44 pages • 1 hour read
Hannah ArendtEichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil
Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 1963A modern alternative to SparkNotes and CliffsNotes, SuperSummary offers high-quality Study Guides with detailed chapter summaries and analysis of major themes, characters, and more.
Themes
Language Used to Obfuscate
Arendt’s first chapter opens with two different languages being spoken—Hebrew and English: “‘Beth Hamishpath’—the House of Justice” (3). Arendt immediately introduces readers to one of the central challenges facing the court: comprehension of what is being said:
[T]he translators […] are needed for direct exchanges between the defendant or his counsel and the court; otherwise, the German-speaking accused party, like almost everyone else in the audience, follows the Hebrew proceedings through the simultaneous radio transmission, which is excellent in French, bearable in English, and sheer comedy, [and] frequently incomprehensible, in German (3).
There are several languages and translations happening simultaneously and this provides a breeding ground for miscommunication and misunderstanding.
One of the main documents presented to the court as evidence by the prosecution is the German text of a taped police examination with Eichmann from May 29, 1960 to January 17, 1961. The text is corrected and approved by Eichmann, every page, but his mastery of the German language is lacking: “Some of the comedy cannot be conveyed in English, because it lies in Eichmann’s heroic fight with the German language, which invariably defeats him” (48). That Eichmann cannot speak or write or edit language successfully supports Arendt’s portrayal of Eichmann’s blind obedience. One who cannot speak for himself may also not be able to think for himself.
When the Final Solution is presented to a select few of the Nazi Party, a system of phrases and code words is introduced so that those in the know may discuss it freely and identify one another in mixed company. The power this language provides is not only protection from bystanders who might try to intervene but also protection from ever fully accepting responsibility for the actions of the Final Solution. This language rule creates a belief system founded upon the basis that if the word “murder” is omitted, then so is the crime. Using the code words and phrases provided means members of the Nazi Party are simply following orders, without malicious intent or even real responsibility.
Interjection as a Means of Empowerment
Throughout the duration of the book, Arendt interjects the text with her own thoughts or opinions through parenthetical phrases or direct breaks in the court transcripts. In doing so, Arendt creates conspiracy, illuminates ironies, and either clarifies or suffocates Eichmann’s testimony. Responding to the cacophony of languages present in the courtroom and the inadequate German translations, Arendt inserts the following:
(In view of the scrupulous fairness of all technical arrangements for the trial, it is among the minor mysteries of the new State of Israel that, with its high percentage of German-born people, it was unable to find an adequate translator into the only language the accused and his counsel could understand…) (3).
Arendt’s interjection suggests that perhaps better translators could have been provided had the Jewish court demanded them to be. It is a slight against the accused that no such quality of translation was provided.
While describing the layout and design of the courtroom, Arendt states:
Whoever planned this auditorium in the newly built Beth Ha’am, the House of the People (now surrounded by high fences, guarded from roof to cellar by heavily armed police, and with a row of wooden barracks in the front courtyard in which all comers are expertly frisked), had a theater in mind… (4).
Not only does Arendt align the proceedings of the court with that of a play, thus suggesting the trial is all a farce since Eichmann is sure to be hanged and very little, if any, new evidence will come to light, she also points to the irony of the people’s house. It is heavily armed and difficult to enter, not welcoming in the least and certainly not run by the people. These ironies establish the backdrop of the ultimate irony of trying one man for the atrocities of the Holocaust.
Very often, Arendt will interject when relaying Eichmann’s testimony:
And [Eichmann] replied: ‘I am here under oath and must speak the truth. Not out of mercy did I launch this transaction’—which would have been fine, except that it was not Eichmann who ‘launched’ it. But he then continued, quite truthfully: ‘My reasons I explained this morning,’ and they were as follows: Himmler had sent his own man to Budapest to deal with matters of Jewish emigration. (Which, incidentally, had become a flourishing business: for enormous amounts of money, Jews could buy their way out. Eichmann, however, did not mention this) (25).
In doing so, Arendt does not allow Eichmann to get away with any untruth, with any discrepancy or overstatement.
Memory as Both Unreliable and Unforgettable
Arendt notes that Eichmann’s memory is faulty on several occasions, one including him forgetting his one and only attempt to save the Jews by deporting them to a camp that was not yet equipped to exterminate people: “Eichmann’s memory functioned only in respect to things that had had a direct bearing upon his career” (62). Attempting to save the Jews had no bearing on his upward mobility. It had been Eichmann’s first mass deportation assignment and his superiors defended him and quickly forgot about the incident, as, apparently, did Eichmann.
Not only did Eichmann forget an incident wherein it might have proven he retained some humanity, he also forgets a detail regarding the architects of the Final Solution that, had he remembered, could have been a turning point for the defense. Eichmann remembers in Jerusalem his reaction to Heydrich’s conveyance of Hitler’s order for extermination but forgets an important addition to his meeting with Heydrich (which he’d remembered while in Argentina) was that Heydrich “had told Eichmann that the whole enterprise had been ‘put under the authority of the S.S. Head Office for Economy and Administration’—that is, not of his own R.S.H.A.” (84). So, the Final Solution was to be directed by an office other than Eichmann’s, which could have led to arguments in the court about the logic of obedience or the breadth of responsibility.
What is unforgettable are the atrocities of the war and the Holocaust. Arendt continually brings readers back to this point when the court proceedings might get bogged down in determining the details of conscience or intent. The ramifications of this crime against humanity performed on the Jewish body is never far from mind.
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