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55 pages 1 hour read

Thomas Piketty

Capital in the Twenty-First Century

Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 2013

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Part 1, Chapters 1-2Chapter Summaries & Analyses

Part 1, Chapter 1 Summary: “Income and Output”

Piketty defines some key terms and concepts necessary to understand his analysis of wealth, capital, and income in subsequent chapters. The first of these is the concept of national income which is defined as “the sum of all income available to the residents of a given country in a given year, regardless of the legal classification of that income” (55). National income is thus related to GDP, or gross domestic product. This is the total value of goods and services produced by a nation in a year. National income differs from GDP in two respects. First, national income is equal to GDP minus the cost of the deterioration of capital. This is the wear and tear to existing capital, for example damage to machines or buildings needed for production. And this capital must be repaired or replaced before any income is allocated in wages or dividends. Second, national income includes net income received from abroad. This is in the form of profits from industries owned by citizens of one nation in another nation. Conversely, net foreign income includes the profits taken from one’s country by foreign owners, which must then be subtracted. In short, national income equals GDP minus the cost of capital deterioration plus net foreign income.

What is “capital,” though? Piketty defines it as “the sum total of nonhuman assets that can be owned and exchanged on some market” (58). In other words, capital is any nonhuman source of economic tradeable value such as real estate, machinery required for production, or technology patents that can become someone’s property. In this respect, capital is identical, for Piketty, to wealth. For this reason, he excludes “human capital” from his definition. This is because a human being’s labour cannot, at least in non-slave societies, be the permanent property of another person.

Finally, the capital/income ratio is the relationship between these two things. Capital is the stock of wealth that has accumulated in a nation. And it exists as a proportion of the yearly flow of income that derives from the interactions of labour with that wealth. For example, the capital/income ratio is currently between five and six in most developed nations. This means that total wealth is equal to five or six years of national income.

It is also important to distinguish between the capital/income ratio and income from capital. The latter are the “returns” on capital each year, or the total of national income each year that goes to the owners of capital rather than labour. It is distinct from, although related to, the total capital stock itself.

Part 1, Chapter 2 Summary: “Growth: Illusions and Realities”

Piketty goes on to examine the relationship between economic growth and wealth inequality. He begins by noting that growth in national income can be broken down into two elements. The first is economic growth owing to population growth and the second to per capita growth. In other words, if the population grows there will be more people producing things, and therefore a higher national income. They will only gain a better standard of living, however, if each person on average produces more. This is “real” growth.

Nevertheless, as he also observes, “strong demographic growth tends to play an equalizing role because it decreases the importance of inherited wealth” (106). If a society’s population grows quickly, the relative importance of past wealth diminishes. For example, if each family has eight children, inheritance both within each family, but also in broader society, will diminish in impact. This is even more the case with strong economic growth. If wages double over a lifetime, then the savings of one’s parents will be small relative to income that can be gained from present labour. Conversely, low growth has the opposite effect. When growth is low, specifically when it is lower than the rate of return on capital, past wealth will accumulate faster than average increases in wages. In such a society, the wealth of one’s parents starts to become more significant than one’s labour. Further, this past wealth will accumulate exponentially over generations, creating potentially vast, and arbitrary, inequalities.

The developed world is tending towards this scenario. Having been as high as 3% or 4% per year between 1950 and 1970, growth has on average fallen to between 1% and 1.5% since. Some economists predict that it could fall even lower, perhaps dipping below 1% in the decades to come. That is, “the twenty-first century may see a return to a low-growth regime” (92). As Piketty points out, this is not historically exceptional. Prior to the 19th century, world growth was almost 0%, and between 1820 and 1913 it was only 0.9%. Yet, given a consistent return on capital above 3%, this fact presents a serious problem for the future structure of wealth and inequality in the West.

Part 1, Chapters 1-2 Analysis

In a 1963 speech US president John F. Kennedy coined the phrase, “Growth is a rising tide that lifts all boats” (14). This captured a spirit of optimism regarding economic progress. It suggested that inequalities, whether of status, income, or wealth, are not important since economic growth will ultimately make everyone better off. There is a powerful logic to this. Does it matter if my neighbour owns a Mercedes, if I am now able to buy my Toyota? Who cares if she travels first class to Paris, staying in five-star hotels, if I can afford a vacation? Economic growth can improve the living standards of most people in tangible ways. This is true, moreover, even if inequalities persist, or if the fruits of growth are unevenly distributed.

Consider, for example, the difference between the 1980s and the present. As Piketty points out, “there was no Internet or cell phone network, most people did not travel by air, most of the advanced medical technologies in common use today did not yet exist, and only a minority attended college” (122). Economic growth then has multiple benefits. It is not merely that it allows us to have a greater quantity and quality of goods and services that already exist. For instance, it may allow us to have more and better clothes and a greater choice of food. It also creates new technologies that can improve our lives and make them easier. Taken from a longer-term perspective, growth since the 18th century has improved things in even more fundamental ways. As Piketty notes, “instead of living in societies where the life expectancy was barely forty years and nearly everyone was illiterate, we now live in societies where it is common to reach the age of eighty and everyone has at least minimal access to culture” (117). We have better medical care. We are better educated. And we have more leisure time to travel, read, and to enjoy ourselves.

Considering this, growth may seem like the ultimate panacea to social ills. Indeed, it can even improve social mobility. Since growth promotes new products, such as computers, and therefore new skills, like programming, it can create opportunities for those “whose parents did not belong to the elite of the previous generation” (107). That is, it can disrupt static and entrenched hierarchies, and offer high incomes to individuals willing to take risks or embrace change. However, growth also has core limitations. Most obviously, it only enhances welfare overall if some of that growth is utilised to improve public goods. Growth only improves our lives if it also allows more resources for education, health, public housing, and a clean and safe environment, in addition to private goods. And this is not something Western governments have been sufficiently doing since the 1980s.

Just as important, growth only limits the impact of inequality when growth is high. It is certainly true that, “a low annual growth rate over a very long period of time gives rise to considerable progress” (95). Even 1% of growth per year results in profound improvements over a century. Unfortunately, though, people do not live with such a long-term viewpoint. What we seem to observe, when growth is 1% or less, is personal stagnation. We live from year to year, and with such growth find it hard to identify any tangible effect on our lives. This makes the greater wealth and income of others even more conspicuous and problematic. This is especially the case if that inequality is significant and if the rich seem (in contrast to us) to be seeing a rapid rise in their living standards.

The benefits of growth then are as much psychological and relative as material. It is about the sense that things are improving, that we are part of Kennedy’s “rising tide,” as much as it is about objective economic fact. It is also why, as Piketty observes, the elimination of inequality as an issue is something which “economic growth is quite simply incapable of satisfying” (122). This is because high growth rates, of more than 2%, which start to affect the structure and perception of inequality, are historically exceptional. They existed in Europe, and to a lesser extent the United States, between the 1950s and 70s, because of the significant post-war rebuilding required. The same is true of contemporary emerging economies. China’s growth rates of over 5% are possible because there is still a great deal of economic and technological “catching up” to be done with the West. Once China has reached the “technological frontier,” having adequate quantities and qualities of the latest industrial machinery, their progress will slow as did that of France, Germany, and Japan in the 1970s. In other words, growth is not a sufficient solution to the problem of inequality. 

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