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John W. DowerA modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
The third part of Embracing Defeat discusses a bloodless revolution—from imperial Japan to a democracy. In Chapter 6, the author discusses the neocolonial trajectory of American-led political changes that occurred in Japan during the formal occupation. Americans acted like the colonists of the old by demonstrating cultural supremacy with an undercurrent of quasi-religious Manifest Destiny, Orientalism, and the lack of interest in understanding the Japanese; “[d]aily reminders of American superiority were unavoidable” (207).
Democratizing Japan was fraught with contradictions. Americans engaged in authoritarian rule while reforming Japan into a democracy. They promoted equality but “themselves constituted an inviolate privileged class” (211). Dower underscores key aspects of American occupation: “The fact that authoritarian, top-down exhortations to dramatically alter the status quo were not new does help explain—but only in part—why the American reformers succeeded as well as they did” (203). General MacArthur played a key role. Dower qualifies him as a predictable ruler who used paternalistic language to describe Japan. He was an “indisputable overlord” with “petty viceroys” (205). However, MacArthur was not the only one with a significant degree of power. For instance, his aide, Courtney Whitney, was the chief of the GHQ Government Section and “exercised decisive influence in supervising the purges, policies regarding the emperor and the imperial institution, revision of the constitution, and all matters pertaining to the cabinet, Diet, electoral system, courts, and civil service” (209).
Furthermore, the conquerors displayed pompous cultural supremacy both in their overall program and their daily interactions with the locals:
Their reformist agenda rested on the assumption that, virtually without exception, Western culture and its values were superior to those of ‘the Orient.’ At the same time, almost every interaction between victor and vanquished was infused with intimations of white supremacism (211).
This neo-colonialism had a particularly American expression, which Dower describes as a “righteous mission” (216). For example, the US War Department produced an instructional film, Our Job in Japan, in November 1945 and sent it to SCAP. In 1946, the film had to be updated because the original reduced the Japanese to American wartime propaganda stereotypes. Despite the changes, the film still portrayed the Japanese as a people who unthinkingly followed their leader. Even undersecretary of state Joseph Dew, who was considered an expert on Japan, relayed to President Truman that democracy would never work in Japan. If the top expert on Japan subscribed to such views, then the majority of Americans in positions of power had little interest in understanding that country. For instance, Colonel Charles Kades had “no knowledge whatsoever about Japan’s history or culture or myths” (223). His case was typical: MacArthur’s “super-government in Tokyo reflected an aversion to area specialists as such” (223). Even MacArthur’s own experience with Japan was limited to warfare, nor did he ask his underlings about the country he ruled.
Such racist stereotypes belittled “the capacity of ordinary Japanese to govern themselves” (217). Dower laments that these racist narratives were “virtually gospel” among the American leadership (217). As a result, the stereotypes affected the American pursuit of democratizing Japan; despite their lack of knowledge, Americans debated the best way to pursue the democracy program through a “complex struggle over the evaluation of Japan’s prospects for democracy” (221). The conquerors also consulted social sciences. During the war, many psychologists and sociologists analyzed the Japanese. By 1945, their so-called analysis showed that the Japanese national character was like a pendulum going between extremes.
Cultural reformation from above was not unusual for Japan. After all, Japanese elites tasked their people with the need to “industrialize, modernize, westernize” in the mid-19th century (203). The author emphasizes the paradox of occupation-era Japan: an induction of democracy through autocratic methods. One method of this induction was “top-down social engineering” (226). For instance, the Americans made the NHK public broadcaster a monopoly and prevented competitors from operating.
Overall, Americans’ occupation of Japan was paradoxical in itself. Beyond politics, the conquerors introduced some positives, including penicillin, blood banks, and authentic public libraries. On the other hand, some soldiers engaged in reprehensible behavior such as sexual assault. Such crimes were underreported because their victims had “little faith in the possibility of fair redress” (210). In other words, American occupation was not unlike its colonialism of the old.
In Embracing Revolution, Dower discusses the public reception of Japan’s democratization initiative under American occupation. This discussion includes the perception of MacArthur as a de-facto leader of this program, the bottom-up response to these top-down political changes, political and media diversification, as well as the key changes in the Japanese language.
First, Dower describes Japanese society’s perceptions of General MacArthur. Even though Japan was defeated by America, many Japanese expressed their admiration for the leader of the occupation force. This attitude was particularly obvious when some Japanese supported MacArthur in his ultimately unsuccessful bid to become the 1948 Republican candidate for President. Dower explains:
This was dramatically reflected in the response to General MacArthur personally and to GHQ more generally. Japanese at all levels of society embraced the new supreme commander with an ardor hitherto reserved for the emperor, and commonly treated GHQ with the deference they had until recently accorded their own military leaders (227).
MacArthur also received many gifts, many of which he kept. All of this behavior fed his vanity.
