91 pages • 3 hours read
ThucydidesHistory of the Peloponnesian War
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Book 7 Chapter Summaries & Analyses
Book 7 Summary
Summary: “Gylippus Arrives in Syracuse, 414 BC” (Chapters 1-9)
The Syracusans are on the verge of surrender until a Corinthian commander tells them that Peloponnesian reinforcements are on their way. Spartan general Gylippus asks the Athenians to restore the peace by retreating, but they reject his offer. The combined Syracusan and Spartan forces push back the Athenians. Nicias decides to send a letter to Athens describing the dire situation its troops face. He writes a letter to ensure his message will not be “distorted in the course of transmission” (483).
Summary: “Letter of Nicias, 414-3 BC” (Chapters 10-18)
Thucydides reproduces Nicias’ letter, in which he explains that Sicily has united against Athens. They have trapped the Athenians in their fortifications. The soldiers are tired, and foreign conscripts are deserting. Nicias asks Athens either to recall the expedition or to send reinforcements. The Athenian assembly votes to send reinforcements. They also position twenty ships to prevent the Peloponnesians from crossing to Sicily. The Spartans prepare to invade Attica.
Summary: “Fortification of Decelea, 413 BC” (Chapters 19-30)
In Attica, Spartan King Agis fortifies Decelea, meaning Athens’ enemy has established a base camp within its borders. Gylippus brings a large force to Syracuse, while Athens sends ships around the Peloponnese. The Syracusans hold Plemmyrium, a critical strategic fort. Financial difficulties in Athens force the levying of an import-export tax.
Summary: “Athenian Defeat in the Great Harbour, 413 BC” (Chapters 31-41)
Syracuse and Athens prepare for battle. Thucydides discusses the various types of military troops each side amasses and from where they come. He also describes a new style of Syracusan trireme that promises strategic advantage. The Athenians and their allies meet the Syracusans in a naval harbor battle. Initially, no clear victor emerges, but the Syracusans surprise the Athenians with a second attack and defeat them.
Summary: “Athenian Defeat at Epipolae, 413 BC” (Chapters 42-59)
Thucydides recounts Nicias’ mistakes, namely inactivity and procrastination, especially at the beginning of the expedition. Demosthenes wants to avoid making the same errors and acts quickly at Epipolae. After initial success, the Athenians lose cohesion. Thucydides describes the battle in which the Athenians are routed. Demosthenes advocates for a quick departure from Sicily, but Nicias does not want to leave with nothing to show for their efforts. According to Thucydides, Nicias preferred death by the enemy to being killed by an Athenian verdict. Further delays ensue as Demosthenes and Nicias disagree, and Nicias insists on waiting for soothsayers. In an ensuing battle, Athenian general Eurymedon is killed and many Athenian ships destroyed. A favorable wind allows the Syracusans to send fires towards surviving Athenian ships. The disheartened troops wish the expedition had never launched. Syracuse is intent on destroying Athens, Thucydides says, because “if they could beat the Athenians and their allies on land and sea, it would be an achievement that would make them famous throughout Hellas” (513).
Summary: “Syracusan Victory at Sea, 413 BC” (Chapters 60-71)
The Syracusans want to prevent the Athenians from escaping. The Athenians resolve to fight a naval battle and, if defeated, to “march away by land” (517). Nicias and Gylippus each address their troops. Harbor conditions favor the Syracusans. Both sides are under great stress due to the highstakes involved. Syracuse defeats the Athenians, who panic as they realize they have little hope of escaping.
Summary: “Destruction of the Athenian Expedition, 413 BC” (Chapters 72-87)
The Athenians attempt to retreat by land but continue to delay. The Syracusans set up blocks, hemming in the Athenians, whose troops are disabled by injuries, hunger, and thirst. Nicias invokes the gods to try to instill hope, but the Athenians are attacked as they attempt to escape by land. They hear thunder and assume it is an omen. Nicias’ and Demosthenes’ forces are separated, and Demosthenes’ troops, who are providing the rear-guard, surrender. Nicias’ troops are captured. Nicias and Demosthenes are put to death. The entire surviving Athenian military—“army, navy, everything”—is either killed or enslaved in what Thucydides calls “the most calamitous of defeats” (537).
Book 7 Analysis
Book 7 focuses entirely on the eighteenth year of the war. This period ushers in what has been called the war’s third stage, named the Decelean or Ionian War after the Athenian territory in which enemy Sparta establishes a base camp. In Sicily, Athens’ losses mount, and internal strife among leadership, as well as ensuing procrastination and indecision, hobble their military’s functionality. The entire expedition is lost, partly due to Athens’ mistakes and partly due to Syracuse’s desire to destroy the once-great power.
As Athens suffers further defeats, its leadership devolves into deeper, and more dangerous, disagreements and mistakes, including those resulting from leaders’ self-interest. Nicias, who had attempted to put the Athenians off the expedition, now prevaricates about abandoning the mission and returning home. Thucydides extemporizes that this is owing to Nicias preferring to be killed in battle overreturning home to Athenian censure and potential execution for his failures. In other words, he sacrifices the security of the soldiers and city for his own desires. Demosthenes overcompensates for Nicias’ indecision by acting too quickly, and Athens’ naval strategy proves outmoded in the harbor battle.
Syracuse’s eagerness to defeat Athens completely in order to prove its own strength and renown mirrors Athens’ decision to destroy Melos to demonstrate its power and authority to other subject states, providing another example of a recurring human event. Thucydides reveals a pro-Athenian bias in the emotional tone of his description of the retreating army, focusing on the despair and heartbreak of soldiers who are either left behind or forced to leave behind their comrades. He contrasts the optimism and grandeur of the launch with the devastation of the expedition’s defeat, highlighting the ephemeral nature of human endeavors. Thucydides’ treatment of the Athenian defeat differs markedly from his detached and abstract tone when discussing the Melian massacre.
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