How Democracies Die

In Chapter 8 Levitsky and Ziblatt explore how President Trump attempted to deploy strategies that have been used by other autocratic leaders. The first of these—“capturing the referees”—was on display shortly after Trump’s inauguration, when he sought guarantees of loyalty from the chiefs of US intelligence agencies and removed one, James Comey, when it became clear he could not be captured (177). By attacking intelligence agencies, as well as the courts and government watchdogs, Trump was drawing “from an authoritarian playbook” (180).

Second, Trump attempted to marginalize important players in the democratic system, including the media. After his election, Trump labeled the media as the “enemy of the American people,” a term that, critics noted, mimicked one used by Stalin and Mao” (181). He threatened to change libel laws, as Ecuadorian President Rafael Correa did to silence journalists and media outlets, and to use regulatory agencies to attack media outlets that criticized him.

Finally—and perhaps most worryingly, the authors say—Trump advocated changing rules to disfavor political opponents. A clear example of this was the creation of the Presidential Advisory Commission on Election Integrity. The commission hopes to create stricter voter ID laws, which would disproportionately impact minority voters—who tend to vote Democrat—and skew elections in Republicans’ favor.

Despite these attempts at authoritarianism, American democracy withstood Trump’s first year in office. But as the examples of other countries show, the erosion of democracy can be a gradual process. Whether that will happen in the United States depends on several factors: first, whether governing parties, including Republicans, act to defend institutions, either by taking steps to contain Trump’s abuses of power or attempting to remove him from office; second, whether public opinion is favorable toward Trump; and finally, whether there’s a security crisis during the Trump presidency, which could lead to attacks on Trump’s political opponents and the curtailment of civil liberties.

Levitsky and Ziblatt note that this pattern of behavior is concerning because it desensitizes people to undemocratic behavior. Because Trump’s attacks on democratic norms are so consistent, particularly those published through Twitter, they are difficult to counter and therefore come to seem normal: “behavior that was once considered unthinkable in American politics is becoming thinkable” (203). Whether or not this leads to authoritarianism under Donald Trump, it makes democratic breakdown more likely.

In the final chapter Levitsky and Ziblatt note that in the process of writing the book, they’ve realized that American democracy is not invulnerable, which could have global consequences. In recent decades, US foreign policy has been pro-democracy, but under Trump, the United States has stopped promoting democracy and no longer serves as a model for other nations, which could encourage authoritarianism worldwide.

When it comes to American democracy itself, the authors envisage three possible outcomes in the wake of Trump. The first is that Trump is either not re-elected or is forced to resign, prompting political change. In that scenario, the “Trump interlude would be taught in schools, recounted in films, and recited in historical works as an era of tragic mistakes where catastrophe was avoided and American democracy saved” (206). The second is that Trump and the Republican Party maintain control and use their position to cement future electoral majorities through measures like widespread deportation, purged voter rolls, and stricter voter ID laws. The third scenario, which the authors see as the most likely, is a future that is increasingly polarized, with mutual toleration and institutional forbearance continuing to decline.

Despite predominantly Republican violation of these norms, Levitsky and Ziblatt suggest the Democrats would be misguided to adopt similar tactics, since “such strategy often plays directly into the hands of authoritarians” (215). Drawing on the example of Venezuela, where opposition attacks on autocratic leaders weakened the opposition and justified autocratic methods, the authors argue a similar outcome could be possible if Democrats obstruct the Trump administration or remove him from office without bipartisan consensus.

Instead, the authors suggest that anti-Trump forces should build a broad coalition in support of democracy. By forging an alliance between individuals and groups who otherwise disagree on many issues, a prodemocratic coalition could reduce America’s partisan divides and encourage mutual toleration.

Meanwhile, political leaders who seek to counter polarization can do so in two ways: through elite cooperation and compromise, as took place between political rivals in Chile in the 1970s, eventually toppling dictator Augusto Pinochet from power, or through overcoming polarization, first through reform of the Republican Party, which has been pushed into more extreme positions by right-wing media and powerful outside interest groups.

Democrats also have a role to play, in appealing to more white, working-class voters, but this should not come at the expense of the inclusion and interests of ethnic minorities. Instead, Democrats should address the growing inequality that is fueling resentment and polarization by expanding social programs and making support, such as health care or family leave, more universal.

The authors close by noting that safeguarding democracy is the responsibility of the public as well as politicians. The norms that sustain democracy must be shared broadly throughout a multiethnic society—and in doing so, American democracy could correctly be called unique.