Being Wrong: Adventures in the Margin of Error

Nonfiction | Book | Adult | Published in 2010

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Summary

Chapter Summaries & Analyses

Part 1, Chapters 1-2

Part 2, Chapters 3-6

Part 2, Chapters 7-8

Part 3, Chapters 9-10

Part 3, Chapters 11-13

Part 4, Chapters 14-15

Key Figures

Themes

Index of Terms

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Part 2, Chapters 7-8Chapter Summaries & Analyses

Part 2: “The Origins of Error”

Part 2, Chapter 7 Summary: “Our Society”

The author informs the reader that women did not obtain the right to vote in Switzerland until 1971, and she questions how such a progressive country could have taken so long to modernize on the issue of women’s suffrage. The author argues that this delayed action relied on a sense of community; allowing women to vote would seemingly undermine centuries of tradition and destroy the community bonds the Swiss men held dear. The anecdote suggests that our membership in a community influences our beliefs about the world.

Each of us, the author argues, is deeply dependent on other people’s minds. We tend to trust information that comes from a trusted source, and thus, the overwhelming majority of the beliefs we hold are, in essence, belief that someone else is right. While we form beliefs based on our communities, says Schulz, we also form communities based on our beliefs. This tendency to associate with people who are like us is known as “homophily.” Being part of such communities affords the comfort of being among others who agree with and understand us. However, faith in these communities can also lead us into error.

Expanding on the idea of community-based error, Schulz references both 13th-century English philosopher friar Roger Bacon and 16th-century scientist philosopher Francis Bacon (no relation), who believed that most errors result from collective social forces. Members of belief-based communities must contend with what Schulz calls the “disagreement deficit.” This problem has four components. First, our communities tend to expose us only to information that already supports our ideas. Second, such communities shelter us from others’ disagreement. Third, they make us ignore the outside disagreement we do encounter. Fourth, these communities suppress potential disagreement from within the group. Thus, belonging to communities bolsters our conviction that we are correct and shields us from considering the possibility that we are wrong.

“Groupthink” is another danger of our inclusion in like-minded communities. This is phenomenon whereby a lack of exposure to external opposition can cause us to become more resolute in our beliefs. Groupthink typically affects homogenous communities and can involve censorship of dissent, the rejection of criticism, a feeling of moral superiority, and the demonization of those with opposing beliefs.

Schulz makes the argument that we must maintain a balance between enjoying the pleasures of autonomy and those of communal life. If more weight is given to the former, there is the threat “of an individual unrestrained by society” (158). On the other hand, if more weight is given to the latter, one risks “the far greater danger of a society unrestrained by individuals” (158).

Part 2, Chapter 8 Summary: “The Allure of Certainty”

In Chapter 8, the author states that the convincingness of our perceptions, the thought that our beliefs are grounded in facts, the biases we hold as we assess evidence, and the reinforcement of our convictions through our communities result in “the condition of certainty—even as they should caution us against it” (163). Certainty, Schulz says, is dangerous in that it prevents shifts in perspective and deadens both imagination and empathy; in a state of certainty, other people’s beliefs cease to matter to us.

Belief, she argues, is our default cognitive state, and disbelief or doubt is secondary. This is because certainty provides the comforting illusion of a stable and understandable environment. Certainty also makes us feel intelligent and powerful, whereas doubt leaves us feeling insecure. Certainty, the author says, is best viewed “as an aversion to uncertainty” (170).

The author explores the topic of doubt and refers to Hamlet. Indecisiveness, Schulz explains, is often regarded as Hamlet’s defining characteristic and has been credited with his internal conflict and the calamities that unfold in the play. Hamlet, she contends, does struggle with doubt: He has no proof that his uncle killed his father, but he’s been directed, by his father’s ghost, to murder his uncle. It is unclear, however, why Hamlet’s doubt has been viewed in such a negative light. A reasonable person, Schulz argues, would generally be contemplative in such circumstances. Nevertheless, people have condemned Hamlet’s serious deliberation because our allegiance lies with certainty.

This tendency, Schulz explains, is particularly true in the realm of leadership. Our doubt is relieved when we follow a confident leader, and we are usually less comfortable with leaders whose beliefs waver than with those who make mistakes. The author uses John Kerry, who ran against George W. Bush in the 2004 election, as an illustration. Kerry was criticized for “flip-flopping” on issues such as the Vietnam War, the death penalty, marriage equality, and much more. The author argues that although changing one’s views over time is legitimate, doing so is at odds with our political culture because we associate uncertainty, hesitation, and reversal with weakness.

The author finally raises the case of undecided voters—a group, she says, who tends to be despised with unanimity. That society vilifies a voter’s hesitation to choose an ideological side reflects our fear of uncertainty about important beliefs.

Certainty, Schulz concludes, ultimately shields us from owning up to our own fallibility and potential error—but examining our capacity for wrongness is the much better action.

Part 2, Chapters 7-8 Analysis

These chapters move from the individual level of error to examine error in a larger, relational context. The author raises the theme of community’s influence on our beliefs; our beliefs essentially stem from faith in others’ beliefs, as we tend to put more stock in information from trusted sources. As usual, Schulz takes an even-handed approach through a cost-benefit analysis; she acknowledges the rewards from community membership—such as the reassurance of being surrounded by those who understand us—but she warns that communal influence can also lead to error. The disagreement deficit and groupthink are among the dangers of communal influence. These phenomena result in a kind of echo chamber, where our communities suppress internal dissent and expose members only to information that already supports their beliefs, fostering undue conviction in members’ worldviews. The author warns that maintaining a balance between independent thought and communal influence is thus crucial to self-awareness.

Another important aspect of these chapters is their continued investigation into mechanisms, inherent to the human mind, that exacerbate a maladaptive approach to error. While many psychological phenomena involve the human antipathy for the experience of being wrong, there is also our irrational aversion to uncertainty. The aversion is deleterious, as an undue sense of certainty can stymie our awareness of error—yet certainty is an alluring illusion of safety, understanding, and power. Doubt provokes a sense of insecurity, an uncomfortable feeling we tend to avoid. Nevertheless, the author points out that uncertainty, however uncomfortable, is often not only appropriate but imperative. She uses three examples: Hamlet, John Kerry, and undecided voters. Each of these figures face(d) complex and profoundly important decisions—decisions that would materially and drastically impact those around them—so their deliberation is merited. Despite this, Western society has historically disparaged their deliberation.

With these examples, Schulz once again moves beyond the individual realm of error to address communal realities and concrete consequences of society’s counterproductive attitudes toward both error and uncertainty. Not only is uncertainty not to be vilified, but it is often to be prized: Doubt should be regarded as a tool that enables us to consider our own fallibility more seriously.