is a clear violation of God’s law, why shouldn’t this transgression result in just rebellion from his Jewish subjects, for whom obedience to God is paramount?

“The prosperity of a people ruled by an aristocratical or democratical assembly cometh not from aristocracy, nor from democracy, but from the obedience and concord of the subjects.”

In comparing democracies and aristocracies to monarchies, Hobbes clearly prefers monarchies. Yet here and elsewhere, he also makes clear that the deciding factor in the success of a commonwealth is not its type but rather the obedience paid to the sovereign individual or assembly by its subjects. Moreover, Hobbes believes that while monarchies are the most preferable form of government among the three, the very best form is that which a citizenry already has, for to dissolve a commonwealth for any reason constitutes the very worst possible consequence.

“For it is with the mysteries of our religion as with wholesome pills for the sick, which swallowed whole have the virtue to cure, but chewed, are for the most part cast up again without effect.”

Despite his own exhaustive biblical exegesis, Hobbes bemoans lengthy interpretations of scripture that contradict his own views of God and the universe. To be fair, this isn’t entirely hypocritical. Hobbes expresses a straightforward view of Christianity in which all that is needed to gain admittance to the kingdom of heaven is to accept Jesus Christ as your savior and to follow the Ten Commandments—in other words, he advises subjects not to overthink the Bible and instead to swallow its core ideas whole. However, these simple prescriptions do not always sit comfortably beside Hobbes’s political views pertaining to the absolute authority of civil sovereigns.

“He therefore to whom God hath not supernaturally revealed that they are His, nor that those that published them were sent by Him, is not obliged to obey them by any authority but his whose commands have already the force of laws; that is to say, by any other authority than that of the Commonwealth.”

Once again Hobbes attempts to find reconciliation between obeying God and obeying the sovereign, even in situations where their orders conflict. Aside from the Ten Commandments, he writes, the only way for a subject to know God’s commands is to be a true prophet. Hearing commands secondhand from an individual who professes to be a prophet is insufficient, given the prevalence of false prophets both in Hobbes’s time and in the New Testament.

“All the earth, as is said in the text, is God’s; but all the earth is not called holy, but that only which is set apart for his especial service, as was the nation of the Jews. It is therefore manifest enough by this one place that by the kingdom of God is properly meant a Commonwealth, instituted (by the consent of those which were to be subject thereto) for their civil government and the regulating of their behaviour, not only towards God their king, but also towards one another in point of justice, and towards other nations both in peace and war.”

From Hobbes’s broader philosophy of materialism, he concludes that the kingdom of God is not a spiritual kingdom but a temporal or civil kingdom—in short, a commonwealth. More than anything else, this argument serves to contradict those Catholic Church leaders who claim that spiritual kingdoms are separate from temporal kingdoms and thus demand different rulers. On the contrary, Hobbes believes that the sovereign ruler of a commonwealth is both a temporal leader and the chief pastor of his dominion, with all pastoral duties stemming from his authority.

“To conclude: from the first institution of God’s kingdom, to the Captivity, the supremacy of religion was in the same hand with that of the civil sovereignty; and the priest’s office, after the election of Saul, was not magisterial, but ministerial.”

This is among the more convincing arguments made by Hobbes as to why scripture supports his political and philosophical arguments. From Moses to the office of the high priest to the era of proper Jewish kings, temporal and spiritual authority is based around just one individual. Moreover, since Saul became the first Jewish king and overtook the office of the high priest, this authority has been predominantly temporal in nature rather than spiritual.

“Leisure is the mother of philosophy; and Commonwealth, the mother of peace and leisure.”

From this perspective, Hobbes’s philosophical framework of commonwealths is at once self-reinforcing and self-defeating. Only under conditions of peace and prosperity can humans leave aside concerns over their daily survival to ponder the mysteries of the natural world. Thus, life in a commonwealth is conducive to philosophical thought. At the same time, Hobbes certainly does not believe that all philosophical thought is healthy, given his great disdain for Aristotle and many of his own contemporaries in the field.

“But the secret foundation of this prohibition of marriage of priests is not likely to have been laid so slightly as upon such errors in moral philosophy; nor yet upon the preference of single life to the estate of matrimony; which proceeded from the wisdom of St. Paul, who perceived how inconvenient a thing it was for those that in those times of persecution were preachers of the gospel, and forced to fly from one country to another, to be clogged with the care of wife and children; but upon the desire of the popes and priests of after times, to make themselves, (the clergy, that is to say,) sole heirs of the kingdom of God in this world.”

In every Catholic ritual or custom that has no concrete source in scripture, Hobbes reads not only faulty interpretation but a conspiracy to grab power from rightful civil sovereigns. In the Catholic Church’s prohibition of marriage, for example, Hobbes views a metaphorical attempt to convince followers that clergymen, because their commitment to faith leaves no time for wives and children, makes them more worthy to receive God’s authority than citizen and king. Moreover, because customs around rights of succession all but necessitate that kings and queens marry and have children, this rule is seen by Hobbes as a calculated effort to prevent monarchs from also serving as high priests. This is no matter, however, because regardless of whether sovereigns hold the title of priest, Hobbes views them as possessing ultimate spiritual authority.

“For whatsoever power ecclesiastics take upon themselves (in any place where they are subject to the state) in their own right, though they call it God’s right, is but usurpation.”

The use of “usurpation” to describe the spiritual authority the pope and his bishops profess to hold over civil sovereigns amounts to some of the strongest language Hobbes uses in his exhortations against the Catholic Church. In doing so, Hobbes situates the clergy as being no better than a common anarchist who seeks to overthrow the government, or a foreign invader who seeks to dethrone a sovereign ruler. At the same time, one may rightly question Hobbes’s logic here, given that the actions taken by Parliamentarians who stoked hostilities against Charles I caused far more death and destruction in Hobbes’s era than the Catholic Church.

“I have known clearness of judgement, and largeness of fancy; strength of reason, and graceful elocution; a courage for the war, and a fear for the laws, and all eminently in one man; and that was my most noble and honoured friend, Mr. Sidney Godolphin; who, hating no man, nor hated of any, was unfortunately slain in the beginning of the late civil war, in the public quarrel, by an undiscerned and an undiscerning hand.”

After a lengthy treatise largely written at an emotional remove, to read Hobbes’s grief-stricken dedication to his best friend who was killed in action during the English Civil Wars is both startling and poignant. It puts a human face on the victims of civil unrest and on the author himself. Although this passage does betray Hobbes’s biases against rebellion to an extent, those biases were also already fully apparent to any reader paying attention. Moreover, some readers may better sympathize with Hobbes after reading this, knowing now that his strong and imperious opinions came at a price.