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PlatoGorgias
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481b-527eChapter Summaries & Analyses
481b-527e Summary
Callicles now breaks in. In response to an extended speech in which Socrates defends the importance of philosophy and his method, Callicles claims that Socrates used a cheap trick to make Polus concede that doing wrong is more shameful than suffering wrong. Callicles argues that the weak invented such conventions (nomoi) to defend themselves against the strong, but that nature (physis) dictates that it is right for the stronger to rule the weaker. Socrates, after praising Callicles for his frankness, presses him to clarify his position, leading Callicles to make the case that by “stronger” he means those who have superior intelligence and courage, and that individuals who possess these virtues should rule over others.
Socrates tries a different approach, suggesting that somebody who exercises “moderation” (sophrosyne) would be happier than somebody who is inclined to excess. Callicles, on the other hand, maintains that “pleasure” (hedone) produces happiness, even when Socrates exposes the implications of this position—namely that, in Callicles’s view, it would be good to satisfy even one’s most despicable desires (including irregular sexual practices) provided they produce pleasure. This notion elicits horrified disgust from Callicles.
Socrates then argues that it is mistaken to identify pleasure and good. First, good and happiness cannot coexist with evil and misery, while pleasure and pain can. Second, because fools and cowards (bad men) have the same capacity for pleasure and pain as those who are intelligent and brave (good men), this means that if pleasure and happiness are identical, the bad man would need to be just as good as the good man. Instead of pursuing every whim, a person should seek to live a life that is “ordered” (kosmios). Callicles finally admits that some pleasures are better than others and agrees with Socrates that if this is the case, one needs an expert to judge which actions one should pursue to produce the best pleasures.
In the next part of the discussion with Callicles, Socrates tackles the question of how a person should live their life, contrasting the life of the philosopher with that of the politician. For Socrates, the political orator (like a poet or musician) panders to the desires of the masses, while the ideal politician should seek what is best for the souls of the citizens.
Callicles, refusing to admit the importance of restraint (an admission that would undermine his earlier equation of pleasure with good), stops taking an active part in the conversation. Socrates must therefore continue developing his ideas on his own through a series of long speeches. Socrates defines “excellence” or “virtue” (arete) as having moderation and its concomitant virtues of justice, reverence, and bravery. He then suggests that this moral order is universal and unites all things, meaning that human law and natural law are in fact identical.
To avoid suffering or doing wrong, then, requires a kind of power or art (a point with which Callicles voices agreement), and to be a true politician one must show that they have acquired knowledge of the art of making others better. Recent politicians have not achieved this, pandering as they do to the unpalatable desires of the masses. Socrates concludes that, in a sense, he is the only Athenian “who studies the true political art” (521d) because he alone pushes his countrymen to better themselves, even though it makes him unpopular. Socrates concedes that his unpopularity means he could easily be condemned if brought to court, but this does not concern him, for doing right is the best form of self-defense, so that a just person need not fear even death if they are being put to death unjustly.
The dialogue ends with Socrates’s account (logos) of the rewards and punishments meted out in the afterlife. Originally, people were judged before they died by the god Cronus, with the good enjoying eternal bliss in the Isles of the Blessed while the wicked were sent to suffer in Tartarus. This system was imperfect, for the judges could be misled by a person’s appearance, fine clothing, or speaking ability. Therefore, Zeus changed things so that people were judged after they died, stripped naked so that the good and evil that they did would be clear to see—Socrates maintains that the wicked deeds one performs in life are manifested on their physical body after death. Socrates concludes by exhorting his listeners to pursue a life of righteousness and virtue.
481b-527e Analysis
The final conversation of Plato’s Gorgias, featuring the conversation between Socrates and Callicles, is the longest of the three sections of the dialogue, and in many ways the most important. This section establishes Socrates’s views on the nature of justice and The Nature and Social Function of Oratory for politicians and orators. Socrates’s arguments here literally silence his interlocutors—by the end of the dialogue, Callicles all but withdraws from the conversation.
The characterization of the interlocutors remains a key aspect of the final part of the dialogue. Callicles, initially a polite and seemingly careful speaker, quickly becomes adversarial, rude, and clumsy. His refusal to make any concessions to Socrates even when he is refuted precludes him from responding to Socrates’s questions sincerely. Since “sincerity, goodwill, and readiness to be perfectly frank” (487a) are the three things required for the elenchus to be successful, Callicles proves a wholly inadequate interlocutor. By the end of the dialogue, he is so humiliated and upset that he stops taking an active part in the conversation, forcing Socrates to continue developing his ideas on his own through a set of longer speeches.
The idea of “excellence” or “virtue” (arete) also becomes particularly important in the final section of the dialogue, with Socrates seeking to define the best way for a person to live their life, addressing The Meaning of Right and Wrong. Socrates’s position that “self-control” or “moderation” (sophrosyne) produces “happiness” (eudaimonia) is opposed to Callicles’s idea that “pleasure” (hedone) produces happiness. Socrates’s defense of his view is based on his argument of the “unity of the virtues”—that is, that to possess arete one must possess the concomitant virtues of moderation, justice, reverence, and courage. Moreover, Socrates concludes through a series of arguments that these virtues are based not only on human law or convention (nomos) but on nature (physis) as well, claiming to refute the position represented by Callicles—namely, that convention and nature are opposed.
Socrates, moreover, defines the ideal politician in this section as an expert with knowledge, not just belief, on The Meaning of Right and Wrong, who in turn uses this knowledge to advise the citizens on what is in their best interest—that is, what is in the best interest of their souls. These ideas represent Socrates’s own views on The Nature and Social Function of Oratory. Here Socrates employs the same “craft analogy” he has used throughout the dialogue, comparing the politician to craftsmen, such as physicians or other experts who advise others in their area of expertise. These ideas also reflect Socrates’s antidemocratic sentiments and are not questioned by his interlocutors, as all the men present seem to regard the morality of an unguided citizen mob with skepticism. The conclusion Socrates reaches is that, in a sense, he is the only “true politician” in Athens because he alone advises the citizens on what is best for their souls even though doing so makes him unpopular.
Socrates’s apparent victory also highlights some of the limitations of the elenchus, leaving it debatable whether this method has really revealed the truth—as Socrates claims it does—or whether Socrates has simply established his own views by exploiting the oversights and inadequacies of his interlocutors’ arguments. Indeed, Socrates on a few occasions employs shaky arguments that his interlocutors fail to challenge: For example, Callicles could have better defended his identification of pleasure and happiness had he not agreed to Socrates’s debatable assertion that pain and pleasure coexist when one satisfies desires such as hunger. Even if Socrates exposes the weaknesses of his interlocutors’ positions, this does not mean that the resultant conclusions are true, only that they are less apparently inconsistent than the positions that have been refuted.
This conclusion—and Socrates’s awareness that his unpopularity puts him in danger of being denounced and destroyed by his enemies—foreshadows the reality of Socrates’s trial and execution for impiety in 399 BCE. It is perhaps within this context that we are to understand the concluding account (logos) of the afterlife, which Socrates characterizes as true even though it is cobbled together from various mythical traditions and sources. In Socrates’s account, everybody is judged by the gods after they die, with the good being rewarded and the wicked being punished. With this in mind, a just man like Socrates need not fear even death, for being just and doing good is ultimately “the best of all kinds of self-defence” (522d).
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