Justice as Fairness: A Restatement

This is a concept that Rawls proposed in A Theory of Justice and continued to develop over the course of his career. Its basic premise is that the fairest origin for a society would require none of those responsible for its creation to know what their role in it would be. Otherwise, they would have an interest in making sure that institutions reflected the interests of the group to which they belonged. If a “veil of ignorance” (15) inhibited such knowledge, all would have to assume that they could end up as one of the “least advantaged,” and so everyone would ensure that the social system they designed put the least advantaged in the best possible position.

A liberal society cannot impose a comprehensive moral doctrine on its citizens; it must instead tolerate a wide variety of viewpoints. Thus, Rawls relies on the idea of “overlapping consensus,” wherein diverse moral perspectives can converge on certain key principles, including an acceptance of reasonable pluralism, the kind of reasoning that should guide political debate, and the freedom and equality of all citizens. Rawls considers this a realistic way to achieve unity in a democracy, far more so than any attempts to impose one moral doctrine upon the whole of society. It helps to secure agreement from all sectors of society on the worthiness of a liberal society.

When describing the procedures involved in the “original position,” Rawls must explain why the representatives will choose justice of fairness over an alternative principle, such as the utilitarian notion of “average utility,” which promises the greatest possible benefits to the average citizen. The maximin rule holds that when someone is uncertain of their social position, they will choose the option that guarantees them a set of rights and freedoms, rather than hope that the law of averages will work in their favor. It rests on the assumption that people will choose to avoid the worst option, especially when they do not know what else to expect from society.