Despite the excessive power that MacArthur wielded, Japan’s “structures of authoritarian control were undermined in fundamental ways” (244). Dower explains the seismic changes that the Japanese political scene experienced. Japanese workers obtained unprecedented basic rights. The legislature received bicameral reinforcement through the reform of the electoral system, and popular sovereignty arose from amending the constitution. Even the education system introduced more liberal curricula, which included coeducation egalitarianism. These measures were overseen by the SCAP—a “revolution from above” (211).
Japan’s political scene became more democratic and ideologically diverse. For instance, left-wing thought, including Marxism, attracted some Japanese. Grassroots movements included the unionizing of teachers in large numbers. One of the most significant unions, the Nikyōso, was linked to the Communist Party. Teachers disseminated new coursework in schools. Their initiatives were matched by the Japanese Ministry of Education, which released textbooks in 1946 emphasizing the extension of democratic ideals into daily life.
Public engagement also comprised letters to the editor. These diverse grassroots examples “reflected an impressive nationwide engagement with the meaning of ‘democratization’” (239). Radio was another medium of significance—as important as the printed counterparts. In 1946, radios were turned on for five hours a day. Even the growing concern for public opinion displayed the reach of ongoing democratization. There were also important shakeups in major Japanese newspapers, including Mainichi and Asahi.
The publishing industry continued to display a greater degree of cosmopolitanism described in the previous chapter. For example, the early issues of a publication called Sekai (World) featured the translations of several classic authors, including Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, Plato, Hegel, and Marx. The intellectual community also underwent a dramatic transformation; few intellectuals expressed anti-war views in the late imperial era but rebranded themselves as the “community of remorse” afterward (233).
Dower also evaluates the changes in communication, which he calls a “revolution in everyday language” (251). The latter had a precedent in the 19th century when Japan opened up to foreigners and “[d]emocratizing everyday language” ranged in expression (250). For instance, the Japanese language assimilated a number of English neologisms, such as “money-moon” to describe the honeymoon of those married for materialistic reasons (252). Furthermore, during the war, the word hōkoku—meaning to “repay the country”—appeared in many variations, such as “public expression in the service of the nation,” genron hōkoku (252). In the postwar era, these expressions “have been obliterated by the atomic bombs” (253).
However, the nationwide democratization campaign, both top-down and bottom-up, was not always positive. The author provides several examples of the Japanese denouncing their fellow citizens; for instance, those with ultranationalist views. They also complained about those whom they perceived as anti-American or anti-democratic.
Chapter 8 focuses on the left-wing movements and popular protest in Japan under American occupation as well as their impact in the long term. The period between 1946 and mid-1948 saw a feverish socialist- and Communist-linked protest movement demanding basic necessities such as a living wage and access to food. This popular protest eventually met a conservative reaction and a crackdown by American authorities.
Dower details many left-wing initiatives that occurred at this time and points out that they “seemed threatening to the carefully controlled revolution from above” (254). The most significant popular protest was the 1946 Food May Day demonstrations across Japan with participants several million strong. May Day, an iconic labor holiday, was suppressed in Japan in the previous decade. Dower calls these grassroots events—in particular, the Food May Day in Tokyo itself—an “ideological crazy quilt” (263). In Tokyo, the crowd in front of the imperial palace was an estimated 250,000. Similar events include Tokyo’s Hibiya Park event, which gathered an estimated 70,000 attendees including various “labor-farmer” and “cultural” groups. At another event, police shot at the rowdy crowd—luckily with no serious injuries. At some of the May Day events, the crowd carried red flags, especially after the ban of the imperial Japanese counterpart. The author associates them with labor instead of outright revolt.
At this time, Japan was in a dire economic situation ranging from joblessness and homelessness to food shortages and hyperinflation. As a result, some of the May Day events’ participants demanded simply to be fed, hence the name Food May Day. Others demanded a living wage. The average railroad employee’s salary covered only a quarter of the necessary family expenses.
On May 22, 1946, Shigeru Yoshida, Japan’s Prime Minister, formed a new cabinet. For the first time, women exercised their right to vote choosing from 363 parties. Despite the perception of a revolutionary uprising in the year following Japan’s surrender, a coalition of socialists and more radical Communists did not form. The 1947 elections created a coalition cabinet led by the Socialists, albeit a short-lived one. When the planned 1947 general strike was crushed, it became clear that labor movements would not be equal participants in Japan’s new democracy. One of the greatest critics of American occupation was Yashirō Ii, the main left-wing coordinator of the planned general strike. He articulated that the American conqueror was not a liberator but rather a hypocrite. Later, Ii qualified American occupation as “deceiving the Japanese people with democracy only at the tip of their tongues” (270).
