Ion

“SOCRATES: Then what in the world is it that you’re clever about in Homer but not in Hesiod and the other poets? Does Homer speak of any subjects that differ from those of all the other poets? Doesn’t he mainly go through tales of war, and of how people deal with each other in society—good people and bad, ordinary folks and craftsmen? And of the gods, how they deal with each other and with men? And doesn’t he recount what happens in heaven and in hell, and tell of the births of gods and heroes? Those are the subjects of Homer’s poetry-making, aren’t they?”

By alluding to Homer and the subjects he discusses in his poetry, Socrates tries to point out a contradiction in Ion’s thinking. If Ion can judge how Homer treats these subjects in his poetry—which he claims he can—then there should be nothing preventing him from judging the same subjects in another poet’s work. When Ion says he does not have the power to do this, Socrates concludes that Ion’s talent for reciting Homer must come from some source other than Ion’s familiarity with the poetry’s content.

“ION: When someone discusses another poet I pay no attention, and I have no power to contribute anything worthwhile: I simply doze off. But let someone mention Homer and right away I’m wide awake and I’m paying attention and I have plenty to say.”

To show the distinction between his knowledge of Homer and his knowledge of other poets, Ion uses the metaphor of sleeping and waking. This comparison of opposites is meant to underscore the lack of understanding that Ion claims to have about any poet other than Homer and to show how powerful divine inspiration can be (that it can “flip a switch” and make someone capable of something they wouldn’t have been capable of otherwise).

“SOCRATES: Anyone can tell that you are powerless to speak about Homer on the basis of knowledge or mastery. Because if your ability came by mastery, you would be able to speak about all the other poets as well.”

Socrates uses a syllogism to express his position and support his conclusion. The logic is as follows: If one has knowledge or mastery of a subject, then one can speak about the whole subject well. Ion cannot speak about the whole subject of poetry well; therefore, he does not have knowledge or mastery of poetry. From this, Socrates concludes that Ion’s knowledge of Homer comes from a source other than knowledge or mastery.

“SOCRATES: I wish that were true, Ion [that I was a wise man]. But wise? Surely you are the wise men, you rhapsodes and actors, you and the poets whose work you sing. As for me, I say nothing but the truth, as you’d expect from an ordinary man.”

Socrates invokes irony here. Socrates’s wisdom comes from the fact that he does not believe he is wise. This means he tries not to make assumptions about what is true, which is what he is doing here when he proposes that wisdom can be found in art and poetry and not solely in knowledge and facts.

“SOCRATES: As I said earlier, that’s not a subject you’ve mastered—speaking well about Homer; it’s a divine power that moves you, as a ‘Magnetic’ stone moves iron rings. […] This stone not only pulls those rings, if they’re iron, it also puts power in the rings, so that they in turn can do just what the stone does—pull other rings—so that there’s sometimes a very long chain of iron pieces and rings hanging from one another. And the power in all of them depends on this stone. In the same way, the Muse makes some people inspired herself, and then through those who are inspired a chain of other enthusiasts is suspended.”

Socrates uses the metaphor of the magnet to explain how he thinks the power of inspiration works. The metaphor is meant to help readers understand how an external force like divine inspiration can imbue someone with a power that they have no control over, and how that force can affect others. The image of the magnet also invokes the idea of the physical sensation and movement of forces flowing through a medium, which is how divine inspiration has been reported to feel by those who have experienced it.

“SOCRATES: As long as a human being has his intellect in his possession he will always lack the power to make poetry or sing prophecy […] each poet is able to compose beautifully only that for which the Muse has aroused him: one can do dithyrambs, another encomia, one can do dance songs, another, epics, and yet another, iambics; and each of them is worthless for the other types of poetry.”

Socrates uses a series of examples to emphasize that inspiration comes in many forms and manifests in many ways. The list he gives covers just some of the ways inspiration can manifest, but there are others, implying that messages from the gods may come to us in forms we may not have expected.

“SOCRATES: The best evidence for this account is Tynnichus from Chalcis, who never made a poem anyone would think worth mentioning, except for the praise-song everyone sings, almost the most beautiful lyric-poem there is, and simply, as he says himself, ‘an invention of the Muses.’ In this more than anything, then, I think, the god is showing us, so that we should be in no doubt about it, that these beautiful poems are not human, not even from human beings, but are divine and from gods; that poets are nothing but representatives of the gods, possessed by whoever possesses them. To show that, the god deliberately sang the most beautiful lyric poem through the most worthless poet. Don’t you think I’m right, Ion?”

Socrates uses the contrast between a terrible poet and a wonderful poem to emphasize the power of inspiration. The idea that “the most beautiful lyric poem” could be the product of “the most worthless poet” is meant to illustrate the lack of human agency in moments of divine inspiration.

