A Treatise of Human Nature

In this final part, Hume discusses “natural virtues,” meaning those virtues that come directly out of human nature. Hume sees sympathy as the best explanation for how these virtues operate in human psychology. Sympathy is so strong a force that just the passion coming out of these virtues or their causes in another person is enough to make us share in it. Hume argues that the natural virtues serve the public interest, like artificial virtues (629)—we have sympathy with the pleasure other people gain from the natural virtues and the public interest they serve. This process happens both with those close to us and with complete strangers. We are capable of “general judgments” (633) which we can apply to anyone. This does not just apply to the natural virtues. In our general judgments, we can overlook our own self-interest and sympathize with someone who opposed or hurt us, and have sympathy for someone else’s, even a stranger’s, vices.

Hume suggests that each natural virtue is either good for the interest of others, good for our own self-interest, immediately agreeable to others, or immediately agreeable to ourselves (640-41). Examples of virtues good for our interest include the natural virtues of prudence and thrift with money, which would also benefit others. We respond positively to natural virtues of agreeableness, like wit (640), because they give us pleasure, or we sympathize with the pleasure the virtues give to others and the person who has them.

Hume then returns to the subject of pride and humility, asking how they relate to the natural virtues of heroism and kindness. We distinguish different kinds of pride through comparison (643). The person whose pride is justified by their natural virtues gives us pleasure through sympathy, as in the case of natural virtues. However, the person whose pride does not reflect any natural virtues causes us discomfort. Still, social norms demand that even people with natural virtues like ambition and courage act with appropriate humility, although even too much humility in relation to one’s natural virtues can provoke negative feelings from other people. This is what Hume views as the reason behind social norms of “good-breeding and decency” (648), which guard against people’s tendencies to become either too arrogant or too modest.

As for the natural virtues of benevolence and goodness, Hume argues that they help direct other natural virtues like compassion, humanity, loyalty, and zeal toward the public interest (653-54). On the other hand, there are the opposite “angry passions” like inhumanity, which “form the most detested of all vices” when “they rise up to cruelty” (655). Even so, Hume notes that these vices are often excused as normal or can even draw disapproval when people do not express them in certain situations. This leads Hume to conclude that other people judge your virtues and vices based on how they affect your social relationships with them (656).

Finally, Hume discusses the difference between moral virtues and natural abilities (i.e., innate mental talents) (656). Hume sees the distinction between the two as very thin. Both are characteristics of the mind that produce pleasure in ourselves and improve our social relationships. Hume even argues that many virtues and vices are involuntary in the same way natural abilities are. Still, Hume admits that moral qualities, unlike natural abilities, are changed through punishments and rewards and by the influence of political and religious leaders and moral philosophers (659). As for natural abilities themselves, the most prized are the ones that benefit our own self-interest and our social relationships, like industriousness, patience, eloquence, and good humor. These are not always perceived the same, though, and sometimes what is a good quality for one person is seen as bad in someone else because of the person’s age or profession (660-61).