Within the context of the conservative crackdown, more radical forces, such as the Communists and labor organizers, became more disconnected from the American conquerors. By the summer of 1948, General MacArthur used his autocratic power to change the labor policy. He took away the right to strike from public employees. At the same time, MacArthur fostered the anti-Communist movement in order to decapitate labor—the “unmaking [of] the revolution from below” (267). Ultimately, the Left lost power in this way but still participated in “defining the contours of democratization” (272). For instance, some left-wingers, educated by Marxists in top universities, impacted public policy and embraced the necessity and desirability of active state intervention in the economy” (272).
Japan underwent truly significant changes under American occupation in the early postwar period as it transformed from an empire to a democracy, yet these formal political events are not the focal point of these chapters. Instead, these events remain in the background as Dower once again highlights the ordinary people in Japan: their grievances, their demands, their lived experience. By doing so, the author not only stays true to the declared purpose of his book but also gives agency to these ordinary people—the type of agency they did not have during the war. This type of agency is also often missing in classic history texts that focus on political and military leaders rather than those whom their decisions most impact.
First, Dower highlights the many contradictions of American occupation. These contradictions did not go unnoticed by the Japanese themselves. The conquerors—a foreign occupying power ruling Japan quasi-autocratically—attempted to democratize Japan by using the language of freedom and equality. Central to this period is the paradox of imposing democracy autocratically while crushing true grassroots movements, like the Japanese progressive Left. The American leadership—from MacArthur to most of his experts—had neither the understanding nor the interest in Japanese history and culture. As a result, they treated the Japanese as their racial and cultural inferiors. Dower calls the American occupation and democratization of Japan a “neocolonial revolution.” Therefore, the period of 1945-1952 involved both types of colonialisms: an indirect, cultural hegemony enforced by direct military control.
The author also underscores the American quasi-religious zeal to reform Japan. Americans, generally viewing the Japanese as being unable to govern themselves, used Japan’s imperial tradition and social cohesion as “proof” of the people’s collectivist mindset. The vestiges of anti-Japanese wartime propaganda and “the white man’s burden” (i.e., colonialist aspirations) translated into racial stereotypes reducing millions of people to a single “national character.” By carefully molding this new Japanese democracy, the Americans conditioned the Japanese to accept American authority backed by military power and stringent censorship. Dower points out that this acceptance of authority was later interpreted by the Americans as an innate Japanese trait. The question of social conditioning is a running theme in this book.
The supremacist zeal with which Americans sought to reform Japan from its imperial past is particularly remarkable in light of America’s own foreign policy toward Japan 40 years earlier. At that time, President Theodore Roosevelt brokered the Treaty of Portsmouth (1905) to conclude the Russo-Japanese War. Roosevelt viewed Japan as the most civilized of east Asian countries and the one that most resembled the West. He advocated for Japan’s leadership in its region and for it to exercise an equivalent of the American Monroe Doctrine. Effectively, the American government encouraged Japan to pursue the path of imperialism only to halt it later through a military victory and its postwar demilitarization and democratization agenda (Bickerton, Ian. The Illusion Of Victory: The True Costs of Modern War. Melbourne, Melbourne University Publishing, 2011, p. 109; Bradley, James. The China Mirage: The Hidden History of American Disaster in Asia. Little, Brown and Company, 2015). One could, therefore, argue that the period of 1905-1931 displays a failure of American foreign policy.
The Japanese diversity of democratic reforms that took place within the Japanese society parallel to political legislation challenges the American supremacist perception of the Japanese as inferior. The author finds evidence for the grassroots-level reforms by analyzing a plethora of publications, radio broadcasts, and even changes in language; his analysis of the lives of ordinary people is, therefore, communication-driven. For instance, the introduction of several neologisms in Japanese, rooted in the English language, indicates the extent of American cultural hegemony. The author notes the general trend of cosmopolitanism in terms of the publication of foreign classics from Europe and Russia as well the thirst for information evident from the exponential growth of publishing houses in Japan at this time. The author compares the liberalized legislation for schools with the spontaneous, self-driven development of teachers’ unions.
Dower’s overall tactic, therefore, is to both address the top-down changes instituted by the MacArthur-led American occupation government and the bottom-up changes that occurred within the Japanese society at a grassroots level. It was some of these authentic movements that were effectively halted by the American leadership to carefully construct Japanese democracy in line with the American vision. At the same time, the mass-scale protests that occurred across Japan in 1946 under the banner of Food May Day demanded basic necessities. They demonstrated the true extent of Japan’s hardship in the wake of the war and people’s desperation to self-organize. The way in which the SCAP directly interfered and ultimately crushed these left-wing movements is one of the many paradoxes of democratizing Japan along the trajectory that benefitted the American occupants. After all, the left-wing organizers of the would-be 1947 general strike were suspicious of Americans and threatened their policies. This attack on the Left also demonstrates just how early American Cold War policies were implemented—even prior to the Korean War.
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