“ION: I do think it’s by a divine gift that good poets are able to present these poems to us from the gods.

SOCRATES: And you rhapsodes in turn present what the poets say.

ION: That’s true too.

SOCRATES: So you turn out to be representatives of representatives.

ION: Quite right.”

The repetitive phrase “representatives of representatives” echoes Plato’s thinking on the relationship between art and truth. For Plato, Forms are the highest truth—a metaphysical realm that is unchangeable and inaccessible in its pure form. Humans are capable of perceiving just a representation of this truth, so that makes art a representation of a representation. By analogy, then, Ion is also at two removes from the “truth” that is divine inspiration, which encourages readers to question the value of his interpretations of Homer.

“SOCRATES: When you recite epic poetry well and you have the most stunning effect on your spectators, either when you sing of Odysseus—how he leapt into the doorway, his identity now obvious to the suitors, and he poured out arrows at his feet—or when you sing of Achilles charging at Hector, or when you sing a pitiful episode about Andromache or Hecuba or Priam, are you at that time in your right mind, or do you get beside yourself? And doesn’t your soul, in its enthusiasm, believe that it is present at the actions you describe, whether they’re in Ithaca or in Troy or wherever the epic actually takes place?”

Socrates makes several allusions to the Odyssey throughout “Ion,” and they serve multiple purposes. First, because allusions are references to a shared culture that exists outside of the text, they serve to ensure that Plato’s audience is on the same page in terms of understanding his argument. Furthermore, allusions generate pathos in the audience because the audience understands the cultural significance of the reference. Here, Socrates alludes to the Odyssey to emphasize what he means by being “beside yourself” or not “in your right mind.” Because the audience has had the experience of listening to the Odyssey, they can better understand the experience of being transported or carried away from oneself that he is referring to.

“You see it’s not because you’re a master of knowledge about Homer that you can say what you say, but because of a divine gift, because you are possessed.”

This quote represents the main claim that Socrates tries to prove throughout the dialogue. He provides support for his claim by giving evidence and examples that show both why he believes that Ion is divinely possessed and why he does not believe Ion has a mastery of the knowledge of poetry as a whole.

“SOCRATES: Then a person who has not mastered a given profession will not be able to be a good judge of the things which belong to that profession, whether they are things said or things done.

ION: That’s true.

SOCRATES: Then who will know better whether or not Homer speaks beautifully and well in the lines you quoted? You, or a charioteer?

ION: A charioteer.”

This example of the Socratic method shows how Socrates gets his interlocutors to accept his logic when they are trying to agree on the definition of a term. Each time Ion says something to the effect of “that’s true,” Socrates can move on to the next step of the argument. In this way, by the time they get to a conclusion, Ion is forced to agree to it because he has agreed to all of its premises. (By contrast, see quotes 13 and 14 for examples of the absurdity that results when Ion agrees to all of the argument’s premises but rejects its conclusion.)

“SOCRATES: Now you tell me—just as I picked out for you, from the Odyssey and the Iliad, passages that belong to a diviner and ones that belong to a doctor and ones that belong to a fisherman—in the same way, Ion, since you have more experience with Homer’s work than I do, you pick out for me the passages that belong to the rhapsode and to his profession, the passages a rhapsode should be able to examine and to judge better than anyone else.

ION: My answer, Socrates, is ‘all of them.’

SOCRATES: That’s not your answer, Ion. Not ‘all of them.’ Or are you really so forgetful? But no, it would not befit a rhapsode to be forgetful.

ION: What do you think I’m forgetting?”

Socrates uses both a concession and humor to emphasize that the profession of rhapsode does not use skill. First, Socrates concedes that Ion has “more experience with Homer’s work” than he does, which is supposed to set Ion up to give an answer about which passages in Homer “belong to the rhapsode and to his profession.” The humor occurs when Ion is still unable to answer Socrates’s question, which underscores one of Plato’s main points: that art is not knowledge and in fact may distance one from the truth.

“SOCRATES: Now, since you know the business of a general, do you know this by being a general or by being a good rhapsode?

ION: I don’t think there’s any difference.

SOCRATES: What? Are you saying there’s no difference? On your view is there one profession for rhapsodes and generals, or two?

ION: One, I think.

SOCRATES: So anyone who is a good rhapsode turns out to be a good general too. ION: Certainly, Socrates.

SOCRATES: It also follows that anyone who turns out to be a good general is a good rhapsode too.

ION: No. This time I don’t agree.”

Ion’s claim that good rhapsodes make good generals but good generals do not make good rhapsodes is a non sequitur because it does not follow the rules that he and Socrates have used throughout their discussion. Using this non sequitur, Plato may have intended to make Ion look silly, as if to say: how can art lead to knowledge or truth when it does not follow the rules of logic in the first place?